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1. This study investigated the range of policy frameworks currently in place 
in high income countries to promote investment in private rented housing 
supply.  The research began with a statistical overview of the private 
rented sector in the 27 high-income OECD member countries (as listed 
by the World Bank for 2008).  From this 12 countries were selected for 
further investigation: Australia, Belgium (Flanders), Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the USA.  Four countries were then examined in still 
more detail to probe the reasons for the varying levels of private rented 
sector investment, namely, the USA, Australia, France and Germany.  
The demand for and the supply of private rented housing in these 
countries was compared with England, although the policy related 
conclusions from this study apply more broadly to the UK. 
 
2. Despite growth in recent years, the private rented sector in England, 
which accounts for 13 per cent of the housing stock, is small by 
international standards.  The private rented sector accounts for 20 per 
cent or more of the stock in all the countries considered in detail and 
nearly half the stock in Germany (or more depending on the definition 
adopted). 
 
3. In all countries, private rented sector demand is diverse and comes from 
households on higher as well as lower incomes.  Households that seek 
mobility and younger households are substantial components of 
demand.  The private rented sector is large in countries where the 
demand for renting is strong from a range of income groups.  In some 
cases the demand is driven by the lack of options in other sectors.  This 
implies that some households are reluctant private renters who might 
prefer to own if this was affordable.  In Germany, in particular, the tenure 
is also attractive because of the availability of good quality 
accommodation with a high degree of tenure security. 
 
4. The tenure choices facing households and the relative costs of those 
choices, especially the relative costs of owning and renting are, in all 
countries, crucial determinants of the demand for private rented housing.  
This in turn has an important impact on the size of the private rented 
sector. 
 
5. In all the countries examined, including those with a small private rented 
sector, as well as those with a large private rented sector, most of the 
stock is owned by individual investors.  In all the countries that have a 
large private rented sector, even those with substantial institutional 
involvement, more than 60 per cent of the stock is owned by individual 
investors.  Where the private rented sector is large it is attractive as an 






6. For companies and financial institutions to be interested in the private 
rented sector, the main requirement from the international evidence is an 
acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return, and in this trade-off most 
investors are looking for a more secure rate of return than in other real 
estate asset classes.  Institutional investors are also typically interested 
in large-scale holdings and thus the structure of the housing stock is 
fundamental.  Scale is relevant from three perspectives: acquisition and 
disposal costs; management economies; and market information.  
Institutional investors tend to be more active in larger rental complexes 
and are typically more geographically concentrated in larger markets.  
Furthermore, whilst small-scale individual investors may accept negative 
net rental income, in return for capital gains in either the short or long 
run, institutional investors are more likely to want a positive income-
related return as well. 
 
7. The international evidence shows that a range of contrasting regulatory 
environments can be compatible with a large private rented sector.  
Some countries with a large private rented sector have a degree of 
restriction on rent levels, or at least rent increases, and strong security of 
tenure for tenants.  This is the case, for example, in France and 
Germany.  From the countries considered in less detail, Sweden and 
Switzerland provide further examples of restrictions on rent increases, 
strong security of tenure and a large private rented sector. 
 
8. In all countries with a large private rented sector the sector has been in 
the past, and still is, supported by taxation advantages that promote 
investment in the private rented sector by boosting the rate of return and 
sometimes providing a tax shelter.  This option for individual investors to 
use losses from rental income to reduce the tax on other income has 
been significant in each of the countries considered in detail. 
 
9. The large private rented sector countries considered in detail all offer 
taxation advantages, especially to individual investors, which are more 
favourable than those available in England.  Taxable net rental income is 
crucially affected by the deductions that are possible against gross rental 
income.  On this point, the major difference is that in England there is no 
deduction available for depreciation whereas such deductions do apply 
in the other countries.  In the large private rented sector countries 
generous depreciation allowances have been very important in 
encouraging investment in the sector and promoting new building for 
private renting. 
 
10. A major difference between the taxation of individual landlords in the 
large private rented sector countries and England is that in all the large 
private rented sector countries rental income losses can be used to 
reduce taxable income from other sources.  Thus, individuals with 
income from work or from another business can reduce the tax due on 
income from these other activities by making, for tax purposes, a loss 





11. Capital gains tax is greater in England than in the large private rented 
sector countries and there are no concessions for holding property for 
several years.  This contrasts with the other countries.  In the USA the 
rate of capital gains tax falls after one year of ownership and in Australia 
there is a 50 per cent reduction after one year.  Deductions begin after 
five years of ownership in France and liability is zero after 15 years.  In 
Germany no capital gains tax is due after 10 years of ownership. 
 
12. Private sector social supply schemes, which exist in all the large private 
rented sector countries, encourage private sector organisations to invest 
in, and in some cases specifically to build, dwellings for rent.  They 
provide support through measures such as grants, tax advantages and 
sometimes soft loans for the building or acquisition (and sometimes 
improvement) of real estate intended for rental with conditions attached 
that limit both rents and the incomes of the eligible households. 
 
13. Whether or not the accommodation that is provided under social supply 
schemes should be counted as part of the private rented sector or not is 
a matter of debate.  If private ownership of the dwellings is the key 
criterion then this accommodation is clearly part of the private rented 
sector.  If however the key criterion is whether or not the rent setting and 
allocation of the dwelling is through market processes then such 
accommodation might be counted as part of the social rented rather than 
private rented sector. 
 
14. Germany, France, the USA and Australia all have examples of private 
sector social supply schemes.  They boost the size of privately owned 
rental sector considerably in Germany, France and the USA.  In 
Germany the scheme is long standing, was much more significant in the 
past, and is an important explanation for the large private rented sector.  
In Australia it is new and small-scale.  There are additional examples to 
be found in Belgium, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland.  All these countries 
have schemes that trade incentives, in the form, variously, of long term 
rental contracts, rental guarantees, financial support and fiscal 
advantages, for constraints on rents and requirements to house people 
whose incomes fall within specified thresholds and ceilings.  England 
does not have a comparable scheme. 
 
15. In the USA, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have been 
successful in encouraging investment in rented housing.  A REIT is 
effectively a mutual fund for real estate with retail investors obtaining the 
benefit of a diversified portfolio under professional management.  Whilst 
the potential for residential REITs is limited in the UK, with the boundary 
between private and social suppliers becoming blurred, the large scale 
purchase of existing housing association stock by REITs or the 
conversion of existing large housing associations to REITs has been 
viewed as a possible source of rental sector growth. 
 
16. Based on evidence from other countries, policies to increase investment 





1. Determine the role for the sector.  Is there to be a larger ‘modern’ 
private rented sector offering high quality accommodation on a 
flexible basis or is the sector to have another role? 
2. Promote a policy environment that establishes a positive image for 
the private rented sector as a tenure to meet needs not catered for by 
other tenures. 
3. Increase the taxation advantages for individual investors. 
4. Promote niche opportunities for institutional investors through 
improved taxation advantages. 
5. Provide soft loans and/or grants for new investment and 
improvements. 
6. Promote a favourable regulatory environment – for landlords and 
tenants. 
7. Provide conditional taxation and subsidy support for affordable rental 
housing from private landlords possibly using a model similar to Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits in the USA (depending on the role that 
the sector is to perform and the definition of the private rented sector 
that is applied). 
8. Consider encouraging housing associations to supply more market 
rent properties (depending on the role that the sector is to perform 
and the definition of the private rented sector that is applied). 
 
17. However the policy mix would need to take account of possible crowding 
out issues and consider the extent to which additional private rented 
sector investment displaced investment in other housing sectors. 
 
18. Based on evidence from other countries, policies to increase house 
building for the private rented sector in England might: 
 
1. Apply a combination of the measures identified above to increase the 
proportion of the housing stock that is privately rented. 
2. Make the taxation advantages especially favourable for investment in 
newly constructed buildings, for example, more generous 
depreciation allowances. 
3. Provide conditional taxation and subsidy support for affordable rental 
house building by private developers; the housing to be managed by 
private sector landlords or by housing associations possibly using a 
model similar to Low Income Housing Tax Credits in the USA 
(depending on the role that the sector is to perform and the definition 
of the private rented sector that is applied). 
4. Consider allowing large housing associations to become REITs 
(depending on the role that the sector is to perform and the definition 
of the private rented sector that is applied). 
 
19. However, the policy mix would need to take account of possible 
crowding out issues and consider the extent to which additional private 






20. Based on evidence from other countries, policies to improve the quality 
of the private rented sector stock in England could: 
 
1. Continue to regulate for high quality and for quality improvements. 
2. Attach minimum dwelling quality standards to taxation and subsidy 
incentives. 
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1.1 This is a comparative study of the private rented sector in several high 
income countries.  It examines the reasons for a larger private rental 
housing sector in some countries compared with England.  The policy 
options for promoting more investment in the private rented sector in 
England are considered. 
 
1.2 The research has been conducted by the Centre for Comparative 
Housing Research at De Montfort University in Leicester and the OTB 
Research Institute for the Built Environment at Delft University of 
Technology.  The work has been assisted by the contributions of country 
experts from the USA, Australia, France and Germany. 
 
Objectives of the project 
 
1.3 The Department for Communities and Local Government commissioned 
this study to investigate the range of policy frameworks currently in place 
in high income countries to promote investment in private rented housing 
supply. 
 
1.4 The study sought to provide: 
 
• An overview of existing policy frameworks for the private rented 
sector across a representative range of high income countries. 
• A detailed, comparative analysis of the policy framework in England 
with the frameworks in other countries. 
• A critical analysis of how alternative policy frameworks lead to 
contrasting levels and compositions of investment in the private 
rented sector housing stock. 
• An analysis of policies to promote investment in new supply in the 
private rented sector in other countries. 
• An examination of the sources of investment in the private rented 
sector in other countries (for example, institutional investors and 
households). 
• An assessment of the private rented sector’s relative contribution to 
total investment in housing supply in the countries considered. 
• An examination of the relevance of comparative analysis of the 
private rented sector to policy initiatives in England. and 
• Research findings that are of relevance to future investment by both 
small and large scale investors and landlords in England. 
 
Methodology and choice of countries 
 
1.5 To determine the choice of countries and to compare them with the UK, 





 Stage 1: A statistical overview of the private rented sector in high income 
countries 
 
1.6 The term ‘high income countries’ was used in the DCLG brief but was 
not defined.  The Word Bank definition of high income countries was 
used in this research1.  World-wide this gives a list of 66 countries.  The 
investigation was restricted to high income OECD members as listed by 
the Work Bank for 2008.  This provided a list of 27 countries (this 
excludes the many very small countries on the world-wide list).  Most of 
these countries (21) are in Europe; the others are Australia, Canada, 
Republic of Korea, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.  We 
provided a statistical overview of the private rented sector in these 27 
OECD countries2.  This showed indicators of levels of housing 
investment, the size of the sector relative to other tenures, recent 
changes in the size of the sector, where this information was available, 
and relevant demographic and macroeconomic contextual information. 
 
Stage 2: An overview of policy frameworks in 12 of the countries 
identified in Stage 1 
 
1.7 From the statistical overview of the 27 countries in the first stage we 
identified 12 countries for further investigation.  This included several 
with a large private rented sector and some with a smaller private rented 
sector including some where there are recent policy measures in place 
that are designed to increase the size of the private rented sector.  The 
selected countries together included those with a range of large 
(company and institutional) as well as smaller (typically individual) 
investors in the private rented sector.  On this basis the following 12 
countries were considered for this policy overview stage of the research: 
United States (32 per cent), Australia (21 per cent), Belgium (Flanders) 
(18 per cent), Canada (28 per cent), France (20 per cent), Germany (48 
per cent), Ireland (11 per cent), Netherlands (11 per cent), New Zealand 
(27 per cent), Spain (12 per cent), Sweden (21 per cent), Switzerland (57 
per cent), plus England (13 per cent).  The figures in brackets show the 
approximate size of the private rented sector as a proportion of the 
housing stock based on the latest available data.  This overview of policy 
took the form of a rapid evidence analysis.  Using secondary information, 
the overview summarised for each country: the policies towards the 
private rented sector, the factors that explain the size and the recent 
changes in the contribution of the private rented sector to housing 
investment, the distinction between individual and institutional landlords 
and the attractiveness of the private rented sector for households and 
investors in relation to other tenures3. 
 
                                                 
1 For a full discussion, and the detailed lists of countries for 2008 by world region see 
www.worldbank.org. 
2 This is available separately as MS Excel file. 




Stage 3: The identification of four countries for more detailed 
investigation 
 
1.8 Four countries were selected for further investigation on the basis of the 
findings from the previous stage.  The selection took account of the size 
of the private rented sector, its contribution to housing investment, and 
the range of policies in place to promote increases in the size and quality 
of the private rented sector stock.  Together the countries also provided 
examples of a range of individual and institutional investors and of the 
use of fiscal and other incentives to promote investment in the private 
rented sector.  The countries chosen were the USA, Australia, France 
and Germany. 
 
Stage 4: Detailed country reports for the USA, Australia, France and 
Germany and England 
 
1.9 For each country included in the detailed comparison, a country report 
was prepared according to a common format.  The preparation of the 
country reports in each case included the involvement of a country 
expert to recommend source material and verify a draft report.  The 
information gathering included accessing the recommended material as 
well as other material identified by the research team.  It included journal 
articles, official reports, conference papers and statistical information.  
English language material as well as texts in French and German was 
accessed.  A report for England was prepared following the same 
approach as that for the four overseas countries that were considered in 
depth.  These country reports are provided as Appendices B to F. 
 
Stage 5: A comparative analysis of the factors influencing the size of the 
private rented sector in these countries compared to England 
 
1.10 This analysis considered the key policy levers, the drivers of demand 
and the sources of supply in each country.  In a broader sense it sought 
to address each of the objectives of the overall project.  The outcome is 
this report. 
 
Structure of the report 
 
1.11 In the previous sections the objectives of the project, the methodology 
and the choice of countries have been explained.  Alternative definitions 
for the private rented housing sector are considered in the next section 
along with a summary of the characteristics of the sector in the various 
countries.  Questions about the size of the private rented sector in the 
selected countries as a proportion of the housing stock and its 
contribution to house building are addressed and there is an overview of 
why the private rented sector is much larger in some countries than in 
England. 
 
1.12 The demand side drivers and the attractiveness of the private rented 




more depth.  The relevance of the regulatory environment to both 
households and landlords is considered.  There is then a detailed 
examination of the taxation of investors in large private rented sector 
countries compared with England.  This considers both the taxation of 
rental income and capital gains.  The availability of soft loans to support 
rental investment in some countries is examined.  There is then a 
comparative analysis of private sector social supply incentives that are 
important in boosting the size of the sector in each of the four large 
private rented sector countries. 
 
1.13 The effectiveness of tax incentives and soft loans in promoting more 
investment in the private rented sector is questioned and the possibility 
of crowding out effects where private rented sector incentives dampen 
investment in other sectors is considered.  Key differences between 
England and those countries where the private rented sector is large are 
summarised and the implications of the evidence from other countries for 
policies to increase investment in the private rented sector in England 
are reviewed.  Policies for expanding the size of the private rented sector 
stock, improving the quality of that stock and for more building for the 
private rented sector in England are assessed on the basis of evidence 
from other countries.  Finally, the overall conclusions from the research 
are summarised. 
 
1.14 The country reports that are provided as appendices (B to F) give more 
details in the particular national contexts of the issues set out in this main 
report.  The country reports also contain additional references that are a 





2. What is the private rented housing sector? 
 
2.1 One benefit of comparative research is that it produces ideas about new 
policy instruments based on experience from other countries.  Another is 
that is introduces a form of ‘shock therapy’ that challenges home grown 
assumptions about the phenomena under investigation.  In this study 
there are ideas for new policy instruments but there is also a challenge 
to how we think about and define the private rented sector. 
 
2.2 Table 1 shows four categories of housing that might be included in the 
private rented sector.  The definition of the private rented sector that is 
used in compiling official statistics varies from country to country.  Often 
it is what is left over after owner-occupation and social renting have been 
considered.  In some countries it is not officially separated as a distinct 
category (for example, Germany and the USA).  It is usually a diverse 
category bringing together housing supplied by individuals, companies, 
private sector employers, and even churches and the armed forces.  
Typically the definition is based on ownership.  Rented housing 
categorised in this way is not necessarily allocated by market forces and 
supplied at market rents.  Estimates for the UK, which broadly adopts 
such a definition, suggests that only about 80 per cent of the private 
rented sector stock is overtly traded in the sense of being provided 
through a market landlord or letting agency (Rhodes, 2006).  This 
ownership-based definition limits the private rented sector to categories 
1 and 2 in Table 1. 
 
2.3 In many countries privately owned housing is a significant element of 
socially allocated provision.  This housing is subject to tax concessions 
and sometimes soft loans that are used to encourage investment.  The 
housing is subject to rent and income-related allocation conditions which 
may be time-limited.  Official conventions on classifying such housing, 
shown as category 3 in Table 1, vary (in most countries it will be deemed 
to be part of the private sector because it is privately owned but a recent 
change in legislation in Ireland, for example, means that this will in future 
be counted as part of the social rented sector (Housing (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 20094).  However, in many countries where the private 
sector is, according to official data, large such housing is a substantial 
component of the stock.  Category 3 housing is, for example, a very 
important element of housing that is privately owned in the USA, 
Germany and France.  In the case of Germany, in particular, the time-
limited concessions and allocation conditions applied in previous 
decades have ended for many properties and they can now be subject to 
market forces. 
 
2.4 In some countries, including England, non-profit organisations, such as 
housing associations are able to supply some housing at market rents.  
This is sometimes done through a subsidiary that is specially created for 
                                                 




this purpose.  However, such accommodation, which is identified as 
category 4 in Table 1, will not necessarily be counted as part of the 
private rented sector.   
It may be subject to market forces but if it is owned by a body that is not 
in the private sector of the economy it will not necessarily be classed as 
part of the private rented sector. 
 
2.5 These points of definition are crucial to discussions about the expansion 
of the private rented sector in England.  Do we want only categories 1 
and 2 to expand or are we also interested in seeing category 3 become 
bigger?  Do we, furthermore, wish to see category 4 expand to increase 
the volume of market allocated rented housing?  Is it ownership or 
allocation that is the main concern? 
 
2.6 If we switch the argument and say that the main concern is expanding 
the overall stock of housing, no matter what the ownership or allocation 
conditions are, then it is essential to consider the extent to which 
expansion of any of the categories of housing in Table 1 displaces 
dwellings in another tenure, including home ownership and social rented 
housing supplied by local authorities and housing associations.  This 
point about possible displacement, or crowding out of other types of 
housing, is relevant to discussions about increases in the volume of 
house building for the private rented sector as well as discussions about 
an increase in the number of dwellings in the stock, and the proportion of 
the stock, that are part of the private rented sector. 
 
Table 1: What counts as private rented housing? 
 
Categories Ownership Allocation 
1 Private ownership by individuals and companies By market forces. Market rents.  
2 Private ownership by individuals and companies 
Not by market forces. Linked to 
employment or family relationships. 
3 Private ownership by individuals and companies 
Not by market forces.  Social allocation 
criteria linked to receipt of a tax 
concession or soft loan.  Rents limited.  
Incomes of occupants limited.  
Concessions, rent limitations and 
allocation conditions often time limited. 
4 Non-profit organisations and public bodies By market forces. Market rents. 
 
Characteristics of the sector 
 
2.7 Despite international variations in the composition of the private rented 
sector, some generalisations across the high income countries examined 
are possible.  Demand is diverse and comes from households on higher 
as well as lower incomes.  Households that seek mobility and younger 
households are big components of demand.  The ownership of dwellings 
(even where company and institutional involvement is strong) is 
predominantly by individual households and couples.  The average size 




The belief that property is a sound long-term investment is a 





3. How big is the private rented sector in other 
countries? 
 
3.1 Despite growth in recent years, the private rented sector in England, 
which accounts for 13 per cent of the housing stock, is small by 
international standards.  Table 2 shows that, as a proportion of the 
housing stock, the private rented sector in England is significantly 
smaller than in the four countries examined in detail for this report.  It is 
also smaller than in five out of eight of the countries examined in less 
detail (Table A1 – Appendix A).  The private rented sector accounts for 
20 per cent or more of the stock in several countries and nearly half the 
stock in Germany (or more depending on the definition adopted: see the 
Appendix E - Germany report).  The country reports show that the 
private rented sector declined in many countries from 1945 until the 
1980s (often accompanied by large increases in home ownership) and 
then either stabilised or grew as a proportion of the stock. 
 
3.2 Taking all the countries together (Tables 2 and A1) the private rented 
sector is large either where owner-occupation has been historically 
relatively small and there is a relatively small social rented sector 
(Germany and Switzerland5) or where there is a large owner-occupied 
sector and a very low (or almost non-existent) social rented sector (USA, 
Canada6 and Australia).  However, in France the private rented sector 
co-exists with significant social rented and owner occupied sectors. 
 
Table 2: Tenure % of stock; main countries 
 
 Private rented Social rented Owner occupied Other 
USA 2004 32 1 67  
Australia 2006 21 5 68 6 
France 2006 20 18 58 4 
Germany 2006 48 11* 40 1 
England 2007 13 17 70  
* cooperatives and government housing agencies 
 
Sources: see country reports, Appendices B to F 
                                                 
5 For Switzerland see Bourassa et al (2009). 




4. How much does the private rented sector 
contribute to house building in other countries? 
 
4.1 In most countries official data on house building does not identify the 
eventual tenure of the dwellings.  There is thus no data in these 
countries to show how much the private rented sector contributes to 
house building.  The USA and France are exceptions to this rule and 
Table 3 shows that here around 15 per cent of house building has been 
intended for the private rented sector in recent years.  Such data, even if 
it was available for all countries, would be of limited value because the 
actual tenure may change after construction is completed.  Many private 
rented sector dwellings were once in another tenure and dwellings built 
for the private rented sector can also end up in another tenure.  
However, there are some incentive schemes in other countries that are 
designed to increase the level of house building intended for private 
renting and these incentives may remain in place only as long as 
specified occupancy conditions are met.  These schemes will be 
discussed later in this report. 
 
Table 3: Contribution of building for the private rental sector to new housing production 
% 
 
 Private rented 
USA 2009 17 
Australia Not known 
France 2010 Yearly 10% to 25%; average over 20 years 
15% 
Germany Not known1 
England Not known 
 
1. Private housing companies (which own 15 per cent of the rental stock) built 34 per cent of all 
dwellings in 2008.  See Germany report, Appendix E, Table 2-1. 
 




5. Why the private rented sector is large in some 
countries: An overview 
 
5.1 An overview of the main factors that contribute to an explanation of the 
size of the private rented sector in the four main large private rented 
sector countries examined is provided in Table 4.  The private rented 
sector is large (20 per cent or more of the stock) in countries where the 
demand for renting is strong from a range of income groups.  In some 
cases the demand is driven by the lack of options in other sectors and 
the need for a tenure that allows for a high level of mobility.  In Germany, 
in particular, the tenure is also attractive because of the availability of 
good quality accommodation with a high degree of tenure security. 
 
5.2 In all the countries examined that have a large private rented sector the 
tenure is attractive as an investment to individuals seeking either a 
capital gain or a long term stable return.  The relative significance of 
these two aspects of investment varies from country to country.  For 
example, in Australia, the prospects of capital gains is particularly 
important whereas in Germany an acceptable, secure and long term flow 
of net income has been more relevant.  In Germany and the USA the 
prospect of an acceptable income-related return has also been essential 
for companies and institutional investors. 
 
5.3 In all countries with a large private rented sector, investment has been in 
the past, and in most cases still is, supported by taxation advantages 
that promote investment in the private rented sector by enhancing the 
rate of return and sometimes provide a tax shelter.  This option for 
individual investors to use losses from rental income to reduce the tax on 
other income has been relevant in each of the countries considered in 
detail. 
 
5.4 It is also the case that in Germany, France and the USA tax reductions, 
and in some cases grants and soft loans, have been used over long 
periods to support privately owned but socially allocated housing.  In 
terms of the categories used in Table 1, there has in each of these 
countries been an important element of category 3 accommodation that 
has boosted the size of the private rented sector.  This point can be 
extended to the large private rented sector countries in Table A1; they 
have large elements of category 3 privately owned rented housing.  
Switzerland in particular has boosted the size of its private rented sector 
by using German-style subsidies to support investment in privately 
owned housing to which rent and allocation conditions are attached 





Table 4: Why is the private rented sector large in some countries? Summary 
 
USA 
Very small publicly rented sector.  Strong demand including from low income 
groups.  Housing investment is a profitable activity supported by a mainly free 
market and a benign tax regime.  Attractive to individual, company and 
institutional investors because of reasonable rates of return, taxation advantages 
and the diverse nature (smaller complexes as well as large apartment blocks) of 
the stock. 
Australia 
Very small publicly rented sector.  Strong demand from a range of income 
groups. Significant tax advantages for small scale investors.  Acceptable rates of 
return and long term capital growth prospects. 
France 
Strong demand at all levels of income.  Attractive to individual investors because 
of acceptable returns that are enhanced by taxation advantages.  Significant tax 
incentives and soft loans for some of the intermediate market.  Housing 
allowances available to all private rented sector tenants. 
Germany 
Very small publicly rented sector. Strong demand at all levels of income.  
Attractive tenure for households because of good quality dwellings and strong 
security of tenure.  Home ownership has been relatively expensive.  Attractive as 
an investment since the 1950s because of generous tax advantages, principally 
degressive depreciation allowances that have helped provide an acceptable rate 





6. The demand side drivers and the role of the 
private rented sector 
 
6.1 It is clear from the country comparisons set out in Table 5 that there is no 
one simply identified source of demand for the private rented sector.  
Everywhere, it is a diverse sector accommodating high as well as low 
income households.  Mobile households are important to demand and 
turnover in the stock is typically significantly higher than in other sectors.  
Younger and single households are a significant source of demand in 
every case.  The country reports (Appendices B to F) show that in 
several cases demand has risen in recent decades as a consequence of 
affordability problems associated with rising prices for owner-occupied 
housing. 
 
6.2 The information in Table 6 shows that the private rented sector is often a 
tenure for those who cannot, or do not want to, become home owners or 
social renters.  For some households in all countries it is likely to be a 
tenure of choice, and this may, in particular, be true for some households 
in Germany who value the security of tenure that is provided.  It has 
been suggested that in Germany the private rented sector offers the 
security that is sought in home ownership in other countries (see 
Germany report, Appendix E, section 2). 
 
6.3 This issue of the role of the sector is central to arguments about 
expanding the sector in England.  Is it to be expanded as a tenure for 
those who aspire to, but cannot obtain, access to other tenures or is to 
be more a tenure of choice: for households who seek the flexibility 
offered?  It is likely that in England the sector will continue to offer 
housing in the variety of sub-markets that have been identified (including 
young professionals, students, high income renters, immigrants and 
asylum seekers – see England report, Appendix F, section 2) and the 
relative significance of these sub-markets will vary from one place to 
another.  However there may also be scope for expanding what has 
been termed the ‘modern private rented sector’ (Rhodes, 2006) that 
offers flexible and affordable accommodation for younger households 
and more generally fills a gap in the housing market at one or more 
points in the life cycle of households rather than being a tenure for life 
(see England report, Appendix F, sections 3 and 4).  The expansion of 
supply for this market may well require the sorts of fiscal incentives that 
are available in the large private rented sector countries. 
 
6.4 It is important to note that in all the countries examined private rented 
sector demand from lower income households is significant and in all 
cases supported by some sort of demand subsidy, typically in the form of 
a housing allowance that provides income-related and rent-related 
assistance that varies with household size.  In the USA the support 
comes mainly through vouchers which provide a choice of 
accommodation from those private sector landlords that accept this 




that low income demand is not sustainable in any country without 





Table 5: Sources of demand 
 
USA 
Low income households who cannot afford to own.  Middle to higher income 
and mobile households who prefer not to own.  High proportions of young 
and single households. 
Australia 
New households who cannot afford to own.  Middle to higher income and 
mobile households who prefer not to own.  Low income households unable 
to obtain public housing.  Market renter households are about 18% of 
households in the lowest income quintile and 20 per cent of those in the top 
quintile.  Young mobile households.  Young lone person households.  One 
quarter of private renters in top income quartile.1 
France 
Households whose incomes are too high for social renting and too low of 
home ownership in expensive areas.  Mobile households that do not wish to 
be social renters or home owners.  Many young single households.  Nearly 
one fifth of private renters in top income quartile.2 
Germany 
Tenants are spread through the income distribution.  Renter households are 
about three quarters of households in the lowest income quintile and over 40 
per cent of those in the top quintile.  Average equivalent incomes do not 
differ greatly on average between renters and owners.  A large number of 
younger households and, in eastern Germany, a large volume of elderly 
households.3 
England 
Diverse demand including high proportions of young and mobile households.  
Over half under 35 years old.  Average incomes are twice those of social 
renters.  But private rented tenants are spread through the overall income 
distribution: market renter households are about 12 per cent of households in 
the lowest income quintile and 10% of those in the top quintile.4 
 
Notes: 
1. See Australia report, Appendix C, Tables 2 and 3. 
2. See France report, Appendix D, Table 3. 
3. See Germany report, Appendix E, Table 2-2. 
4. See England report, Appendix F. 
 
Table 6: Role of the sector 
 
USA Housing those who cannot afford or do not want to own. 
Australia Housing those who cannot afford or do not want to own. 
France Housing those whose incomes are too high for social renting and too low of home ownership (in expensive areas) and mobile and young employees. 
Germany Secure long term tenure housing those who do not wish or cannot afford to own. 





7. The attractiveness to investors 
 
The attractiveness to individual investors 
 
7.1 In all the countries examined, including those with a small private rented 
sector as well as those with a large private rented sector, most of the 
stock is owned by individual investors.  Table 7 shows that nearly all 
private rented sector dwellings in France are owned by individuals; and 
in each of the other countries at least 60 per cent of the stock is owned 
by individual investors.  The importance of individual investors is clear 
even in countries such as the USA and Germany that have sizeable 
institutional involvement in the private rented sector and many large 
scale company landlords.  The holdings by individual landlords are often 
very small and may amount to only one or two dwellings.  However the 
average size of individual holdings is higher in Germany and can range 
from six to 45 dwellings depending on whether the individual is classed 
as an ‘amateur’ or ‘professional’ investor (see Germany report, Appendix 
E, section 4).  These investors are attracted variously by the prospects of 
capital gain but also by acceptable rental returns.  In the large private 
rented sector countries these returns are enhanced by tax reliefs and the 
possibility of using private rented sector investment as a tax shelter. 
 
7.2 The appeal of the private rented sector to individual investors is 
summarised in Table 8.  Part of the attraction of the private rented sector 
to small scale investors can lie in self-management but, where the 
information is available, it is clear that many individual landlords use 
agents to manage their properties.  The use of agents is significant in 
France, especially when investors purchase properties, through 
specialised brokers, that are long distances from their place of 
residence.  In Australia 68 per cent of all privately rented dwellings are 
managed by agents and this must include large numbers of dwellings 
that are individually owned (Short et al, 2008).  A German survey 
suggested that only 27 per cent of individually owned rental dwellings 
were not self managed (BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  In the USA only 20 per 
cent of individually owned unsubsidised rental units are professionally 
managed (Apgar & Narasimhan, 2008; see USA report, Appendix B, 
section 5) but the taxation system perversely discourages professional 
management (see the information on passive loss deduction rules in the 
USA report, Appendix B).  In England it is estimated that 60 per cent of 
individual landlords use agents and this proportion has grown in recent 
years (Rugg & Rhodes, 2008). 
 
7.3 As Table 9 shows, individual ownership can potentially present a variety 
of problems.  The actual significance of these problems is, however 
unclear.  For example, whether or not a lack of professional 
management is a problem for tenants is debatable.  Evidence for 
England (Rugg & Rhodes, 2008; see the England report, Appendix F) 
shows that tenants are on average more satisfied when individual 
owners, rather than agents, manage properties.  The lack of funding for 




on loans, have been identified at some times, and for some landlords, in 




Table 7: Individual investors 
 








Table 8: Individual investors: attracted by 
 
USA 
Small scale often self-managed safe property investment.  Significant tax 
advantages including large costs deductions, transferability of losses to other 
income and low capital gains taxation.  Some small self-managing investors 
accept low profit margins.1 
Australia 
Small-scale often self-managed safe property investment.  Significant tax 
advantages including large costs deductions, transferability of losses to other 
income and perception of long term capital gains.  Perception of good return 
relative to costs.  Some ‘accidental and unintentional’ landlords.2 
France 
Small scale often self-managed safe property investment.  Low maintenance 
on new buildings through ten years guarantees from developers. Taxation 
advantages.  Acceptable low rental yields and expectation of capital growth.  
Availability of ‘investment packages’ that include management services, New 
insurance scheme GRL developed covering rent arrears, legal fees and 
repairs.3 
Germany Secure equity building – including for retirement. Taxation advantages.  Long term horizon rather than sort term capital gains.  Secure return.4 
England Small scale often self-managed safe property investment.  Capital growth and availability of mortgage finance. 
 
Notes: 
1. See USA report, Appendix B, sections 4 and 5. 
2. See Australia report, Appendix C, section 5. 
3. See France report, Appendix D, section 5. 





Table 9: Possible problems for individual investment 
 
USA 
For some, low operating margins, debt and foreclose problems.  Not all have 
access to competitively priced funds for maintenance and for quality 
improvements.  High level of self management; potential taxation 
disadvantages from using a professional management company.1 
Australia 
Taxation system works against holdings of more than one or two properties.  
High level of self management but 68 per cent of privately rented dwellings 
professionally managed.2 
France 
Significant quality problems in some of the older private rented sector stock 
and individual landlords let property on average of a lower quality than the 
small proportion of other private rented sector landlords.  High level of self 
management.3 
Germany Limited market knowledge and problems of effective responses to changing market conditions.  Lower returns in recent years.4 
England Funding of improvement and maintenance.  Lack of professional management.  Debt and mortgage default issues. 
 
Notes: 
1. See USA report, Appendix B, section 5 and 7.11 and 7.12. 
2. See Australia, Appendix C, report section 5 and 7.12 to 7.14. 
3. See France, Appendix D, report section 5. 
4. See Germany, Appendix E, report sections 4 and 5. 
 
The attractiveness to institutional investors 
 
7.4 For companies and financial institutions to be interested in the private 
rented sector, the main requirement from the international evidence is an 
acceptable and secure rate of return.  The key pros and cons for such 
investors are summarised in Tables 10 and 11.  Companies may own 
and manage properties directly and financial institutions may have such 
direct holdings or invest indirectly in the private rented sector through a 
financial vehicle.  Of the countries examined in detail, only in the USA 
and Germany is institutional investment significant and of the countries 
considered in less detail it is particularly important in Switzerland (where 
about 28 per cent of the very large private rented sector is owned by 
pension funds, insurance companies, real estate funds and real estate 
companies (Montezuma, 2006)) and the Netherlands (where, although 
the private rented sector is small, around 60 per cent of the sector’s 
dwellings are owned by professional landlords, mainly financial 
institutions (Elsinga et al, 2007)).  In Germany, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands institutional investors are not put off by the strong security of 
tenure that tenants have.  In fact long term tenancies are attractive in 
keeping down voids and management costs and maintaining a secure 
long term return.  So, long term secure tenancies can benefit landlords 
and tenants. 
 
7.5 Institutional investors are typically interested in large-scale holdings and 
thus the structure of the housing stock is fundamental.  Scale is relevant 
from three perspectives.  One related to acquisition and disposal costs, 
another to management and the third to market information.  Large-scale 
apartment holdings, as in the USA, allow for transactions costs to be 
kept down relative to the value of the investment.  Large complexes are 




information is essential to institutional investors who want forecasts of 
returns and costs.  This information is only forthcoming in a satisfactory 
fashion where there are significant local markets.  This is again a 
question of scale, both for the size of a rental block and the proportion of 
commercial renting in a local market. 
 
7.6 In Australia, studies of why institutional investors are not interested in 
residential property suggest that low rates of return, high management 
costs, high risks and a lack of robust market information, which are all 
linked to the small unit size of investment opportunities, dissuade 
investors who have other more attractive investment options.  Added to 
this, Australian financial institutions are wary about the possible negative 
public image effects of becoming involved in a sector where evictions 
may be a necessary part of the efficient management of a property 
portfolio (Berry et al,1998; Berry, 2000; Berry & Hall, 2005).  These 
findings are arguably of significance to England where similar conditions 
may apply.  In England the low yields and the lack of scale economies 
linked to the structure of the housing stock are important.  Another point 
of particular significance to England is that whilst small-scale individual 
investors may accept negative net rental income, in return for capital 
gains in either the short or long run, institutional investors are more likely 
to want a positive income-related return. 
 
Table 10: Company and institutional investors: attracted by 
 
USA 
Acceptable rate of return compared with other investments at least for larger 
multifamily property properties.  Relatively low capital costs.  Favourable 
taxation environment.  Attractive to institutional capital.  Large-scale 
portfolios are possible. Significant investment through RIETS.1 
Australia Low level of attraction.2 
France Low level of attraction compared with retail and office investment; poor liquidity compared with other investment3 
Germany Stable income returns, attractive financing options and large portfolios of dwellings.3 
England Low level of attraction. 
 
Notes: 
1. See USA report, Appendix B, section 6. 
2. See Australia report, Appendix C, section 5. 
3. See Germany report, Appendix E, section 6. 
 
 
Table 11: Company and institutional investors: put off by 
 
USA Regulatory controls especially land use controls and rent restrictions in some locations.  Some periods of tight availability of finance.1 
Australia 
Low rate of return.  Land taxation that contributes to a negative yield.  High 
management costs, small unit size of investment opportunities.  High risks.  
Lack of robust market information.  Potential negative public image effects of 
evictions.2 
France Low yields and selling regulations that limit liquidity.3 
Germany High vacancy rates – especially in the east of Germany. 






1. See USA report, Appendix B, sections 6, 7 and 8. 
2. See Australia, Appendix C, report section 6. 





8. Real estate investment trusts 
 
8.1 In the USA, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have been 
successful in encouraging investment in rented housing.  REITs can 
manage their own properties, provide related services to their tenants 
and undertake development and refurbishment.  A REIT is effectively a 
mutual fund for real estate with retail investors obtaining the benefit of a 
diversified portfolio under professional management.  A REIT in the USA 
does not pay corporate income tax so that there is no double taxation of 
the income to the shareholder.  They are required to pay out 90 per cent 
of net income.  Originally they were designed to attract small investors 
but they now attract institutional investment. 
 
8.2 Whilst important in the USA, the scale of REITs has to be kept in 
perspective.  Less than 1 per cent of multi-family properties are owned 
by REITs but it has been estimated that REITs account for 8 per cent of 
apartments (Newell and Fischer, 2009).  There are four REITs in the top 
10 apartment providers and thirteen publicly traded REITS in the top 50 
apartment owners (Jones, 2007). 
 
8.3 The Australian equivalent of REITs is Listed Property Trusts (LPTs).  
However, LPTs do not invest in residential property.  One reason is that 
income returns are deemed too low compared with commercial property 
and another is related to the nature of the stock especially the lack of 
large rental complexes in Australia.  Whilst REITs can invest in rented 
housing in France and Germany their involvement is recent and as yet 
their impact has been small. 
 
8.4 It is clear that large landlords are important in the USA and are 
particularly important in owning large apartment blocks but only some of 
these large landlords are REITs.  Most are not.  Jones (2007) argues 
that a distinctive feature of large scale private sector investment in the 
USA is that much of it is imbedded in deep urban markets with high 
proportions of rental housing.  He suggests that these deep urban rented 
markets minimise investment risk and enable purpose-built large-scale 
developments.  The key to the existence of large scale investors, he 
concludes, is the opportunities provided by large scale local spatial stock 
concentrations of rented housing.  The lack of such deep local markets 
in the UK (compared with the USA) limits the potential of REITs to buy in 
bulk and manage as efficiently.  Whilst the potential for residential REITs 
is seen to be limited in the UK, it is argued that this may change as the 
boundary between private and social suppliers becomes blurred.  Jones 
sees the large scale purchase of existing housing association stock or 
the conversion of existing large housing associations to REITs as a 
possible source of growth: “Enabling the conversion of the large housing 
associations to REITs in the UK arguably provides the most likely route 
for the long-term growth of the private rented sector by this means” 






8.5 The potential for REITs in England seems limited on the basis of 
international evidence about those factors that make REITs work 
elsewhere.  There are two sets of circumstances in which REITs might 
have a more important role.  One is where they respond to niche 
markets that warrant large scale building and investment and the other is 






9. The regulatory environment 
 
9.1 From the international evidence it is clear that a range of contrasting 
regulatory environments can be compatible with a large private rented 
sector.  Tables 12 and 13 set out some key points on rents and security 
of tenure.  Some countries with a large private rented sector have some 
degree of restriction on rent levels, or at least rent increases, and strong 
security of tenure for tenants.  This is the case, for example, for France 
and Germany.  From the countries considered in less detail, Sweden 
(Lind, 2001) and Switzerland (Bourassa et al, 2009) provide further 
examples of restrictions on rent increases, strong security of tenure and 
a large private rented sector.  In Australia and the USA a large private 
rented sector is combined with mainly market rents (with exceptionally a 
degree of rent controls in some states in the USA) and limited security of 
tenure.  More generally across all the countries considered the pattern 
for rents is that initial rents are determined by market forces, and 
increases in rents can be limited, but the limits are usually in line with 
market circumstances. 
 
9.2 It is not possible to make simple statements about the cause and effect 
relationships between rents and security of tenure regulations on the one 
hand and investment in the private rented sector on the other.  One view 
would be that free market rents and weak security of tenure for tenants 
are what landlords want and this will encourage investment.  Another is 
that strong tenant demand is boosted by strong security of tenure and a 
low risk of dramatic rent increases and this in turn can encourage 
investment that responds to this demand.  Landlords in such 
circumstances can value the long term secure income that goes with 
long term tenancies.  Another crucial point is that where there is weak 
security of tenure it does not follow that all tenancies are short and 
turnover in the stock is driven by moves by unwilling tenants.  This is 
certainly not the case for England as shown by the evidence quoted in 
the England report. 
 
9.3 The experience of other countries shows that a variety of regulations are 
compatible with a large private rented sector.  The fundamental point is 
that regulations need to result in actions which on balance suit the needs 
of both tenants and landlords.  This means they should not stifle demand 
or supply and they should not result in hardship for either set of parties.  
This is more about getting things right in the context of local 






Table 12: Market rents? 
 
USA 
Mainly market rents. Some element of control on increases for some 
properties in some states.  Restrictions on rent levels and increases for tax 
subsidised properties and directly subsidised properties. 
Australia 
Mainly market rents.  Some element of control over rent increases – to keep 
them in line with market levels and to prevent increase in early months of 
contract. 
France Rents for new contracts set freely.  Limits on increases related to inflation.  Rent limits for subsidised properties. 
Germany Rents for new contracts set freely.  Limits on increases for sitting tenants – linked to market conditions. 
England Mainly market rents. 
 
 
Table 13: Security of tenure 
 
USA Limited security of tenure which depends on the contract.  Typically six months or one year but can be less or more. 
Australia Limited security of tenure which depends on the contract.  Typically six months or one year but can be less or more. 
France 
Strong security of tenure.  Standard contract is three years (individual 
landlords) or six years (other landlords).  Termination of contract only in 
limited circumstances.  Termination of contract only in limited circumstances, 
for example, rent arrears.  Sale of dwelling does not break the lease. 
Germany 
Strong security of tenure.  Length of tenancy in principle indefinite.  Notice 
periods of three to nine months depending on how long the tenancy has run 
for.  Termination of contract only in limited circumstances, for example, rent 
arrears, landlord needs dwelling for own family.  Sale of dwelling does not 
break the lease. 









10.1 The large private rented sector countries all offer taxation advantages, 
especially to individual investors, which are more favourable than those 
available in England.  The comparative taxation position for individual 
investors is summarised in Table 14.  Taxable net rental income is 
crucially affected by the deductions that are possible against gross rental 
income.  A set of cost deductions are possible in all the countries 
considered, as shown in detail in Table 14.  The major difference is that 
in England there is no deduction available for depreciation.  This makes 
the landlord’s tax bill bigger and reduces the net after-tax rental income 
return in England compared with other countries.  Another significant 
difference is that in the USA, France and Germany capital gains tax is 
reduced if investments are held for longer, rather than shorter, periods.  
This encourages long-term holdings of investments.  The system in 
England provides no such incentive for long-term holdings of private 
rented sector investments. 
 















Capital gains tax system 
discourages short term holding 
of the investment 
USA YES YES YES YES 
Australia YES YES YES YES 
France YES YES YES YES 
Germany YES YES YES YES 




Table 15: Cost deductions against rental income 
 
USA All expenses deductible including interest payments, local property taxes and depreciation. 
Australia Wide range of expenses deductible including interest payments, local property taxes and depreciation. 
France 
If gross annual rental income is less than €15,000, 30 per cent deduction to 
offset costs; if rental income level is greater than €15,000, a wide range of 
expenses deductible including interest payments, local property taxes and 
depreciation. 
Germany Expenses deductible including interest payments, management costs and depreciation. 
England Interest costs and managements expenses deductible.  Depreciation costs not deductible. 
 
10.2 Table 15 provides more information on the deductions that are possible 
against rental income.  It also shows that in France there is a simplified 




for a standard 30 per cent deduction of gross rental income for expenses 




10.3 In the large private rented sector countries generous deprecation 
allowances have been very important in encouraging investment in the 
sector and promoting new building for private renting.  All four large 
private rented sector countries have such incentives.  England does not.  
The allowances are summarised in Table 16 and more information on 
the operation of the schemes and their outcomes is given in the country 
reports (Appendices A to F).  In Germany, depreciation allowances have 
been fundamental to encouraging investment in rented housing since 
1945.  Earlier schemes, which gave large deductions in the early years 
of an investment, were more generous than the current taxation regime.  
They are viewed in Germany as contributing significantly to investment in 
privately owned rented housing.  Now that there is less need for new 
building, and indeed over-supply in some locations, the deductions, it is 
argued, can be less generous (Kemp & Kofner 2010; Kofner, 2010). 
 
10.4 In France there have been several incentive schemes that have been 
associated with large numbers of additional dwellings constructed.  
Currently deprecation allowances can provide for as much as 50 per 
cent of the cost of a building to be deducted against income over nine 
years.  Some of these schemes, are linked to conditions that limit rents 
and the incomes of tenants of the dwellings (Taffin, 2008).  Deprecation 
allowances in Germany, the USA and Australia do not have such 
conditions attached.  They simply reduce the rental income tax due in 
investments, including the construction of new dwellings for rental, and 





Table 16: Depreciation allowances for income tax 
 
USA 3.636 per cent per annum for 27.5 years.  Applies to value of the building, not the land. 
Australia 
Where construction commences after 18 July, 1985 and before 16 
September, 1987 – 4 per cent per annum.  After 15 September 1987 - 2.5 
per cent per annum.  Applies to the cost of construction – not the value of the 
land.  Not allowed for buildings constructed before 1985.  Depreciation is 
also deductible for fixtures and fittings. 
France 
Special incentive schemes. 20 to 50 per cent over nine years depending on 
the incentive scheme (with further deductions of 2 per cent per annum up to 
16 years in one scheme).  Maximum rent levels apply.  For current schemes 
maximum deductible amounts (€60,000 apply).1, 2 
Germany 
Currently 2 per cent per annum for 50 years for properties built since 1925 
(for older properties 2.5 per cent for 40 years).  Earlier (pre-1995) systems 
allowed much higher rates in earlier years (for example 58 per cent 
cumulative in first ten years from 1989 to 1996).  Deductions apply to value 
of the building, not the land.3 
England No depreciation allowance for properties.  Ten per cent of gross income allowable for furniture for furnished properties. 
 
Notes: 
1. See Tables 9. 10 and 11 in the France report, Appendix D, for more details. 
2. If the owner of the property is a company subject to corporate income tax, depreciation 
is allowed (on a straight-line basis) on the acquisition value of the buildings but not of 
the land. 
3. For details see Germany report (especially Appendix 1), Appendix B.  Generous 
degressive depreciation schemes were significant in promoting investment in previous 
decades. 
 
Rental income loss deductions 
 
10.5 A further major difference between the taxation of individual landlords in 
the large private rented sector countries and England is evident from the 
information in Table 17.  This shows that in all the large private rented 
sector countries rental income losses can be used to reduce taxable 
income from other sources.  These losses can be big once the generous 
cost deductions, including depreciation allowances, are applied.  Thus 
individuals with income form work or from another business can reduce 
the tax due on income from these other activities by making, for tax 
purposes, a loss from net rental income. 
 
10.6 This is a major incentive for small-scale investors in all the large private 
rented sector countries.  No such incentives apply in England.  This tax 
advantage through negative gearing is viewed as a big incentive in 
Australia where it is particularly advantageous for high income tax 
payers.  In the USA and France there are limits to the allowances but 
they can still be very important investment incentives.  Landlords can, in 
short, benefit not only by paying no income tax on current rental income 
(because it is negative) but can pay less tax on, for example, their 





Table 17: Losses allowable against other income for income tax 
 
USA Up to $25,000 of losses deductible against other income.  Reduced amount if individual income is above $100,000 per annum. 
Australia All negative net rental income can reduce other taxation.  Negative gearing important incentive for high income individuals with high marginal tax rates. 
France 
Negative net rental income up to a maximum of €10,700 per annum can 
reduce other taxation.  Mortgage interest may not be taken into account in 
the calculation of this deficit.  Interest can only be deducted as long as the 
remaining balance is positive.  
Germany All net negative rental income can reduce other taxation. 
England It is not possible for individuals to use rental income losses to reduce taxation on other income. 
 
Capital gains taxation 
 
10.7 Capital gains tax is greater in England than in the large private rented 
sector countries and there are no concessions for holding the property 
for several years.  The contrasts with the other countries are 
summarised in Table 18.  In the USA the rate of capital gains tax is 
higher for short term gains (less than one year) than for long term gains.  
Short term gains are taxed at the relevant marginal rate of income tax.  
The maximum long term rate is 15 per cent and for some lower income 
people it may be zero.  If capital losses exceed gains the excess can be 
used to reduce other income, such as wages, up to an annual limit of 
$3,000.  In Australia there is a 50 per cent reduction after one year.  In 
Germany and France the tax advantages of owning rental dwellings for 
longer periods are even more significant.  Deductions begin after five 
years of ownership in France and liability is zero after fifteen years.  In 
Germany no capital gains tax is due after ten years of ownership.  In 
England, not only are rates of capital gains tax higher than in France and 
Germany but there are no concessions for long term ownership of 
dwellings. 
 
Table 18: Capital gains tax 
 
USA 
Maximum of 15 per cent if property owned for more than one year, otherwise 
marginal rate of income tax which may be as high as 35 per cent.  Capital 
losses can be (within limits) offset against other income.  Avoidable if 
replacement property purchased.  Up to $500,000 deduction for a couple 
($250,000 for individual) if property is used as primary residence for two out 
of five years before sale. 
Australia Applied at marginal rate of income tax but 50 per cent reduction from the nominal gain if property is owned for at least one year. 
France 16 per cent of net gain; ten per cent per annum discount after five years of ownership.  Thus no tax liability after 15 years of ownership. 
Germany Applied at marginal rate of income tax but does not apply at all if the property is owned for more than ten years. 





11. Soft loans 
 
11.1 In the USA, France and Germany, in particular, loan finance at 
favourable rates of interest is available under certain conditions for 
investment in private rented housing.  This is shown in Table 19 and 
more information is given in the country reports (see Appendices B, D 
and E). 
 
11.2 The two main loan schemes available to private sector landlords in 
France target the intermediate and the higher rental parts of the market.  
They are available at sub-market interest rates for up to 30 years (or 50 
years for the purchase of land).  Maximum rent and tenant income levels 
apply and these vary with location.  Several thousand dwellings are 
supported each year by these incentives (Haffner et al, 2009).  Low 
interest loans have been used for quality improvements such as 
additional energy efficiency in Germany. 
 
 
Table 19: Support through soft loans 
 
USA State tax exempt bond financing in limited circumstances.  Tax credits apply also to the financed dwellings.  Rent and allocation restrictions apply. 
Australia No specific schemes. 
France 
For some of the private rented sector significant soft loans for individual and 
institutional landlords.  Rent and allocation restrictions apply. In some cases 
additional tax advantages apply to the financed dwellings.1 
Germany Low interest loans for specific purposes such as improving energy efficiency.2 
England No specific scheme. 
 
Notes: 
1. For details see France report, Appendix D, Table 8. 




12. Private sector social supply incentives 
 
12.1 Private sector social supply schemes, which exist in all the large private 
rented sector countries, encourage private sector organisations to invest 
in, and in some cases specifically to build, dwellings for rent.  They all 
involve what may be called ‘conditional object subsidies’.  This means 
they support the building or acquisition of real estate intended for rental 
and there are conditions attached that limit both the rents that may be 
charged and the incomes of the households that may occupy these 
dwellings.  In France such conditional subsides are also used to promote 
improvements in the quality of the rental stock.  The subsidy may take 
the form of a grant, tax deduction, a soft loan or a combination of these. 
 
12.2 The conditions attached to rents and to occupancy are often time-limited 
meaning that several years after the dwelling is initially subsidised (or, 
for example, after the repayment period of a soft loan has ended) it can 
become part of the open market.  Such conditional subsidies have been 
used not only for supporting rented houses for very low income 
households (in some cases the schemes do not even target such 
households) but are used to support housing for those on incomes 
above the lowest levels.  In France, for example, they can support 
intermediate dwellings such as key-worker housing.  Whilst privately 
owned, the dwellings may (depending on the country and the scheme) 
be managed by a private company, a non-profit organisation, or a 
governmental organisation.  Germany, France, the USA and Australia all 
have examples of such schemes.  In each case they boost the size of 
privately owned rental sector.  England does not have a comparable 
scheme. 
 
12.3 Whether or not the accommodation that is provided under these 
schemes should be counted as part of the private rented sector or not is 
a matter of debate (as the earlier discussion about the definition of the 
sector makes clear).  If private ownership of the dwellings is the key 
criterion then this accommodation is clearly part of the private rented 
sector.  If however the key criterion is whether or not the rent setting and 
allocation of the dwelling is through market processes then such 
accommodation might be counted as part of the social rented rather than 
private rented sector (Haffner et al, 2009).  Whilst an allocation based 
definition is in principle useful in distinguishing social from private rental 
dwellings, official data inevitably defines the private rental sector on the 
basis of ownership. 
 
12.4 Table 20 provides examples of schemes that incentivise investment in 
privately owned rental housing that has rent and allocation conditions 
attached.  More information on each case is provided in the country 
reports in the Appendices.  There are additional examples to be found in 
the countries considered in less detail.  In particular, Belgium, (Haffner et 
al, 2009), Ireland, (Haffner et al, 2009), Spain (Hoekstra et al, 2009) and 
Switzerland (Bourassa & Hoesli, 2010) all have schemes that trade 




rental guarantees, financial support and fiscal advantages, for 
constraints on rents and requirements to house people whose incomes 
fall within specified thresholds and ceilings. 
 
Table 20: Private sector social supply incentives: examples 
 
USA 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits support some privately owned housing with 
rent restrictions and income related allocation conditions.  Also project-based 
Section 8 assistance (vouchers for low income households) have promoted 
supply. 
Australia 
New National Rental Affordability scheme gives tax credits for building of 
privately owned housing (and housing owned by non-profit organisations) 
with rent restrictions and income-related allocation conditions.  As yet on a 
small scale to private investors. 
France 
Tax incentives (principally generous depreciation allowances) and soft loans 
for some privately owned housing with rent restrictions and income-related 
allocation conditions. 
Germany Subsidies for housing with rent restrictions and income-related allocation conditions. 
England Since 2004 private firms have been able to bid for funding to support the development of social housing. 
 
 
12.5 In can be argued that in England there are private sector social supply 
arrangements through the land use planning system where Section 106 
arrangements can require developers to provide a given proportion of 
social housing as a condition of panning permission.  Other countries 
also have similar arrangements that effectively require private 
development to cross-subsidise social housing.  The schemes identified 





13. Low income housing tax credits 
 
13.1 In the USA building for privately owned rental housing is assisted by Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) which in recent years have 
generated about 120,000 units annually (JCHS, 2009).  LIHTC accounts 
for nearly 90 per cent of all affordable housing created in the USA today.  
They are essentially construction subsidies that are obtained by 
developers provided that at least 40 per cent of units go to low income 
households whose income is less than 60 per cent of the area median.  
Alternatively qualifying property owners may elect to provide 20 per cent 
or units for households with incomes below forty per cent of the area 
median.  Normally, however, all or a very large share of units are 
targeted to households at 60 per cent or less of area medians in order to 
achieve the maximum allowable tax credits for a property. 
 
13.2 The federal LIHTC programme provides quotas of tax credits to each 
state on a per capita basis.  The allocation by the state to individual 
rental developments is done on a competitive basis.  Thus some 
developers might offer larger proportions of affordable housing or lower 
rents than the regulations specify in order to have a strong competitive 
position.  Each state is obligated to use a published Qualified Allocation 
Plan to layout the criteria it will use to pick among competitive 
applications.  Rents must be less than a maximum related to local 
affordability.  The rent ceilings are 30 per cent of 60 per cent of the area 
median income. 
 
13.3 LIHTC provides a ‘present value’ tax credit of 70 per cent of the cost of 
new construction or 30 per cent of the cost of acquisition of existing low 
income housing.  The credits are allocated over a ten-year period based 
on the ‘Applicable Federal Rate’ (AFR).  Nominally the value of the credit 
is nine per cent annually for the seventy per cent credit and four per cent 
annually for the thirty per cent credit.  In 2008, 9 per cent was 
established as a floor on the nominal 9 per cent credit.  For acquisition of 
existing rental housing, the applicable credit is also 4 per cent. 
 
13.4 The system relies on the sale of tax credit by a general partner that 
generally retains a one per cent interest in the property, and raises the 
rest of the equity through sale of the tax credit to third-party investors 
(Belsky, 2010).  The volume of tax credits that can be allocated to a 
project depends on non-land development costs, the proportion of units 
set aside for low income households and its credit rate (4 per cent for 
projects financed from tax-exempt state bonds and 9 per cent for other 
projects). 
 
13.5 Compliance with allocation rules and rent limits was initially (from 1986) 
required for a minimum period of fifteen years.  Beginning in 1990, an 
additional 15-year ‘extended use’ requirement was imposed for all 
properties receiving new tax credit allocations.  LIHTC can therefore be 
seen as a means of providing a temporary subsidy in return for landlords 




2010).  LIHTCs have a strong record in terms of housing quality and 
financial stability and creating new housing in more diverse locations 
than previous programmes.  They enjoy wide bi-partisan support.  
However, extremely low income households cannot afford the rents 
unless they have a housing voucher or the developer is able to obtain 
additional capital and operating subsidies. 
 
13.6 The application of a LIHTC type model in England offers a new way of 
using private investment to boost the rented housing stock.  As a 
tradable instrument that reduces the holders’ tax liability they provide an 
option that may be attractive to a range of investors.  From the 
perspectives of governments and tenants they offer the prospect of 
efficiency gains from competitive allocation that should result in good 
value for money.  They do not involve direct public expenditure; their 
exchequer cost is indirect, through tax concessions.  They do, 
furthermore, tie the tax concession to housing that has to conform to 
specific quality, allocation and rent standards.  These specifics can be 
tied to local decisions that are made about the allocation of a nationally 
financed policy instrument.  The additional housing that results from 
LIHTC may be privately owned but it might also be owned or managed 




14. The effectiveness of tax incentives and soft 
loans: more investment in the private rented 
sector or a crowding-out effect? 
 
14.1 Incentive schemes that try to increase investment in private rented 
sector stock may in principle lead to a larger housing stock or the growth 
of the private rented sector stock may be at the expense of another 
sector.  Similarly more house building for the private rented sector might 
mean more house building in total or any increased building for the 
private rented sector may be at the expense of less building for say 
owner-occupation or social renting.  Whether or not there is either a net-
addition effect or a crowding-out effect depends on the specifics of the 
incentives and the housing market context.  It is also likely to depend on 
the period of time over which the effect is measured.  In the short run, 
limits to the growth of total housing demand and housing supply capacity 
might make crowding-out effects more likely than in the longer run where 
markets may adjust to larger volumes of aggregate housing demand and 
supply. 
 
14.2 Estimating the existence and scale of crowding-out effects is a complex 
task and will inevitably require complex estimations.  Even then the 
outcomes will depend crucially on the assumptions adopted.  It is 
therefore not surprising that attempts at such estimates are rare.  One 
study in the USA (Malpezzi & Vandell, 2002) considered whether the 
LIHTC programme adds to the stock of housing or merely substitutes for 
units that would have been produced with other sources of finance.  
Using modelling techniques and data for all 50 states they were unable 
to reach a definitive conclusion on whether or not LIHTC housing crowds 
out other unsubsidised units but they were also unable statistically to 
reject the proposition that crowding out is a possibility. 
 
14.3 The difficulty of measurement and the possibility of inclusive results does 
not mean that the problem should be ignored.  Policy makers need to be 
aware that incentivising more private rented sector housing might be at 
the expense of less housing in another tenure.  This might or might not 




15. Key differences between England and those 
countries where the private rented sector is 
large 
 
15.1 There are several significant differences between England and countries 
with a large private rented sector.  These are summarised in the 12 
points below.  Together they show that the history as well as the current 
context of policies and housing markets is important.  One needs to ask 
questions about the past as well as the present to understand different 
levels of investment. 
 
1. It is several decades since there was a large private rented sector in 
England.  (It has been less that 20 per cent of the stock in England 
since 1971 [1961 31%; 1971 20%; 1981 11%; 2007 13%]). In the 
large private rented sector countries the sector has been at least 20 
per cent and as high (in Germany) as over 45 per cent for several 
decades despite (depending on the country) various periods of 
growth and decline. 
2. In the large private rented sector countries, measures to support the 
sector have been in place for several decades. 
3. Compared with England, there is a broader demand base in other 
countries: both (depending on the country) from low income 
households who cannot access social housing – or do not want to – 
and higher income households who do not want to be owner-
occupiers. 
4. In England, tenants do not have long-term security of tenure as in 
Germany and France (although tenure is relatively short in the USA 
and Australia). 
5. In England, rent increases are not subject to legislative limits as in 
Germany and France (there are limits in some circumstances in the 
USA and Australia but more generally rent increases depend on 
market circumstances). 
6. In England, individual investors cannot benefit from deprecation 
allowances as they can in Germany, France, the USA and Australia. 
7. In England, individual investors cannot transfer current rental income 
losses to other income for tax purposes.  This can be done in 
Germany, France (with limits) the USA (with limits) and Australia. 
8. In England, there is a high reliance on capital growth rather than a 
significant return from income (this is very different from Germany 
where the return is mainly from a stable long term income return, 
although similar to Australia where capital gains are important). 
9. In England, capital gains tax does not encourage long term holdings 
– that is it does not become proportionately less as the period of 
ownership increases (as in France where there is no capital gains tax 
liability if the property is held for 15 years; there is none in Germany if 
it is held for ten years; in the USA it falls after one year and can be 
avoided totally if there is reinvestment in another property). 
10. In England, the physical structure and location of the rental (and 




(compared with the economies of scale and comparable market 
information offered by deep urban markets and large-scale rental 
complexes elsewhere, and in the USA in particular). 
11. In England, institutional investors perceive that they are not able to 
obtain a reasonable risk-adjusted rate of return (in comparison with 
the USA in particular). 
12. In England, there are no significant programmes, comparable to 
those in other countries, to encourage the private sector to invest in 
and manage affordable housing (despite the recent possibility for 
private firms to bid for grants to develop social housing).  This 
contrasts markedly with Germany (taking a long term perspective), 
France and the USA in particular (where LIHTC are important) and in 





16. How to increase the private rented sector as a 
percentage of the stock in England – based on 
evidence from other countries 
 
16.1 Policies to support the private rented sector should start from a clear 
view of what the sector is expected to do.  Is it to continue to perform a 
similar role to that which does currently for a variety of households 
whose needs and demands are not catered for by home ownership or 
social housing or is it to have a new enhanced role for particular 
households?  This might include some lower income households who 
choose private renting rather than social renting and some higher 
income households who choose private renting rather than home 
ownership. 
 
16.2 The details of policy instruments are vital but so are the image of the 
sector and what government says it wants from the sector and how it 
sees the future. 
 
1. Determine the role for the sector.  Is there to be a larger ‘modern’ 
private rented sector offering high quality accommodation on a 
flexible basis or is the sector to have another role? 
2. Promote a policy environment that establishes a positive image for 
the private rented sector as tenure to meet needs not catered for by 
other tenures. 
3. Increase the taxation advantages for individual investors. 
4. Consider promoting niche markets for institutional investors where 
sufficient depth of demand can promote an efficient scale of 
investment opportunity. 
5. Promote a favourable regulatory environment – for landlords and 
tenants. 
6. Provide conditional taxation and subsidy support for affordable rental 
housing from private landlords possibly using a model similar to 
LIHTC in the USA. 





17. How to increase the volume of house building in 
England intended for private renting - based on 
evidence from other countries 
 
17.1 To increase the volume of house building that is specifically intended for 
private renting, the international evidence suggests four possible 
approaches: 
 
1. Apply a combination of the measures identified above to increase the 
proportion of the housing stock that is privately rented. 
2. Make the taxation advantages especially favourable for investment in 
newly constructed buildings, for example, more generous 
depreciation allowances. 
3. Provide conditional taxation and subsidy support for affordable rental 
house building by private developers; the housing to be managed by 
private sector landlords or by housing associations. 
4. Consider allowing large housing associations to become REITs. 
 
17.2 The measures to promote more investment in private rented sector stock 
may raise the attractiveness generally of private rented sector 
investment and lead to improved profitability of building for renting and 
thus increase supply.  Following the lead applied in some countries, the 
probability of enhanced new production can be increased by targeting 
the instruments at construction.  An example of this is where 
depreciation allowances are particularly generous for new buildings. 
 
17.3 Applying points 3 and 4 above involves widening the concept of the 
private rented sector.  Incentives for the private sector to invest in and 
build housing with rent and allocation conditions attached are a 
substantial part of the explanation for a larger private rented sector is 
some countries.  A similar approach in England would require a fresh 
form of thinking.  Similarly, the use of private capital for investment in 
housing associations with the key incentive being tax concessions would 
amount to a completely new approach. 
 
17.4 The adoption of any of these policy approaches would, as with the 
measures for increasing the private rented sector as a proportion of the 
housing stock, have to face up to the issue of crowding out effects.  If 
more private rented sector building is at the expense of less building for 
home ownership or traditional social housing, there would need to be a 
clear policy imperative for this approach.  The design of a policy package 
that enhanced building for the private rented sector without negative 
effects on other forms of house building, and this increased overall 
output, would need to ensure that there is sufficient aggregate housing 





18. How to address quality issues in England - 
based on evidence from other countries 
 
18.1 Quality is about the physical condition of buildings and the degree of 
tenant satisfaction with the management of accommodation.  Reviewing 
the approaches adopted elsewhere suggests three possible elements to 
a quality enhancement strategy: 
 
1. Continue to regulate for high quality and for quality improvements. 
2. Attach minimum dwelling quality standards to taxation and subsidy 
incentives. 
3. Provide tax incentives and grants for improvements as in France. 
 
18.2 Points 1 and 2 relate to evidence from several of the countries whereas 
point 3 is specific to France which has particular quality problems in part 
of the private rented sector and has adopted policies that subsidise 
improvements to dwellings. 
 
18.3 Regulations include building and land use planning controls and health 
and safety standards or their equivalent.  Together they are designed to 
ensure that the construction and occupation of dwellings is of a standard 
acceptable in the given context.  There is no suggestion from the 
international evidence that changes are required on these matters in 
England. 
 
18.4 Incentives to promote private rented sector investment in other countries 
typically come with minimum quality standards attached.  If such 
incentives are in the future applied in England, there will be an 
opportunity for the tax incentive or subsidy to be linked to prescribed 
standards of management and dwelling quality. 
 
18.5 Section 10 of the report on France, Appendix D, sets out a range of 
measures that are in place in that country to improve the quality of the 
housing stock, including the private rented sector.  The incentives 
include tax concessions and grants for refurbishment and renovation that 
are administered by the national home improvement agency.  
Governments looking for tried and tested measures that have helped to 
improve many thousands of dwellings could consider the instruments 







19.1 The private rented housing sector in England at 13 per cent of the 
housing stock, despite growth in recent years, is small by comparison 
with the large private rented sector in several other high income 
countries.  In those countries where the sector is large (20 per cent or 
more of the stock) policy measures have been in place for many years 
that encourage both the demand for private rented housing and 
incentivise supply.  Many of the supply incentives are conditional on the 
dwellings being allocated to households whose incomes are within 
specified limits and being supplied at rents that are limited to specified 
maximum levels. 
 
19.2 On the basis of the international evidence, three broad scenarios for 
promoting additional investment in the private rented sector can be set 
out.  These scenarios are related how broadly the sector is defined and 
what roles policy makers expect the private rented sector to perform. 
 
19.3 In the first scenario the private rented sector is defined to include only 
privately owned unsubsidised housing that is allocated by market forces.  
The role of the sector is essentially as it is today in England, serving a 
variety of households whose needs and demands are not met by home 
ownership, social housing or any other tenure including shared 
ownership and cooperative housing.  On this basis the international 
evidence suggests that such housing in England is relatively poorly 
supported by taxation policies.  Incentives in the form of depreciation 
allowances, the option of using current losses from negative net income 
to reduce the tax on other activities (including income from employment 
and other investments) and capital gains tax concessions for the long 
term holding of private rented sector investments would begin to put the 
English private rented sector on a par with the large private rented sector 
countries.  These incentives would, as in other countries, incentivise 
mainly individual investors.  These investors are responsible for a clear 
majority of the private rented sector even in countries where there is 
significant company and institutional investment.  Such advantages 
could be extended to larger scale investors but the experience of other 
countries suggests that it will be very difficult to replicate the conditions 
necessary for a major increase in large scale investment.  This is linked 
to the nature of the housing stock, the lack of scale economies and the 
relatively low rate of return from rental income.  However, there may be 
niche market opportunities for large scale investment and measures that 
help identify these opportunities and a policy commitment to the 
significance of such investment may produce some positive outcomes. 
 
19.4 In the second scenario the private rented sector is defined more broadly 
to include privately owned subsidised housing that is subject to social 
allocation conditions.  The role of the sector is broader than it is currently 
in England and includes housing those who might otherwise be in 
conventional social housing, in shared ownership housing or in other 




who currently cannot afford housing of the sort they desire in the owner-
occupied and (narrowly defined) private rented sector and who are 
unable to access social housing.  In this scenario conditional investment 
incentives of the type used for many years in Germany, France and the 
USA might be applied.  The cornerstone of such a policy approach 
would be tax based incentives tied to conditions about housing quality, 
allocation and rents. 
 
19.5 In the third scenario the private rented sector is defined as housing that 
is subject to market rents and is allocated by market forces irrespective 
of the ownership of the housing.  In this scenario it should be 
acknowledged that social housing suppliers in England now build, own 
and manage some housing that is subject to market rents.  This is 
typically done through a commercial subsidiary.  If the policy aim is to 
increase the supply of this sort of housing then the emphasis could be 
on encouraging an expansion of the activities of these subsidiaries. 
 
19.6 Within any of these three scenarios, any incentives could be targeted 
especially at newly built housing if the policy aim is to increase the rate 
of construction of dwelling intended for the private rented sector.  For 
example, deprecation allowances could be more generous for 
investment in new dwellings compared with investment in the stock. 
 
19.7 Whichever scenario is followed, policies need to take account of the 
possibility, outlined in this report, of crowding-out effects where 
additional private rented sector investment is at the expense of less 
investment in another housing sector.  Policy makers will need to 
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Housing tenure in selected countries 
 
Table A1: Tenure % of stock; other countries 
 
 Private rented Social rented Owner occupied Other 
Belgium (Flanders) 
2005 18.4 5.4 74.3 1.5 
Canada 2001 28.4 5.6 66.1  
Ireland 2006 11.4 10.7 74.7 3.2 
Netherlands 2006 11.0 33.0 56.0  
New Zealand 2006 27.1 6.0 66.9  
Spain 2008 12.0 1.0 85.0 2.0 
Sweden 2005 21.0 20.0 59.0  
Switzerland 2000 57.0 3.0 35.0 5.0 
 




Belgium (Flanders): Haffner, M., Hoekstra, J., Oxley, M., & van der Heijden, H. (2009) 
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European countries? (Amsterdam, IOS Press).) 
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1.1 This report considers the role of the private rented sector in the USA and 
the key factors influencing the demand and supply of privately owned 
rented housing.  There is some emphasis on policy measures that help 
to explain why around one-third of the American housing stock is rented.  
Most housing is in the owner-occupied sector.  This has for many 
decades been supported as the principal tenure of choice for most 
households.  It should be noted that the term ‘private rented sector’ is 
not generally used in American policy literature.  The usual tenure 
distinction is simply between home ownership and rental housing.  In this 
report there is an emphasis on federal measures.  However, the local 
variations, especially in the administration of tax credits to support rental 
production and the use of rent controls, are acknowledged in the 
relevant sections of the report. 
 
1.2 Most rented housing in the USA is private and unsubsidised.  There is a 
very small publicly owned sector.  However, significant numbers of 
privately owned dwellings are subsidised through a variety of 
programmes.  Also there are important demand-side subsidies including 
housing vouchers that have supported privately rented housing.  There 
is a good deal of variation by state and by city in the financial support 
and the regulation that the rented sector experiences.  The variations in 
financial support arise from a combination of national funding and local 
decisions.  State and local governments, with a few exceptions, put very 
little of their own money into housing subsidies.  They do, though, play 
an essential role in the allocation and administration of funding that 
comes from federal programmes. 
 
1.3 There are important senses in which privately produced and owned 
rented housing is used to support low income tenants and it might be 
argued that some privately owned rented housing is subject to social 
allocation criteria and rent limits.  This is the case for the major subsidy 
system for the supply of new private rented housing, the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) programme. 
 
1.4 Given the importance of LIHTC, and its relevance as a measure that is 
very different to approaches in the UK, there will be some emphasis on 
this topic in this paper.  The paper will also give some weight to Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and consider their success in the USA 
relative to their potential in the UK.  There are important differences in 
the taxation treatment of rental housing in the USA and these will be 
highlighted.  The main issues of interest are the availability of 
depreciation allowances; the way that the tax system treats losses from 
rental investment and the related ‘passive loss rules’; and the treatment 




controls in the USA.  The emphasis is on federal measures but the 
importance of variations throughout the USA is noted. 
 
1.5 In a broad context it should be noted that there are a wide range of 
demand and supply-side supports for rented housing that are designed 
not only to improve affordability but to promote neighbourhood renewal, 
labour mobility and support welfare to work (JCHS, 2007). 
 
2. The size of the private rented sector and its 
contribution to housing investment 
 




Households in the 
Rented Sector 
Number of Households 
in the Rented Sector Commentary 
1950 45% 19.2m  
1960 38% 20.3m  
1970 37% 23.6m 
Includes 1.4% public rental 
and 0.2% subsidised 
private rental 
1980 34% 27.6m 
Includes 1.5% public rental 
and 2.4% subsidised 
private rental 
1993 35% 33.5m 
Includes 2.4% public rental 
and 3.0% subsidised 
private rental 
2000 34% (rented housing units) 35.7m (rented housing units)  
2004 32.9% 36.0m 27.4m unsubsidised units in 2003*7  
 
Sources: Malpezzi (1998): 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1993 
 U.S. Census Bureau (2001): 2000; Katz & Turner (2008) 2004: * Apgar & Narasimhan, 
2008 
 
2.1 The unsubsidised private rented sector is a highly significant part of the 
housing market – approximately 30 per cent of the total housing stock.  
In proportional terms, it has gradually declined relative to owner 
occupation, but in absolute terms it has remained stable or increased in 
recent decades.  There is considerable geographical variation.  For 
example, the ten largest cities in terms of population each have over 39 
per cent of the stock in the rented sector.  New York has over 60 per 
cent and Los Angeles and San Francisco nearly 50 per cent (Jones, 
2007). 
 
2.2 The federal government subsidises around one million publicly owned 
housing units and two million privately owned units.  There are one 
                                                 
7 Note that this number is based on self reports form a household survey.  The 8.6 million 
subsidised rentals it implies is higher than the roughly 5.5 million that administrative records 
data imply.  One study by HUD that tried to reconcile the two approaches also found that the 
specific rent subsidy categories that households reported they fell in did not match 




million rentals in properties assisted by tax credits.  In addition the 
federal housing choice voucher programme provides rental subsidies to 
2.1 million lower income households (Belsky & Drew, 2008). 
 
2.3 Privately owned unsubsidised housing is home to more than 80 per cent 
(27.4 million) of all renters and nearly two-thirds of the lowest income 
renters.  The vast majority of these unsubsidised units consist of single 
family residences, two to four family units and dwellings in smaller 




2.4 There is a difference in America between: (i) housing that is privately 
owned and is part of the housing market in the sense that it is subject to 
market forces and has market rents; and (ii) housing that is privately 
owned but is subject to rent and allocation restrictions.  There is an 
argument that some landlords specialise in accepting housing vouchers 
that means they accept such restrictions.  There are also rent and 
allocation conditions attached to several subsidy and tax credit 
programmes.  It has been suggested that in total more than 10 per cent 
of the occupied rental stock is privately owned but subject to such 
restrictions (Belsky, 2010). 
 
2.5 There is a particular issue about how to treat LIHTC housing.  The 
advisor for this report argues that, 
 
“While privately owned, especially the LIHTC begs the question 
as to whether it is part of the private market or not.  Most would 
say no – its rents are capped so not really set by the market and 
there are income eligibility criteria applied.  In addition, conditions 
are placed on its disposition after the 15 year compliance period.  
As for vouchers, while their rents are also capped, the rent 
increases are based on a survey of market rents and pegged at 
whatever the 40th percentile rent turns out to be so the cap is sort 
of set by the market.  In both the tax credit and voucher cases, 
landlords do have to compete for tenants and can do so by 
lowering rents, and in this sense behave exactly like fully private 
markets.  These nuances are important to helping the reader 
judge for themselves whether to include older assisted properties, 
tax credit properties, and/or vouchers as part of the private market 
or are better thought of as privately owned but with regulated 
rents” (Belsky, 2010). 
 
2.6 These issues of what to count as part of the private rented sector are 
germane to the arguments that will be considered in the final report for 
this project about how to get more investment into the private rented 
sector in England.  They will be considered in a comparative context in 
that report. 
 





3.1 One-third of all households rent their dwelling.  Some are renters by 
choice because they are highly mobile or prefer not to own but most rent 
out of necessity because of a lack of savings and low incomes (Katz & 
Turner, 2008).  A growing proportion of these households face 
affordability problems.  Even many who report being subsidised report 
affordability problems, and certainly this is a big issue for those in tax 
credit properties as well as voucher holders who may end up spending 
up to about 40 per cent of income by choice (Belsky, 2010).  In 2005 
45.7 per cent of renter households spent more than 30 per cent of their 
income on housing. 
 
3.2 Large proportions of young people, minorities, foreign born and low 
income persons rent.  This included 47 per cent of unmarried persons 
living alone, 61 per cent of those under 35, 46 per cent of divorced or 
separated households and more than 70 per cent of recent movers 
relocating for financial or employment reasons (Belsky & Drew, 2008). 
 
3.3 Single adults with/without children were over-represented in the rental 
sector in 2000 while married couple families with/without children were 
significantly under-represented.  Younger households (i.e. those with a 
head of household under 35) were highly over-represented in the rental 
sector (U.S. Census, 2001). 
 
3.4 Lower income and poor households are more likely to rent than own, but 
there are substantial sections of middle income households that rent.  
Malpezzi (1998, p377) summarises this state of affairs by commenting 
that “most poor people rent, but most renters are not poor”. 
 
3.5 Affordability is however an issue for many tenants.  The median income 
among renter households is just under half that for owner-occupiers.  
Around half of low income renters (those with household incomes that 
are 30 per cent or less of the area median) spend 79 per cent or more of 
their incomes on rent.  Overall, renter households are concentrated in 
central cities whereas owner-occupiers are more prevalent in the 
suburbs.  However, single family rentals are more likely to be in the 
suburbs and much more likely to be occupied by white middle-aged, 
married couples with higher incomes than are units in large multi-family 




3.6 Since the mid-1970s rental housing vouchers have “emerged as the 
most substantial form of subsidised housing in the United States” (Katz & 
Turner, 2008, p330).  The 2.1 million households currently supported by 
vouchers in general receive the difference between 30 per cent of the 
recipient’s income and the rent of a qualifying moderately priced 
dwelling.  They facilitate household choice and are a means of 
responding quickly to affordability problems.  Voucher recipients are 




housing residents.  They are judged to have enhanced economic 
independence and improved the life chances of recipient households 
(Katz & Turner, 2008). 
 
4. The supply of private rented housing 
 
4.1 There has been considerable volatility in the amount of new rented 
housing since data was first collected in the early 1970s8.  The vast 
majority of units that are built with the intention of renting them has been 
‘multi-family units’ and output has ranged from just over 100,000 per 
year in the early 1990s to over 500,000 per year in the mid 1980s 
(Malpezzi, 1998).  Lampert and Pomeroy (2002) note that rented sector 
completions averaged 314,000 per year in the 1970s but only 165,000 
per year in the 1990s.  This equates to 16 per cent of total output of new 
units.  In 2007 multi-family completions for rent were 169,000, only one 
third of the 1986 level (JCHS, 2008, p25).  Most recent rental 
construction is in large apartment buildings.  From 1996 to 2005, 1.3 
million of the 3.2 million rentals completed were in structures with 20 or 
more units, and another one million rentals were in buildings with 5 to 19 
units (JCHS, 2008; p11).  In 2009 16.6 per cent of dwellings started were 
intended to be multi-family completions for rent9. 
 
4.2 Around two-thirds of unsubsidised rental units are owned by individuals 
or couples.  The rest are owned by a variety of corporations and other 
entities including limited partnerships, churches, non-profit organisations 
and real estate investment trusts.  For many individual owners their 
rental business is a part-time activity.  Only one in five rental units owned 
by individuals and couples is under professional management.  
Fragmented ownership makes for limited economies of scale (Apgar & 
Narasimhan, 2008; p288).  More details on the ownership of rental 
dwellings are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
4.3 Most unsubsidised rental housing is small scale.  Thirty-nine per cent of 
unsubidised renters live in single-family housing and 21 per cent in two 
to four dwelling units.  Only 7 per cent is in buildings with 50 units or 
more (Apgar & Narasimhan, 2008; p280).  There is little difference in the 
average age of rented and owner-occupied properties.  In relation to 
type of property, 45 per cent of the rented sector was in apartments 
comprising more than five units.  The corresponding figure for owner-
occupation was less than 3 per cent (U.S. Census, 2003). 
 
                                                 
8 These figures include all privately owned housing starts and completions whether or not they 
were directly subsidised or assisted with LIHTC.  Thus, they include starts that are in supported 
by federal spending or tax expenditures.  Also note that multifamily starts over time have been 
heavily influenced by US tax policy.  They were high in the 1970s due to a host of direct 
subsidy programmes and in the period 1981 to 1986 especially high due to unusually generous 
depreciation allowances (Belsky, 2010). 





5. Individual investment in the private rented sector 
 
5.1 As stated above around two-thirds of unsubsidised rental units are 
owned by individuals or couples and only one in five of these units are 
under professional management (Apgar & Narasimhan, 2008).  Eighty-
five per cent of small properties (four units or less) are owned by 
individuals and couples.  Many of the owners have low incomes 
themselves and many report low operating margins. 
 
“A 1995 survey revealed that more than half of all resident 
owners, and nearly half of non-resident owners of properties with 
one to nine units, reported barely breaking even or losing money.  
As a result, many of these owners lack the resources to maintain, 
let alone improve, their properties.” (JCHS, 2009a; p22) 
 
With the twenty-first century housing boom, lending criteria for new 
purchases by small scale owners were relaxed and the number of 
households reporting at least some rental income from one to four unit 
properties jumped from two million in 2001 to 2.9 million in 2007. 
 
5.2 There are thus large numbers of small scale landlords self-managing 
dwellings with low profit margins.  In the property boom, 
 
“Many inexperienced investors made bets they could not cover 
when declining prices put them underwater on their mortgages.  
Indeed, tenant evictions from small rental properties in the 
foreclosure process are now a major concern, and all the more so 
because some landlords reportedly continued to collect rent even 
as they fell behind on their mortgages and left tenants unaware of 
the pending foreclosure.” (JCHS, 2009a; p23). 
 





6.1 Malpezzi (1998) reviewed the literature from the 1980s and 1990s on 
investment in new construction.  He concluded that the following four 
issues were significant: 
 
Expected profitability of rented property: He noted that there was a lack 
of robust research on developer behaviour although a ten to fifteen per 
cent return before tax was regularly quoted. 
 
Importance of real estate investment trusts: These achieved over a thirty 
year period between the 1960s and 1990s a real rate of return of 5.4 per 
cent per annum.  An estimate of the performance of residential REITS 
for the period 1994 to 2007 suggested that a total return (income plus 




market return of 10.55 per cent over the same period (Newell & Fischer, 
2009). 
 
Availability of finance: Malpezzi argued that over the thirty year period 
finance had been available for good quality rental projects at 
advantageous rates.  He, however, commented that there had been 
“temporary but significant departures” (Malpezzi, 1998; p361) when there 
were credit crunches (for example the early 1980s).  Capital is viewed 
generally available for larger properties in normal times but less so for 
smaller properties, where costs are higher and competition lower.  
However since 2008, availability of finance has again been a problem in 
some sectors of the market (see the comments in section 7 of this paper 
on funding for LIHTC). 
 
Land use planning: Malpezzi argues that land use planning controls 
have been far more important than rent regulation in influencing rented 
housing provision.  In areas where there are stringent controls, there is a 
reduction in the supply of low and moderate income rented housing.  
This has been a particular issue in suburban areas where there is a 
powerful element of nimbyism.  A study by Schuetz (2007) that looked at 
land use regulation and the rental housing market using case study 
evidence from Massachusetts suggested that land use regulations were 
constraining the development of rental housing.  Communities with less 
restrictive zoning were found to build more rental housing, both in 
absolute numbers, as a share of the housing stock, than those with more 
restrictive controls. 
 
6.2 Large investors are important for larger investment complexes: 
 
“The corporations and private partnerships that own the vast 
majority of large rental properties are more likely to have the 
resources and economies of scale to provide professional 
management and to tap a broader set of financing sources.  The 
size of the properties permits careful underwriting, making their 
loans more attractive to institutional investors and to the 
secondary mortgage market.” (JCHS, 2009a; p24) 
 
6.3 In 2006 it was argued that, 
 
“For the past four years, institutional investors have bid up prices 
on apartment buildings despite weakness in rent revenues.  
Investors in rentals are betting that appreciation and lower interest 
rates will help their leveraged investments outperform stocks and 
bonds.  Indeed, with investor demand still strong, net operating 
incomes stabilising, and condo conversions rising, values of 
apartment buildings soared 13.5 percent in 2005—the first 
double-digit increase since 1984.” (JCHS, 2006; p20) 
 





“While nominal rents rose 3.7 percent last year, real rents fell by 
0.2 percent.  Rent declines and higher vacancies slowed the 
growth in 2008 of net operating incomes, which looked to turn 
negative in 2009.  The real price of multifamily properties dropped 
in 2008 for the first time in years as investors demanded a higher 
return for taking on greater risk” (JCHS, 2009a; p21).  The data 
for 2009 shows an industry under greater stress though there are 
some signs that falling effective rents are stabilising and the 
speed of reductions in value has slowed (Belsky, 2010). 
 
6.5 Mapazzi (1998) suggests that although the largest determinant of 
investment in new construction and the existing stock is the expected 
profitability of rental housing, “Everyone talks about profit, but no one 
measures it systematically” (ibid, p360).  Quoting some limited data from 
1987 to 1992 Malpazzi suggests that the investment performance of 
rental housing was “strong” compared to other commercial investments. 
 
6.6 The data in Table 2 below suggests that in 2009 a ten year assessment 
of the total return from residential investment (taking account of capital 
growth and income) shows that it out-performed offices and industrial 
property but was a little below the aggregated return for all property.  The 
2009 one year total return is negative, as for all property, reflecting falls 
in capital values and the income return is a little below that for other 
types of property.  It should be stressed that the data in Table 2 is based 
on only a small sample of investments but it does provide some 
indication that rental property has provided a return that compares 
favourably with some other classes of property over the long term. 
 











growth % Total return per year 
 Dec 1998=100 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 3 yrs 5 yrs 10 yrs 
All property 212.0 -17.1 6.6 -22.4 -4.3 3.8 6.6 
Retail 247.8 -12.6 6.8 -18.2 -3.5 4.3 8.7 
Offices 200.5 -19.5 6.8 -24.7 -4.1 4.1 5.9 
Industrial 205.7 -17.9 7.1 -23.5 -4.3 2.8 6.3 
Residential 209.9 -16.5 5.8 -21.2 -5.6 3.1 6.4 
Other 190.6 -15.1 6.0 -20.0 -4.3 5.1 5.6 
 
Source: IPD US Annual Property Index results for year to 31 December 2009, www.ipd.com/us  
NB: The IPD US Annual Property Index database as at December 2009 covered 3,087 
properties of which 482 were residential.  The 27 residential funds covered 17% of the 
$102,466m capital value of all the property included. 
 
6.7 The data in Table 3, based on a larger sample of properties and showing 
the total rate of return to apartments compared with other properties, 
also shows that in some time periods rental investment has compared 






Table 3: NCREIF Property Index Returns - Total rate of return, first quarter data, selected 
years 
 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
All property 4.14 2.4 1.51 2.56 3.62 1.6 0.76 
Retail 2.92 1.99 1.88 3.0 3.41     1.44 1.13 
Offices 5.5 2.66 2.95 2.24 3.91 1.96 0.86 
Industrial 3.71 2.46 1.85 2.39 3.34 1.44 0.64 
Apartments 3.29 2.37 1.99 3.0 3.52 1.26 0.42 
 
NB: “The NCREIF Property Index is a quarterly time series composite total rate of return 
measure of investment performance of a very large pool of individual commercial real estate 
properties acquired in the private market for investment purposes only.  All properties in the NPI 
have been acquired, at least in part, on behalf of tax-exempt institutional investors - the great 
majority being pension funds.  As such, all properties are held in a fiduciary environment - - -  In 
the first quarter of 2010 the Total Market Value (millions): $233,154.8 and Total Number of 
Properties: 6,067.” 
 
Source National Council for Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Property Index 
http://www.ncreif.com/property-index-returns.aspx  
 
6.8 The argument that rental property represents a good investment in the 
USA is set out robustly in a research report (Torte Wheaton Research, 
2009) that examines investment in apartment properties.  It shows that 
“The apartment sector now accounts for the second-largest share of 
institutional investors’ real estate holdings, lagging only the office sector” 
and states that “Professionally-managed apartment properties in the 
United States are a highly liquid asset class that is very attractive to 
institutional capital due to its stable cash flows, abundant debt financing, 
and unique diversification benefits” (ibid, p2).  It sets out several factors 
that explain the attraction of apartments to institutional investors.  The 
key points include the following: 
 
“1. Apartments have a long track record of having the highest risk-
adjusted investment returns compared to other property types. 
The sector has proven to be most resilient during economic 
downturns, delivering superior returns during recessionary 
periods. 
 
2. Apartments have the most efficient cash distribution, due to low 
capital expenditures and technical improvements. 
 
3. Apartments have a lower cost of capital and wider availability of 
debt capital; apartment investments can support more debt with 
the same level of risk. 
 
4. Apartments operate in a favorable, transparent, and market-
driven regulatory and taxation environment. In addition, 
apartments have shorter leases than other property types, 






5. Apartment properties vary widely in terms of age, size, quality, 
and location, creating a broad spectrum of opportunities and 
possible investment strategies, thereby providing greater liquidity 
than other sectors. 
 
6. Short-term problems from the current economic downturn 
aside, apartment market fundamentals are expected to remain 
positive on a cumulative basis over the next five-to-seven year 
period. Demand is expected to expand and new supply is 
expected to subside, creating conditions for moderate rent and 
revenue growth in most locations.” (ibid, p3). 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 
 
6.9 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have been successful in the USA 
in encouraging both individual and institutional investment in rented 
housing.  REITs can manage their own properties, provide related 
services to their tenants and undertake development and refurbishment.  
A REIT is effectively a mutual fund for real estate with retail investors 
obtaining the benefit of a diversified portfolio under professional 
management.  A REIT in the USA does not pay corporate income tax so 
that there is no double taxation of the income to the shareholder.  They 
are required to pay out 90 per cent of net income.  Originally they were 
designed to attract small investors but they now attract institutional 
investment.  Residential REITs accounted for 13.5 per cent of the value 
of all REITs in the USA in 2007 (Newell & Fischer, 2009).  There are four 
REITs in the top 10 apartment providers and 13 publicly traded REITs in 
the top 50 apartment owners.  This is shown in Tables 2 and 5 (Jones, 
2007).  The ownership pattern of large apartment blocks is quite different 
than for smaller rental properties.  Whilst individuals and couples own 86 
per cent of two to four unit rental properties, they own smaller 
percentages of larger properties (See Appendix 1). 
 
6.10 It is clear that large landlords are important in the USA and are 
particularly important in owning large apartment blocks but only some of 
these large landlords are REITs.  Most are not.  It has been estimated 
that apartment REITs account for eight per cent of apartments in the 
USA (Newell & Fischer, 2009).  Jones (2007) argues that a distinctive 
feature of large scale private sector investment in the USA is that much 
of it is imbedded in deep urban markets with high proportions of rental 
housing.  He suggests that these deep urban rented markets minimise 
investment risk and enable purpose-built large-scale developments.  
However there is very little information on which investors own what, in 
which markets (Belsky, 2010). 
 
6.11 Nevertheless, the key to the existence of large scale investors, according 
to Jones (2007), is the opportunities provided by large scale local spatial 
stock concentrations of rented housing.  The lack of such deep local 
markets in the UK (compared with the USA) limits the potential of British 




residential REITs is seen to be limited in the UK, it is argued that this 
may change as the boundary between private and social suppliers 
becomes blurred.  Jones sees the large scale purchase of existing 
housing association stock or the conversion of existing large housing 
associations to REITs as a possible source of growth: “Enabling the 
conversion of the large housing associations to REITs in the UK 
arguably provides the most likely route for the long-term growth of the 
private rented sector by this means” (Jones, 2007; p383).  The data in 
Appendix 1 allows the importance of REITS to be put into perspective.  
Less than one per cent of multi-family properties are owned by REITS 
and less than three per cent of properties with 50 or more units.  
Although as stated above REITs are estimated to account for eight per 





Table 4: Top 10 apartment owner firms, USA 
 
Rank Company No. of apartments with ownership interest 
1 Apartment Investment and Management Company* 233,738 
2 Equity Residential* 197,404 
3 MMA Financial 179,133 
4 Boston Capital Corporation 147,000 
5 SunAmerica Affordable Housing Partners Inc. 143,702 
6 Archstone-Smith* 81,914 
7 United Dominion Reality Trust, Inc* 74,875 
8 ESIC Reality Partners 74,778 
9 Wachovia 70,429 
10 The Richmond Affordable Housing Corporation 57,501 
*A REIT. The apartment stock is defined as the total number of apartments in structures with at 
least five units 
 
Source: Obrinsky 2006, quoted in Jones, 2007 
 
Table 5: Publicly traded REITS among top 50 apartment owners, USA 
 
Rank Company 






1 Apartment Investment and Management Company 233,738 11,468 
2 Equity Residential 197,404 19,351 
6 Archstone-Smith 81,914 15,332 
7 United Dominion Reality Trust, Inc. 74,875 6,616 
11 Camden Property Trust 65,580 5,821 
18 Colonial Properties Trust 45,242 5,460 
20 Home Properties 43,432 3,885 
22 AvalonBay Communities, Inc. 40,606 9,102 
26 Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc 38,227 2,489 
33 AMLI Residential Properties Trust 28,659 1,654 
36 Essex Property Trust 26,587 3,696 
38 BRE Properties 24,440 4,121 
43 Post Properties Inc 21,791 2,755 
The apartment stock is defined as the total number of apartments in structures with at least five 
units. 
 
Source: Obrinsky 2006, quoted in Jones, 2007 
 
7. Policy measures that influence investment in the 




7.1 There are considerable variations within the USA in the nature and form 
of rent controls.  Malpezzi (1998) stated that rent regulation exists in 
approximately two hundred cities but these cities account for only about 
ten per cent of the households in this sector.  Lind (2001) shows that 
New York had a system that kept rents permanently below market levels 




Washington DC had a system protecting existing tenants from significant 
increases as well as limiting the increases in new contracts.  Los 
Angeles and New Jersey had a system that protects only existing 
tenants.  He also pointed out that there was evidence of a trend towards 
a gradual relaxation of controls.  Overall, vacancy decontrol and 
exemptions for new additions to the rental stock is greatly reducing the 
extent of rent control. 
 
7.2 A number of researchers, such as Kutty (1996), have attempted to 
investigate the impact of rent control.  But it is, of course, difficult to 
generalise for the USA as a whole.  For example, Kutty in her study of 
Western European and North American countries concluded on the 
basis of 12 types of regulation and rent control that the willingness of 
landlords to invest in maintenance depended on factors such as the type 
of rent control and its expected degree of permanence.  She highlighted 
that landlords would be willing to invest if there was a degree of 
expectation that in the future there would be a shift from tight to relaxed 
regimes. 
 
7.3 Currently, although rents are generally freely negotiated, in four states 
there are laws that allow cities to limit rent increases.  These states are 
California, Washington DC, New Jersey and New York.  Newly built 
dwellings are often exempt and in many cases vacancy decontrol 
applies which means that landlords can set rents at market levels when 
tenants move on.  Controls on rents are thus an exception rather than 
the rule.  San Francisco’s rent Stabilisation Ordinance exempts all units 
built after 1979 and in New York State units built after 1974 are exempt.  
The allowable rent increases are prescribed annually and typically linked 
to measures of inflation.  They may also be adjusted to give the landlord 
a reasonable return on investment.  For example, in San Francisco from 
March 2010 to February, 2011, the allowable annual increase is 0.1 per 
cent. This amount is based on 60 per cent of the percentage increase in 
the Consumer Price Index10.  This is set by the San Francisco Rent 
Board which is completely funded through the collection of fees that are 
imposed on landlords.  For the 2009 to 2010 tax year, the fee was 
$29.00 per apartment unit but the landlord could recoup 50 per cent of 
this from tenants  The Rent Board's primary function is to conduct 
hearings and mediations of tenant and landlord petitions regarding the 
adjustment of rents under the City's rent control laws.  The Rent Board 
also investigates reports of alleged wrongful eviction.  Most residential 
rental units in buildings that were constructed before 1979 are covered 
by the San Francisco Rent Ordinance with the exception of those run by 
non-profit organisations. 
 
7.4 The NYC Rent Guidelines Board is mandated to establish rent 
adjustments for the approximately one million dwelling units subject to 
the Rent Stabilization Law in New York City.  In 1969, the Board’s first 
year of operation, rent stabilisation covered about 400,000 rental units.  
                                                 




At the time, the vast majority of apartments were located in older (pre 
1947) buildings and fell under the long established rent control system.  
Due to a series of legislative changes, rent control now covers only 
about 43,000 apartments, while the rent stabilisation system has 
expanded to over one million apartments which house over two million 
people – or about one in three City residents (Collins, 2006; p66).  It has 
long been recognised that any “attempt to limit the landlord’s demands” 
through rent regulation would fail “[I]f the tenant remained subject to the 
landlord’s power to evict”.  Therefore, under rent regulation “the general 
power to evict is eliminated in favor of a limited power to remove tenants 
for specifically enumerated causes such as failure to pay rent and 
disregarding the tenancy conditions (Collins, 2006; p66).”  There are 
regulations that protect tenants from illegal evictions and harassment. 
 
7.5 Under the rent control system tenants have permanent tenure and their 
rights and obligations are fully spelled out in the state Rent and Eviction 
Regulations.  Consequently they are referred to as statutory tenants and 
they do not face periodic lease renewals.  Rent controlled tenancies may 
only be terminated on grounds set forth in the Rent and Eviction 
Regulations.  Under the rent stabilisation system tenants are also 
granted permanent tenure, but their rights and obligations are defined by 
both the Rent Stabilization Code and their individual leases.  Rent 
stabilised tenants have a general right to renew their leases as they 
expire.  Under rent stabilisation there are two means for ending a 
tenancy: First, there are a number of grounds to evict the tenant such as 
non-payment of rent, maintaining a nuisance, illegal subletting or use of 
the apartment for unlawful purposes; Second, there are grounds for 
refusing to renew the lease such as recovery of the apartment for the 
owner’s personal use or recovery when the tenant maintains a primary 
residence elsewhere. 
 
7.6 The broad goal of the rent stabilisation system is the establishment of 
‘fair’ rent levels for both owners and tenants.  Currently the allowable 
rent increase for rent stabilised apartments in New York City is 2.75 per 
cent for leases lasting for one year with heating provided by the landlord.  
Landlords can also apply for Comparative Hardship or Alternative 
Hardship where they can be allowed to increase rents up to 6 per cent 
annually.  These measures seek to give the landlord fair rents and they 
recognise that landlords may have limited resources. 
 
Security of tenure 
 
7.7 Generally within the USA there are two main tenancy agreements, a 
lease and a rental agreement.  Rental agreements provide for a tenancy 
of a short period (often 30 days) that is renewed automatically at the end 
of the period unless the tenant or landlord (sometimes the law states 
who should give the notice) ends it by giving written notice and the 
tenant must comply.  The written notice is usually one rental period or 
one month for month-to-month rentals.  The landlord can also change 




control ordinances prohibit it) with proper written notice (typically one 
month also). 
 
7.8 A written lease, on the other hand, gives a tenant the right to occupy a 
rental unit for a fixed term - typically six months or one year but can be 
longer - if the tenant pays the rent and complies with other lease 
provisions.  The landlord cannot adjust the rent or change other terms of 
the tenancy during the lease, unless the tenant agrees.  Unlike a rental 
agreement, when a lease expires it does not usually automatically renew 
itself and the tenant must renew the contract, renegotiate another lease, 
or leave.  The contract usually provides a provision for a renewal and the 
amount of notice required.  A tenant who stays on with the landlord's 
consent after a lease ends becomes a month-to-month tenant, subject to 




7.9 Capital Gains Tax on properties held for more than a year is 5 per cent; 
otherwise the tax is 15 per cent.  An individual can exclude up to 
$250,000 ($500,000 for a married couple) of capital gains on the sale of 
real property if the owner used it as primary residence for two of the five 
years before the date of sale.  The tax can be avoided if on sale the 




7.10 The tax system applies an approach called the Modified Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System under which rental property is depreciated on a 
straight-line basis.  Residential rental real estate is considered to have a 
life of 27.5 years.  This means that the cost of the property is depreciated 
over 27.5 years, which, expressed as a percentage, equals 3.636 per 
cent of the cost a year.  The depreciation allowance applies only to the 
value of the building, not to the land.  In previous periods, more 
generous depreciation allowances were used to encourage the 
production and rehabilitation of privately owned rental housing in general 
and low-income rental housing in particular. 
 
Passive loss deductions 
 
7.11 The American tax system treats some investments as ‘passive’.  Such 
investments generate income without the investor being physically 
involved in the activity of producing the return.  Thus, for example, 
investing in a business which others ran would be a passive investment.  
Before 1986 losses from such investments could be used to reduce tax 
bills from non-passive activities such as earning a wage or running ones 
own business.  Residential property investments are generally treated as 
a passive activity.  The Passive Activity Loss (PAL) for rental properties 
allowed individual investors to make losses and have the tax system 
treat such losses as deductions against other income.  In the past rental 




bill from other income.  From 1986 a rule was introduced limiting 
individual investors from claiming losses from passive investments 
(including real estate) in excess of income from such activities (JCHS, 
2009b).  There is an ‘Active Rental Exception’ that allows up to $25,000 
of rental losses to be deducted each year if the investor is actively 
involved in the business in the sense of ownership and decision making 
over such things as selecting tenants and improvements.  There are 
income limits to this allowance and it is reduced once income is above 
$100,000 per annum. 
 
7.12 Given that all the expenses of investment in a property are deductible for 
tax purposes, including mortgage interest payments and depreciation, 
individual property ownership may well result in a loss.  The ability to use 
this loss to obtain a deduction of up to $25,000 against other income can 
be a clear incentive for individual investors.  However, this does not 
apply if the investor does not actively participate in the management of 
dwellings.  It does not therefore apply if a management company 
handles the property and the individual taxpayer does not actively 
participate in management decisions.  The definition of active 
participation in management decisions is not precisely defined but is 
viewed as going beyond simple ratification of the decisions of the 
professional management company by exercising independent 
judgement.  Investments by individuals in limited partnerships or 
individuals with less than ten per cent ownership interest are ineligible for 
the passive loss allowance. 
 
Low income housing tax credits  
 
7.13 Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) began in 1986 and by 2009 
had provided around 1.7 million units for low income families and in 
recent years has generated about 120,000 units annually (JCHS, 
2009b).  The average number of units in LIHTC developments has risen 
steadily since the start of the programme to around eighty units (JCHS, 
2008; p11).  LIHTC accounts for nearly 90 per cent of all affordable 
housing created in the USA today.  They are essentially construction 
subsidies that are obtained by developers provided that at least 40 per 
cent of units go to low income households whose income is less than 60 
per cent of the area median.  Alternatively qualifying property owners 
may elect to provide 20 per cent or units for households with incomes 
below 40 per cent of the area median.  Normally, however, all or a very 
large share of units are targeted to households at 60 per cent or less of 
area medians in order to achieve the maximum allowable tax credits for 
a property. 
 
7.14 The federal LIHTC programme provides quotas of tax credits to each 
state on a per capita basis.  In 2006 the credits were worth $1.95 per 
capita.  The allocation by the state to individual rental developments is 
done on a competitive basis.  Thus some developers might offer larger 
proportions of affordable housing or lower rents than the regulations 




administered by state officials who make policy decisions about goals 
and priorities including the tenant allocation conditions.  Each state is 
obligated to use a publicly released Qualified Allocation Plan to layout 
the criteria it will use to pick among competitive applications.  Rents must 
be less than a maximum related to local affordability.  The rent ceilings 
are thirty per cent of 60 per cent of the area median income.  This means 
that LIHTC properties can face competition from older conventional 
rented housing and LIHTC tenants often have choices and may leave a 
poorly managed and maintained LIHTC property (Kadduri & Wilkins, 
2008). 
 
7.15 The low-income housing tax credit provides a ‘present value’ tax credit of 
70 per cent of the cost of new construction or 30 per cent of the cost of 
acquisition of existing low income housing in return for limits on rents 
charged.  The credits are allocated over a 10-year period based on the 
‘Applicable Federal Rate’ (AFR).  Nominally the value of the credit is 9 
per cent annually for the 70 per cent credit and 4 per cent annually for 
the 30 per cent credit.  In 2008, 9 per cent was established as a floor on 
the nominal 9 per cent credit.  For acquisition of existing rental housing, 
the applicable credit is also 4 per cent.  The developer must decide 
between two options for the unit.  Either 20 per cent of available rental 
units must be rented to households with income less than 50 per cent of 
the county median income (adjusted for family size), or 40 per cent of the 
units must be set aside for households with income less than 60 per cent 
of the county median income.  The rent can be adjusted in future years 
as median incomes change (Malpezzi & Vandell, 2002). 
 
7.16 In principle LIHTC can be used by property owners to offset taxes on 
other income or can be sold to investors to raise capital funding for a 
project.  However, in practice, seldom if ever do developers use the 
credits to offset their own incomes.  The system relies on the sale of tax 
credit by a general partner that generally retains a one per cent interest 
in the property, and raises the rest of the equity through sale of the tax 
credit to third-party investors (Belsky, 2010).  The amount of tax credits 
that can be allocated to a project depends on non-land development 
costs, the proportion of units set aside for low income households and its 
credits rate (4 per cent for projects financed from tax-exempt state bonds 
and 9 per cent for other projects).  The credits are provided annually for 
10 years so a dollar of tax credit issued now has a present value of six to 
eight dollars.  If the allocation or rent conditions are not met the credit is 
not given (Quigley, 2008). 
 
7.17 The tax credits are more attractive than tax deductions as they provide 
an equivalent reduction in a taxpayer’s federal income tax, whereas a 
tax deduction only provides a reduction in taxable income.  They are 
more attractive to corporations, who constitute almost all investors in 
LIHTC projects, rather than individual investors.  This is because 
investments in tax credits are considered passive, and passive investors 
are not permitted to deduct losses from their incomes.  Only the general 




to offset using the taxes and benefits by spreading their own limited 
equity capital across as many new developments as possible to earn 
developer fees on all properties produced.  While the total development 
cost of an LIHTC property may be $10 million, the net development cost 
after selling tax credits varies.  It has ranged as low as 50 per cent or 
less to as high as 100 per cent or more.  Over the life of the programme 
the median share has been in the low to mid 70s (Belsky, 2010). 
 
7.18 Compliance with allocation rules and rent limits was initially (from 1986) 
required for a minimum period of 15 years.  Beginning in 1990, an 
additional 15-year ‘extended use’ requirement was imposed for all 
properties receiving new tax credit allocations.  The rules governing this 
additional 15-year period are complex.  Many tax credit projects receive 
additional subsidies that have compliance periods that extend beyond 
the initial 15-year period and even the ‘extended use’ 15 more.  In these 
cases, the other subsidies may lock in affordable use for 30 or more 
years in total.  In cases where only LIHTC rules apply, owners have the 
right to opt-out subject to an offer to sell the property at a predetermined 
price to a buyer if one can be found by the allocating agency.  If a buyer 
cannot be found, the owners have a three-year period in which they can 
transition the property to market rents.  LIHTC can therefore be seen as 
a means of providing a temporary subsidy in return for landlords being 
bound by obligations to house lower income households (Belsky, 2010). 
 
7.19 However, LIHTC housing does not reach the lowest income households.  
It is possible for such households to receive income related assistance in 
the form of vouchers that can be used to help pay LIHTC rents and thus 
create mixed income developments.  Whilst rents for LIHTC dwellings 
can rise over time in line with incomes, the increases may be insufficient 
to finance operating and capital cost towards the end of the compliance 
period for dwellings that need capital expenditure to bring them up to an 
acceptable standard.  It has been suggested that capital infusions are 
needed after 15 years to maintain physical and financial viability 
(Kadduri & Wilkins, 2008). 
 
7.20 LIHTCs have a strong record in terms of housing quality and financial 
stability and creating new housing in more diverse locations than 
previous programmes.  They enjoy wide bi-partisan support.  However, 
extremely low income households cannot afford the rents unless they 
have a housing voucher or the developer is able to obtain additional 
capital and operating subsidies.  Because land is not included in the 
eligible funding costs and is also excluded from the benefit of 
deprecation allowances, tax credit housing is often built on low cost land 
in low income neighbourhoods (JCHS, 2007; p5). 
 
7.21 Whilst advocates for supply-side programmes generally argue that they 
increase the supply of housing in general, Malpezzi and Vandell (2002) 
consider whether the LIHTC programme adds to the stock of housing or 
merely substitutes for units that would have been produced with other 




states they are unable to reach a definitive conclusion on whether or not 
LIHTC housing crowds out other unsubsidised units but they are unable 
statistically to reject the proposition that crowding out is a possibility. 
 
7.22 The passive loss rules tend to work against individual investors in LIHTC 
and in favour of corporations: “The passive loss rules apply to housing 
credit investments, with an exception that permits investors to take 
annual credits against income that are equivalent to $25,000 in 
deductions - - -  While this does not preclude individual taxpayers and 
closely held corporations from investing in LIHTCs, it does mean they 
will have less of an appetite for the credits than widely held corporations 
that can make full use of the credits against their tax liability” (JCHS, 
2009b; p19). 
 
7.23 The severe credit market problems disrupted the LIHTC programme in 
2008 and 2009 when the corporate investors on which the programme 
relied moved from profitability to loss and demand for LIHTCs 
plummeted.  As a result “the price of LIHTCs fell, creating funding gaps 
in projects that had received tax credit allocations in 2007 and 2008 but 
had not yet sold them.  Thousands of projects and tens of thousands of 
units that would have otherwise been bought or rehabilitated stalled” 
(JCHS, 2009b; p1).  In order to address the problem two new federal 
programmes were introduced in February 2009 as stop-gaps to improve 
the flow of funding.  These initiatives are the Tax Credit Assistance 
Program (TCAP) and the Tax Credit Exchange Program (Exchange).  An 
early evaluation suggested the relevant additional funding had been 
beneficial but was not sufficient to plug all the gaps and more was 
needed to compensate the falls in LIHTC support (JCHS, 2009b). 
 
Some additional incentive schemes 
 
Tax-Exempt Bond Financing 
 
7.24 Under US tax law, state and local governments are authorised to raise 
capital for various purposes, including housing development by for-profit 
or not-for-profit corporations, by issuing tax-exempt bonds – generally 
with terms of ten to thirty years (Lampert & Pomeroy, 2002).  When used 
for private purposes, state tax-exempt bonding authority is subject to a 
‘Private Activity Bond’ cap.  There are other competing uses for the cap 
so not all of it goes to produce rental housing.  There are restrictions on 
how these funds can be used.  They follow the same requirements as 
the tax credit programme.  By right, any property that receives state tax-
exempt bond financing is entitled to 4 per cent tax credits as long as it 
meets the 40 per cent of units affordable to 60 per cent of area median 
income requirements of the tax credit programme.  These ‘by-right’ 
allocations do not count towards the per capita cap on allocated tax 
credits (Belsky, 2010). 
 





7.25 Created in 1974, CDBG provides a formula-based federal block grant to 
localities for a variety of community redevelopment and revitalisation 
activities – although only a small portion is used to assist new rental 
development (Lampert & Pomeroy, 2002). 
 
HOME Investment Partnership Program 
 
7.26 In the late 1980s, community advocates successfully argued for HOME – 
a specific and separate mechanism outside of CDBG to fund housing 
(including new construction and rehabilitation of rental, as well as 
assisted home ownership programmes) with a formula-based allocation 
to localities similar to CDBG for 60 per cent of the funds and the other 40 
per cent going to state governments to administer (Lampert & Pomeroy, 
2002). 
 
HOPE VI (Housing opportunities for people everywhere) 
 
7.27 This has provided federal resources to transform the worst of the old 










8.1 Federal production programmes have supported new building for rental 
since the 1930s.  Initially and through to the 1960s the emphasis was on 
the construction of public housing which was built as a result of the 
government contracting with local public housing agencies. 
 
8.2 From the 1960s to the early 1980s the federal government subsidised 
the construction of more than 1.3 million privately owned affordable 
dwellings through cheap loans, generous depreciation allowances and 
operating support.  The government contracted with both profit and non-
profit developers and the contracts set out affordability restrictions for a 
limited period of time. 
 
8.3 The current system delegates key decisions to states and local 
governments who use federal resources to produce affordable housing 
in low income neighbourhoods.  The measures include the LIHTC 
programme; the Community Development Block Grant (CBDG) 
programme and the HOME investments partnership programme (see 
section 7).  These programmes have helped deliver large volumes of 
affordable housing and have fostered a national network of community 




improvement and management of affordable housing (Katz & Turner, 
2008). 
 
Table 6: Three phases of federal rental housing production support 
 
Phase Time Policy tools Providers 
1 1930s – 1960s Public housing Local public housing agencies 
2 1960s – 1980s Subsidised private construction Profit and non-profit firms 












8.4 Land use planning controls are seen as providing impediments to an 
expansion of affordable rental housing in locations where it is needed. 
 
“Increasingly restrictive local land use and development 
requirements have contributed to the rise in housing costs over 
time.  This is the result of reducing allowable density, limiting the 
land supply for development, imposing costly building 
requirements, and using administrative procedures that add 
delays and uncertainties.” (JCHS, 2007; p9) 
 
It is claimed that, 
 
“In many markets, zoning restrictions, minimum lot sizes, lengthy 
permitting and approval processes, and voter opposition to 
specific kinds of developments make the construction of 
affordable rental housing more difficult and therefore more 
expensive.” (JCHS, 2008; p20) 
 
8.5 Local property taxes can result in higher taxes on larger rather than 
smaller properties, disadvantaging larger property developments.  This 
can be a negative in locations where this applies (Belsky, 2010). 
 
 
9. Policy measures that influence the volume of 
the stock in the private rented sector 
 
9.1 Table 7 summarises the policy measures that have a positive impact on 
the volume of private rented housing in the USA.  More information on 
the policy instruments has been set out in the previous sections. 
 
Table 7: Principal positive policy measures summary 
 
Policy category Main measures Key outcomes 









Have produced a significant 
volume of subsidised 
affordable housing that is 
privately owned 
Investment tax breaks 
Income tax deductions, 
including depreciation, loss 
deductions, and Capital Gains 
Tax concessions 
Raises rate of return on 
investment 
 
10. Policy measures that influence the quality of 
private rented housing 
 
10.1 Most of the privately owned, small multifamily rental stock was built at 
least thirty years ago, and much of this is now in need of substantial 
repair.  Three million private rental units have severe structural 
deficiencies (JCHS, 2008; p13).  Eleven per cent of all renters and 
twelve per cent of renters in the bottom income quintile live in properties 
with structural problems (Belsky & Drew, 2008). 
 
10.2 Some smaller properties in particular face quality issues. 
 
“Most smaller properties, especially 1-4 unit buildings, are owned 
by individuals with very small portfolios (one or two properties), 
making it difficult for them to realize economies of scale.  Small 
owners also have trouble obtaining funds for capital 
improvements that could generate operating savings, assuming 
rents could bear the cost.  Given their age, many buildings are 
energy-inefficient and/or have faulty plumbing and may be in 
weaker locations. 
 
 It has been suggested that creating a federally-sponsored small 
property REIT (S-REIT) could help preserve this stock by bringing 
in new equity funding and allowing for more professional 
management. It would also solve the exit tax problem by allowing 
owners to exchange properties for S-REIT shares while still 




11. Summary 1 
 
11.1 There is a longstanding large private rented sector in the USA and 
currently around a third of households rent.  As in all countries, the size 
of the sector can only be understood in relation to other housing tenures.  
American households are mostly either home owners or private renters.  
There is a very small publicly owned rental sector.  Home ownership has 
been encouraged through a variety of fiscal initiatives and a mortgage 




most households.  The publicly owned rental sector has not been subject 
to significant policy incentives for several decades.  Thus demand for 
private renting is strong amongst those who cannot or do not wish to 
own.  Amongst low income households this demand is supported by 
housing vouchers that allow households some choice in where they will 
live and help reduce he rental burden.  Nevertheless, many low income 
American households still face significant housing affordability problems. 
 
11.2 Around two-thirds of unsubsidised rental units are owned by individuals 
and couples and the remainder by a variety of commercial organisations.  
Individual ownership is typically small scale and in smaller buildings than 
is the norm for company investment.  The larger scale investors include 
residential REITs that provide a tax efficient way of funding rental 
housing investment that is professionally managed and provides 
acceptable rates of return. 
 
11.3 Interest, maintenance and local property taxes are all deductable 
expenses as is depreciation.  This is calculated on a straight line basis 
over 27.5 years.  These cost deductions combined with rents that are 
mainly set at market levels mean that commercially acceptable rates of 
return are available for most investors.  Capital Gains Tax is set at 5 per 
cent as long as the property is owned for at least one year and can be 
avoided if the proceeds of sale are re-invested in a similar form of asset.  
In short, investing in rental housing can be a profitable activity supported 
by a benign taxation regime. 
 
11.4 The supply of new privately owned housing has been supported by the 
federal LIHTC programme which is administered with a good deal of 
local discretion through the individual states.  This provides a subsidy 
that is conditional on the newly produced or substantially improved units 
being available for lower income households at rents that reflect local 
affordability.  The lowest income households may fail to benefit from 
LIHTC dwellings, even though they can be additionally supported by 
housing vouchers. 
 
11.5 Rents are typically freely determined except in four states where local 
communities can limit rent increases on older tenancies.  Rents in newly 
produced units are freely determined although there are limits on the 
maximum rents in LIHTC supported housing. 
 
 
12. Summary 2 
 
1. Around one-third of American households live in rented housing 
much of which is privately owned and unsubsidised. 
 





3. There are a significant number of low income renting households 
with affordability problems. 
 
4. Investing in rental housing has proved attractive for both 
individuals/couples and large scale investors. 
 
5. A large unsubsidised sector has been mostly subject to freely 
negotiated market rents. 
 
6. Limits on rent increases exist in some locations – these do not 
affect new dwellings or new tenancies unless the new dwellings 
are assisted through subsidies or tax credits. 
 
7. Deductibility of expenses, including depreciation, for tax purposes 
support acceptable rates of return on rental investment. 
 
8. Capital Gains Tax is much lower than in the UK and landlords can 
avoid the tax by reinvestment in rental property. 
 
9. Low Income Housing Tax Credits, and federal rental production 
programmes more generally, have been important in supporting 
the supply of new privately owned affordable rental housing. 
 










Thanks are due to the valuable help provided by Eric S. Belsky from the Joint 




Apgar, W.C. & Narasimhan, S. (2008) Capital for Small Rental Properties; 
Preserving a Vital Resource. In Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, B.S. (eds) Revisiting 
Rental Housing; Policies, Programs, and Priorities (Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution) pp 277-299. 
 
Belsky, E. (2010) Personal communication from Eric Belsky, Harvard 
University Joint Centre for Housing Studies. 
 
Belsky, E.S. & Drew, R.B. (2008) Overview; Rental Housing Challenges and 
Policy Responses.  In Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, E.S. (eds) Revisiting Rental 
Housing; Policies, Programs, and Priorities (Washington DC, Brookings 
Institution) pp14-56. 
 
Collins, T. (2006) An introduction to the NYC Rent Guidelines Board and Rent 
Stabilisation System (New York, Rent Guidelines Board) [WWW] Available from 
http://www.housingnyc.com/html/about/intro/toc.html [Accessed 13/05/10]. 
 
JCHS (2006) The State of the Nation’s Housing (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Joint Centre for Housing Studies). 
 
JCHS (2007) Revisiting Rental housing Policy: observations from a National 
Summit (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Joint Centre for 
Housing Studies). 
 
JCHS (2008) America’s Rental Housing – The key to a balanced national 
strategy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Joint Centre for 
Housing Studies). 
 
JCHS (2009a) The State of the Nation’s Housing (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Joint Centre for Housing Studies). 
 
JCHS (2009b) The Disruption of the Low-income Housing Tax Credit Program: 
Causes, Consequences, Responses, and Proposed Correctives (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Joint Centre for Housing Studies). 
 
Jones, C. (2007) Private Investment in Rented Housing and the Role of REITS 





Katz, B. & Turner, M. A. (2008) Rethinking U.S. Rental housing policy: A new 
Blueprint for Federal, State and Local action. In Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, E.S. 
(eds) Revisiting Rental Housing; Policies, Programs, and Priorities (Washington 
DC, Brookings Institution) pp319-358. 
 
Khadduri, J. & Wilkins, C. (2008) Designing subisidized rental Housing 
Programs; What have we learned? In Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, E.S. (eds) 
Revisiting Rental Housing; Policies, Programs, and Priorities (Washington DC, 
Brookings Institution) pp161-190. 
 
Kutty, N. (1996) The Impact of Rent Control on Housing Maintenance Housing 
Studies Vol 11, No 1, pp69-88. 
 
Lampert, G. & Pomeroy, S. (2002) The Context for Private Rental Housing 
Production in the US (Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing). 
 
Lind, H. (2001) Rent Regulation: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis, 
European Journal of Housing Policy Vol 1, No 1, pp41-58. 
 
Malpezzi, S. & Vandell, K. (2002) Does the low income housing tax credit 
increase the supply of housing? Journal of Housing Economics  Vol 11, No 4, 
pp360-380. 
 
Malpezzi, S. (1998) Private Rental Housing Markets in the United States 
Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment Vol 13, No 3, pp353-
386. 
 
Newell, G. & Fischer, F. (2009) The role of residential REITS in REIT 
portfolios, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 1st April [WWW] 
Available from  
http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/financial-markets-
investing/12722554-1.html [Accessed 15/06/10]. 
 
Obrinsky, M. (2006) NHMC 50: Hot markets bring dynamic changes 
(Washington, DC, National Multi Housing Council). 
 
Quigley, J. M. (2008) Just suppose - Housing Subsidies for Low Income In 
Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, E.S. (eds) Revisiting Rental Housing; Policies, 
Programs, and Priorities (Washington DC, Brookings Institution) pp300-318. 
 
Retsinas, N.P. & Belsky, E.S. (eds) (2008) Revisiting Rental Housing; 
Policies, Programs, and Priorities (Washington DC, Brookings Institution). 
 
Schuetz, J. (2007) Land Use Regulation and the Rental Housing Market: A 
Case Study of Massachusetts (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University 





Torto Wheaton Research (2009) A Case For Investing in U.S. Apartments 
Report prepared for the National Multi-Housing Council (Boston,Torto Wheaton 
Research). 
 
U.S. Census (2001) Housing Characteristics: 2000 (Washington DC, U.S. 
Census Bureau). 
 
U.S. Census (2003) Structural and Occupancy Characteristics of Housing: 






Drier, P. & Atlas, J. (1995) US Housing Problems, Politics and Policies in the 1990s 
Housing Studies, Vol 10, No 2, pp245-269. 
 
Green, R. & Malpezzi, S. (2002) A Primer on U.S. Housing Markets and Housing 
Policy (Washington DC, Urban Institute Press). 
 
Millennial Housing Commission (2002) Meeting our Nation’s Housing Challenges. 
Report of the Millennial Housing Commission appointed by the Congress of the United 
States (Washington, US Congress). 
 
Susin, S. (2002) Rent Vouchers and the Price of Low Income Housing Journal of 












Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics 
Division Last Revised: December 17, 2004 
 
                                                 
11 Property Owners & Managers Survey (POMS) (2004) U.S Census Bureau [WWW] 






Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
 
AFR Applicable Federal Rate 
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S-REIT Small Real Estate Investment Trusts [TBC] 
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1.1 This report examines private rental investment in Australia.  It considers 
the key factors influencing the demand and supply of market rented 
dwellings.  The report shows that strong demand, supported by a 
favourable taxation regime, has encouraged investment, especially by 
small scale landlords who own a majority of the stock. 
 
1.2 There is very little institutional investment in the sector and this is 
unlikely to change without policy interventions that improve the risk 
adjusted rate of return.  A new initiative designed to promote private 
investment in low rent dwellings is considered. 
 
1.3 The report is based in secondary evidence including journal articles, 
census data and especially several reports from the Australian Housing 
and Urban Research Institute.  The production of the report has been 
greatly assisted by advice from Professor Mike Berry of the Australian 
Housing and Urban Research Institute at Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology. 
 
2. The size of the private rented sector and its 
contribution to housing investment 
 
Table 1: Housing Tenure 1991-2006: % dwellings in each sector 
 
 Outright owner Purchaser 
Private 
renter Social renter 
Tenure not 
stated 
1991 37.6 31.9 17.2 6.9 6.4 
1996 42 26 20 6 7 
2001 41 28 20 5 7 
2006 34 34 21 5 6 
 
Sources 1991: Beer, 1999: 1996, 2001, 2006: Wulff et al, 2009. 
 
2.1 Private rental dwellings have comprised around 20 per cent of the 
Australian housing stock in recent years.  The number of dwellings in this 
sector has increased considerably reflecting overall growth in the 
numbers of households and dwellings.  The data in Table 1 employs the 
standard Australian Bureau of Statistics definition of private rental 
accommodation, that is, occupied private dwellings in which the 
household pays rent to either a real estate agent or a person not living in 
the same household. 
 
2.2 Between 1986 and 1996, the Australian private rental market grew by 34 
per cent, but this growth was mainly at the top end of the market with 




number of private rental dwellings between 1996 and 2001 and this 
growth was entirely in the top quintile of the rent distribution.  Despite an 
overall growth in the number of private rental dwellings there were 
absolute losses in the number of dwellings in the bottom four quintiles of 
the rent distribution.  It is suggested that there was an inadequate supply 
of low rent units.  This is because of a lack of filtering down so that 
higher rental dwellings have not reduced pressure at the lower end of 
the market.  Thus there was a shortage of affordable private rental 
housing and this was despite increased incomes for renter households 
as a whole and increased investment in private rental housing (Yates et 
al, 2004). 
 
2.3 Between 2001 and 2006, Australia’s private rental sector grew by a 
further 11 per cent bringing the total number of private renter dwellings 
to 1.47 million.  An analysis of this growth found that the private rental 
stock again expanded most at the higher end of the rent distribution 
whilst declining at the lower end.  Private renter households increased 
mainly in the top third of the income distribution with some increase in 
the lowest income category (comprising 8 per cent of all private renter 
households).  The decline in low rent stock was greater in non-
metropolitan than in metropolitan areas.  There is an ongoing 
affordability problem for low income households who rent privately (Wulff 
et al, 2009). 
 
3. The demand for private rented housing 
 
3.1 Rising demand for renting over the last two decades had been linked to 
increases in house prices, which have made it more difficult for newly 
formed households to become owners and to a reduction in the supply of 
public housing that has made it more difficult for lower income 
households to find accommodation in this sector (Short et al, 2008).  
Renting is often considered to be a less attractive form of housing tenure 
than home ownership, as renters have weak security of tenure.  On the 
other hand, renting is also associated with flexibility, and renters may 
choose to move for lifestyle or employment reasons.  Renting is 
relatively common among young adults and low income households.  In 
addition, some high income households choose to rent for financial, or 
lifestyle reasons (AST, 2008). 
 
3.2 There is a high rate of mobility in the sector.  In 2006, renters were three 
times more likely than owner-occupiers to have changed address within 
the previous 12 months.  At the 2006 Census, 35 per cent of people who 
were renting had lived at a different address within the last year, 
compared with only 10 per cent of owner-occupiers.  Further, 63 per cent 
of all renters said that they had lived at a different address five years 
previously.  Census data indicates higher rates of mobility among 
younger people in renter households.  Among renters aged 18 to 24 
years, 52 per cent had lived at a different address within the past year 






3.3 In 2005-06 the median age for renters (based on the age of the 
household reference person) was 37 years, which was 15 years younger 
than the median age for owner-occupier households (52 years).  Young 
lone person households (reference person aged less than 35 years) 
were the most likely group to be renters (61 per cent).  Half of all young 
couples without children were renters.  Lone person households aged 35 
to 44 years were more likely to be renters (56 per cent) than owner-
occupiers (44 per cent), with the rental rate for this group increasing by 
nine percentage points between 1995-96 and 2005-06 (AST, 2008) 
 
Table 2: Distribution of income of households in the private rental sector 2001, 2006 
 
Household income quartile 2001 2006 
 % of private renter households 
1 26 24 
2 26 23 
3 27 27 
4 20 25 
 
Source: adapted from Wulff et al, 2009, Table 6, page 17. 
Totals do not add to 100 because of rounding 
 
3.4 The data in Table 2 suggests that private rental households are spread 
fairly evenly with respect to income distribution.  It is clear however that 
the proportion of privately renting households on the highest incomes (in 
quartile 4) has increased over time and amounted to one quarter of all 
privately renting households in 2006. 
 
3.5 An alternative representation of the data confirms that there are a 
considerable number of high income households that rent.  The 
information in Table 3 shows that nearly 20 per cent of high income 
households in 2005-06 (households in the highest quintile of equivalised 
disposable household income, i.e. income adjusted to take account of 
differing household size and composition) rented privately. 
 
3.6 High income renters tended to be younger households than other 
renters.  In 2005-06 half of high income renter households were aged 
less than 34 years (based on the age of the household reference 
person) compared with 38 years for all other renter households.  High 
income renter households were also less likely to have children, with just 
15 per cent having children aged less than 15 years compared with 36 




































 % % % % % % % 
 Equivalised disposable household income - quintile 
Lowest 47.6 13.8 13.2 4.0 18.1 2.5 100.0 
Second 39.9 27.6 4.5 2.7 22.8 2.1 100.0 
Third 28.6 41.9 1.5 2.3 23.8 1.5 100.0 
Fourth 24.6 47.3 1.0 2.0 23.5 1.4 100.0 




34.3 35.0 4.7 2.6 21.3 1.8 100.0 
 




3.7 Table 4 shows the variation in housing costs by tenure in 2003-04.  
Housing costs accounted for 19 per cent of renters’ household income 
and this was similar to that for home owners with a mortgage.  However 
more than 9 per cent of private renters allocated over half of their income 
to housing costs, which was a higher proportion than for any other 
tenure.  Extensive work by Australian academics has demonstrated that 
there are significant affordability problems for low income rental 
households.  The worsening affordability situation for low-income private 
renter households is compounded by rising housing costs and a 
shortage of affordable rental housing (Yates et al, 2004; Wulff et al, 
2009).  Low income households are also perceived as higher risk renters 
(greater probability of rent arrears) by property managers and landlords 




































$ % % % '000 
Owner without a 
mortgage 25 3 98.0 1.4 2,702.9 
Owner with a 




84 19 76.1 2.4 376.4 
Renter - private 
landlord 198 19 60.7 9.4 1,638.4 
Total renters(b) 174 19 64.3 7.8 2,133.4 
All owner and 
renter 
households 
157 14 77.9 5.1 5,416.7 
(a) Includes households with nil or negative total income. 
(b) Includes other landlord types. 
 




4. The supply of private rented housing 
 
4.1 Very little new housing is built exclusively for the private rental sector but 
official data does not allow one to identify the eventual tenure of newly 
built housing (Seelig, 2001).  It thus is not possible to suggest what 
contribution private renting makes to housing production. 
 
4.2 However, there is anecdotal evidence that new rental build is increasing 
over the last decade, driven by: booming overseas student numbers 
(studio and one-bed flats built near universities); young higher income 
professionals wanting to live near the centre of town (encouraged by 
state and local government planning strategies to increase densities); 
retired singles and couples looking for lifestyle advantages of central city 
location (Berry, 2010). 
 
4.3 Large land tracts in the inner cities of Melbourne and Sydney are being 
redeveloped for new residential use on converted light industrial and 
warehousing land (Docklands type development) and on old high rise 
public housing estates in Sydney and Melbourne.  Due to cost and 
location factors, the new stock is at the high rental end of the market and 





4.4 Private rental housing is provided by a diverse group of residential 
property owners such as private householders, non-profit institutions, 
employers and corporations.  The largest group, private householders, 
provided rental housing for about 60 per cent of households who rented 
in the private market in 1995-96 (ABS, 1999).  The majority of the private 
rental stock is thus owned by individual households and most of the 
remaining rental stock is owned by small (especially family-based) 
partnerships and small companies.  There is very little institutional 
investment in the sector (Berry, 2000). 
 
4.5 At a state level there have been arrangements where governments have 
leased from private owners to increase the supply of ‘social housing’.  
The dwellings are managed by not-for-profit housing associations and 
tenants get a state rental subsidy. 
 
4.6 There have been several initiatives, with varying success rates, to 
encourage more institutional investment into the private rented sector.  
There have also been several ideas that have been developed but not 
implemented.  There has also been some consideration of why 
institutional investment has not been forthcoming in Australia (Berry, 
2000; Berry & Hall, 2005; Jones, 2007) and this is considered in section 
6. 
 
4.7 A significant recent initiative is the National Rental Affordability Scheme.  
This is discussed in section 8. 
 
5. Individual investment in the private rented sector 
 
5.1 The vast majority of investors in the private rental market are individuals 
rather than corporate investors (Yates, 1996).  Individuals that invest in 
the low rent stock have lower incomes on average than rental investors 
overall.  Consequently they receive fewer of the tax advantages that 
encourage investment in rental property.  They also face higher 
operating costs.  They thus receive lower returns on their investment, 
and are, potentially, the most likely to exit the market.  Higher income 
investors benefit more from tax breaks, but tend to invest in higher 
valued properties (Yates et al, 2004).  Overall, private landlords have 
roughly twice the average incomes of all households (according to a 
1997 ABS investor survey quoted by Berry, 2010).  It has been 
suggested that the sector may be split between lower income relatively 
unsophisticated investors and more rational higher income landlords; 
many of whom use rental property as tax shelters, directly and by 
including rental properties in their private tax favoured superannuation 
funds (Berry, 2010). 
 
5.2 Most individual landlords own only one or two properties.  Only a small 
proportion (around 13 per cent according to a 1994 survey) obtains most 
of their income from their property investment and a majority obtains 




inherited property or they initially rented dwellings as a result of finding it 
difficult to sell their home when moving.  They have been termed 
‘accidental and unintentional’ landlords (Berry, 2000). 
 
5.3 Surveys of rental investors have persistently showed that perceptions of 
a secure long term investment, the advantages of negative gearing and 
the prospects of capital gains drive decisions to invest in rental property 
(Beer, 1999, Berry, 2000).  An investment is negatively geared when the 
income derived from the investment is less than the interest cost of 
borrowing and the other on-going costs of the investment.  Rental 
property investment is frequently negatively geared in Australia.  The 
resulting current losses are claimed by investors as deductions against 
other assessable income.  This contrasts with situation in the UK where 
the transfer of such loses to other taxable income is not possible. 
 
5.4 Two major studies of the motivations of individual investors in rented 
housing have between them stressed the importance of financial and 
personal factors in explaining both the decision to invest and the timing 
of the exit from the market.  Wood and Ong (2010) using a quantitative 
analysis of investors’ costs and returns pointed to the importance of 
financial factors and Seelig et al (2009) used interview evidence to 
examine the attraction of residential property compared with other 
investments. 
 
5.5 The investigation of financial motives concluded that the most important 
driver of rental investment behaviour is a person’s after-tax economic 
costs (referred to technically as the user cost of capital).  A rental 
investor’s user cost of capital is the investor’s after-tax economic costs 
as a percentage of the property value.  This takes account of the after-
tax interest on debt, the return sacrificed on the investor’s equity stake in 
the rental property investment and capital gains.  It also includes the 
operating costs of providing accommodation such as repairs, property 
management fees and land taxes, and transaction costs. 
 
5.6 On the basis of survey evidence from individual investors in rental 
housing (Seelig et al, 2009, p2) conclude that “The most crucial 
perception is that it represents a good (long-term) investment, with a 
sense of ‘low risk’ and ‘guaranteed’ return.  Most investors have 
identified ‘long-term investment’ or ‘capital gains’ as the most important 
reason for having invested in property”  Most commonly, capital gains 
over the longer term is what landlords expect, and this is how the 
success of the investment is judged. 
 
5.7 Investors usually accept that costs may well outweigh returns initially, 
and that positive returns are unlikely for a few years.  The tax benefits of 
negative gearing are not viewed by most landlords as essential to their 
investment but rather they see this as a ‘welcome and generous tool’ or 





5.8 It is shown that “New and seasoned investors alike report very high rates 
of satisfaction with various aspects of their property investment, including 
yield, capital gain, and property and tenancy management.  These 
perceptions provide an ongoing incentive for investors to remain in the 
property market, to increase their portfolio, to consolidate, or to start 
realising their assets as part of their investment strategy” (Seelig et al, 
2009, p3). 
 
5.9 Age and personal circumstances appear to be more important that 
financial factors and market circumstances in determining when the point 
of sale was to be.  Retirement was a significant factor influencing the 
decision to exit the market with landlords realising their capital gain at 
this point in heir lifecycle. 
 
5.10 Ownership of rental dwellings should be separated from the 
management of those dwellings.  Although many small scale landlords 
manage properties themselves, estimates suggest that 68 per cent of all 
privately rented dwellings are managed professionally by real estate 
agents (Short et al, 2008). 
 
6. Institutional investment in the private rented 
sector 
 
6.1 Berry et al (1998) in an attempt to understand the low level of 
institutional investment in private rented housing, interviewed senior 
managers from major Australian superannuation funds and fund 
managers.  They found that the main barriers to rental housing equity 
investment stressed by these interviewees were high management costs 
and the small unit size of residential investment opportunities.  They also 
suggested that securitisation would reduce liquidity problems, although 
the interviewees were comfortable with a degree of illiquidity in return for 
a premium on the required rate of return.  Concern was also expressed 
about the potential for bad publicity for the institution where, for example, 
tenants-in-arrears are evicted.  Institutional investors cannot furthermore 
benefit from the tax advantages available to individual investors. 
 
6.2 Overall it is clear that professional and institutional investors are absent 
from this sector, primarily because the expected return on investment is 
too low given the perceived risks.  The risks include: capital risk on the 
value of the dwellings; interest rate and inflation risks; rental yield risk; 
operating cost risk; and political risk associated with possible changes to 
relevant government policies.  Large institutions may also be concerned 
about the lack of complete and robust market information on the 
performance of this asset, poor tenancy and property management skills 
in the housing sector and the negative public image effects of tenant 
evictions.  Private investors, especially the major institutions like 
superannuation (pension) funds, will not invest until the expected returns 
justify the risks assumed (Berry & Hall, 2005).  Institutional investors 




2008-09 the Australian Government pumped funding into propping up 
the secondary market in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (Berry, 
2010). 
 
6.3 Analysis of the polices that are needed to increase institutional 
investment suggests that lower risks and higher returns could only be 
achieved with the help of subsidies: “A policy package necessary to 
remove the basic barrier to institutional investment—i.e. an inadequate 
risk-adjusted rate of return— will entail three components: a form of 
guaranteed subsidy stream; a mechanism for delivering the necessary 
subsidy; and, a private financing option.” (Berry & Hall, 2005; p105). 
 
6.4 Jones (2007) argues that Real Estate Investment Trusts have not been 
successful as a way of promoting institutional investment in private 
renting.  The Australian equivalent is Listed Property Trusts that have 
existed since 1970.  However unlike their American equivalent Australian 
LPTs do not invest in residential property.  One reason is that income 
returns at 3 to 4 per cent are deemed too low compared with commercial 
property (offices, retail, industrial) at around 7 to 8 per cent.  A lack of 
large investors is also related to the nature of the stock especially the 
lack of large rental complexes in Australia. 
 
6.5 Another barrier to residential REITs is the lack of adequate professional 
property managers, by comparison with the commercial property sector. 
Governments are hoping that the new NRAS (see section 8) will 
stimulate the growth of housing associations on a scale that encourages 
them to become professionally competent management organisations 
who might also attract property managers from the commercial sector 
(Berry, 2010). 
 
7. Policy measures that influence investment in the 




7.1 The states and territories, rather than the national government, are 
responsible for residential tenancy legislation.  Each jurisdiction has 
specific legislation concerning the rights and responsibilities of landlords 
and tenants, and of real estate agents and other property managers 
acting on behalf of landlords. 
 
7.2 Berry (2000, pp662-663) argues that “Australia has largely been free 
from the onerous and prescriptive legislative controls constraining 
landlords in many other advanced capitalist societies during the current 
century.  Rent control, other than during wartime (or as a quickly fading 
hang-over from war), has been absent.  Laws regulating landlord-tenant 
relations are imposed at the state government level, and therefore vary 
somewhat between states.  However, in general and in relation to similar 




landlords rather than tenants reflected above all in the absence of 
effective security of tenure for the latter.” 
 
7.3 Initial rents are freely negotiated in all Australian states.  Increases or 
decreases in rents may be reviewed by a tribunal (or in Tasmania a 
magistrate).  Reviews take account of market rents for comparable 
properties, and the state of repair of the premises.  The rent cannot be 
increased before the end of the first year of tenancy and in some states 
the landlord can only increase rent at intervals of six months.  Rent 
increases may require the service of a notice with a period which varies 





7.4 At the beginning of a tenancy tenants usually pay rent in advance and 
pay a rental bond.  The maximum advance rent is generally two weeks 
or a month’s rent, depending on the type of tenancy agreement and the 
state.  A rental bond functions as a security deposit in case the tenant 
fails to pay rent or incurs serious damage to the property.  Most states 
have a Rental Bonds Office that holds these bonds on behalf of 
landlords and tenants.  The amount is typically equal to four weeks rent 
but in detail the amount depends on the rent level, tenancy agreement 
and the state (Global Property Guide, 2006). 
 
Security of tenure 
 
7.5 There is weak security for tenants.  Landlords can obtain vacant 
possession easily making the investment potentially relatively liquid for 
investors.  There are two types of tenancy: fixed term tenancies, and 
periodic tenancies, which go either from week to week, or from month to 
month.  In principle landlords and tenants can negotiate a mutually 
agreeable term for the lease, but “the general “industry standard” is for 
an agreement to specify, initially, a six or 12-month tenure period (Fixed-
term Agreement) after which it becomes common practice not to specify 
any further period (Periodic Agreement).  This latter agreement provides 
for the tenant to reside in the property for an indefinite period.” (Adkins et 
al, 2002; p12). 
 
7.6 The minimum notice that a landlord is required to give ranges from 14 
days to 28 days depending on the state.  In two states (South Australia 
and Western Australia) there is no minimum period but landlords and 
tenants and required to reach an agreement (Global Property Guide, 
2006). 
 
7.7 The extent to which weak security of tenure is an important problem for 
tenants and a significant source of ‘involuntary’ mobility is a source of 
debate in Australia.  Data from 1999 shows that almost half of all private 
tenants had moved at least three times in the last five years whilst in 




this Adkins et al (2002) argue that while some mobility can be explained 
in terms of preference for flexibility over stability, much of the discussion 
on movement interprets it as involuntary and as evidence of insecurity of 




7.8 Several aspects of the Australian taxation system have important 
influences on the profitability of private renting for individuals and this 
impact on the level of investment in the sector.  The generous cost 
deductions against rental income and the possibility of benefiting from 
negative gearing and thus a reduction of tax due on non-property income 
have positive effects.  However the land taxation and stamp duty 
arrangements effectively incorporate disincentives against individual 
landlords owning more than one or two properties.  Capital gains tax 
additionally reduces the overall return.  Each of these aspects of the 
taxation system will be considered in turn.  There will then be a summary 
of the findings of a study that has examined the impacts of these 
measures and recommends a change in favour of American style Low 






Cost deductions and negative gearing 
 
7.9 All expenses can be deducted against the landlord’s total income for 
income taxation purposes.  The expenses that can be claimed include 
advertising costs, interest on loans, bank charges, council rates, 
insurance, land tax, property agent fees or commissions, repairs and 
maintenance (stationery, telephone, water charges, gardening and 
mowing, pest control), and travel undertaken to inspect the property or to 
collect the rent (Global Property Guide, nd). 
 
7.10 For new buildings the depreciation deduction takes the form of the 
Australian Government Building Write-Off (BWO) allowance, which 
enables a landlord to deduct from their annual taxable income an 
amount equal to 2.5 per cent of the construction cost of a newly built 
dwelling or an extension. 
 
7.11 In addition to the building allowance for capital and operating expenses, 
investor landlords can also deduct a whole range of book depreciation 
items on dwelling fixtures – curtains, carpets, stoves, dishwashers and 
other plumbing, etc.  Thus book losses for negative gearing can be very 
large (Berry, 2010). 
 
7.12 With individuals who have other sources of income able to transfer 
annual loses from rental property to reduce their overall tax bill, the 




attractive proposition for high income earners on the maximum marginal 
tax rate.  In the mid-1980s the Federal Government ended negative 
gearing, replacing it with a 4 per cent depreciation or building allowance 
for new rental dwellings.  It was however reintroduced in 1987 and the 
building allowance was reduced to 2.5 per cent.  It is seen as an 
important incentive for investors who rely on capital gains for the return 
from their investment (Berry, 2000). 
 
Land taxation and stamp duty 
 
7.13 Land tax is an annual tax, levied on all real estate properties.  
Exemptions to land tax are extended in most states, to a person’s 
primary place of residence, and to farms.  The tax base is the assessed 
value of the property.  All jurisdictions, except the Northern Territory, 
impose land tax on the value of land (excluding the value of the 
dwelling).  It is payable on dwellings that are not a primary place of 
residence (rental properties, second homes).  Stamp duty is levied by all 
jurisdictions on the change of ownership of land and dwellings.  
Typically, the higher the value of the transaction, the higher is the rate of 
stamp duty (Global Property Guide, nd; Wood et al, 2003b). 
 
7.14 Land Tax is payable only above certain specified land value thresholds, 
but is then payable on the combined land value of all property holdings.  
The multiple property landlord is thus far more likely to be liable to pay 
land tax.  It has therefore been argued that land tax arrangements act as 
a barrier to landlords increasing their portfolios above one or two 
properties: “State Government land tax is levied beyond a minimum 
value threshold, which varies between states and over time.  In larger 
metropolitan housing markets the threshold is normally surpassed after 
one or, at most, two dwellings, encouraging the maintenance of a highly 
dispersed pattern of rental ownership.” (Berry, 2000; p663). 
 
7.15 This is confirmed by Wood et al (2003b) who demonstrate that State and 
Territory Land Tax and Stamp Duty create disincentives for single 
property landlords who wish to add to their investments in rental housing, 
and thereby potentially limit the supply of dwellings in the private rental 
market.  They show, by way of an example, that for the typical single 
property landlord in Sydney the effective tax burden increases by nine 
percentage points when they invest in one additional rental dwelling. 
 
Capital Gains Tax 
 
7.16 Capital gains tax was introduced in 1983.  Before this capital gains on all 
assets were untaxed.  Capital gains tax is applied at the investor’s 
marginal rate of income tax.  The capital gain is computed by deducting 
the ‘cost base’ from the gross selling price or fair market value of the 
property.  The ‘cost base’ of the property is the sum of the following 
amounts: 
• acquisition cost of the property 




• improvement costs and 
• non-capital costs of ownership of an asset acquired on or after 21 
August 1991 (for example, interest on borrowing to purchase the 
asset, rates and land taxes, repair and maintenance expenditure) to 
the extent that these are not otherwise deductible 
 
7.17 The cost base of the property sold within one year of acquisition cannot 
be indexed.  Otherwise, the non-capital costs of ownership of an asset 
can be indexed.  The indexation method that can be applied depends on 
the date the property was acquired.  For assets acquired before 1999 
indexation is related to the consumer prices index.  For properties 
purchased since then there is simply a 50 per cent discount from the 
unindexed gain as long as the property is owned for at least one year 
(Global Property Guide, nd).  This is a huge incentive to higher income 
investors (Berry, 2010). 
 
The impact of the taxation system 
 
7.18 An evaluation of the financial viability of rental property investment and 
the tax system suggests that a range of factors influences financial 
viability including mortgage interest rates, property prices, income tax 
rates, income tax deductions and, negative gearing.  Tax deductions 
help to make investing in the private rental market more financially viable 
and increase the supply of rental property (Wood et al, 2003b). 
 
7.19 However, the combined effect of negative gearing, capital gains and 
BWO tax arrangements on financial returns is greatest at the high rent 
end of the market.  The effect is small at the low-rent end of the market 
and so the pattern of rental housing financial returns is distorted, 
disadvantaging investments at the low-rent end of the market. 
 
7.20 Woods (2001) found that tax and other incentives encourage high 
income investors to acquire high rent dwellings and low income investors 
acquire low rent dwellings (often managing one expensive property 
rather than two cheaper ones). This adds to a bias in favour of high rent 
segments and reinforces the structural shortage in the low rent segment.  
Rents relative to dwelling quality were found to be higher in the low rent 
segment because a higher proportion of investor return comes from 
rental yield than in the high rent segment (Woods, 2001).  Gross rental 
yields are higher for lower income investors (Berry, 2010). 
 
7.21 It argued that on its own the BWO allowance has little effect on tax 
burdens, reducing the average effective tax rate by only one percentage 
point.  The negligible impact arises because BWO allowances are 
recaptured on sale of the rental property, through capital gains tax.  An 
alternative means of reducing the tax burden of landlords and of 
directing investment to the low-rent end of the market is the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit as used in the United States.  This allows a landlord 
to deduct from their taxable income an amount equivalent to 70 per cent 




dwelling.  It is seen as a better option than the BWO (Wood et al, 
2003b). 
 
Assistance for rental households 
 
Setting up a tenancy 
 
7.22 There are a range of services instigated at state level that are designed 
to help low income tenants set up their tenancy and thereby encourage 
landlords to let their properties to low income renters.  Collectively these 
have been termed Private Rental Support Programs.  The services 
provided include help with the bonds that are required at the start of a 
tenancy.  This takes the form of grants, loans or guarantees.  The 
assistance can also include help in making advance rent payments and 
clearing rent arrears (in the form of loans or grants); assistance with 
moving and utility costs and information and advocacy services.  An 
evaluation of these programmes shows that perceptions of private 
rented sectorP are generally positive amongst both tenants and the 
practitioners responsible for administering the programmes.  They 
believe, in particular, that bond loans and grants are important in helping 
low income households enter the private rental market and maintain their 




7.23 Demand for private renting has been supported by Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance (CRA).  It is a direct housing subsidy available to eligible 
private tenants and is the major form of housing assistance to low 
income households.  It is argued however that it fails to target the 
poorest tenants and those living in high cost housing markets (Wood et 
al, 2003a).  CRA to private tenants is channelled to those in receipt of 
benefits and/or pensions.  Apart from some family households, low paid 
working households do not receive CRA.  The amount paid varies by 
rental level up to a threshold.  As it is capped its value is eroded in areas 
where housing costs are high.  It is not therefore sufficiently generous to 
alleviate affordability problems for lower income households in high rent 
locations (Randolph & Holloway, 2007). 
 





8.1 Investment in newly constructed dwellings is stimulated by the 
interaction of depreciation allowances and capital gains taxes and by the 
ability to reduce (state based) stamp duties by purchasing dwellings ‘off 
the plan’ (Yates & Wulff, 2005; p8).  More generally the tax advantages 
of investing in rented housing are likely to support the purchase of new 





National Rental Affordability Scheme 
 
8.2 In 2008, the Australian government introduced a new scheme, the 
National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), which has potential to 
directly contribute to the supply of private rental housing let at submarket 
rents.  It aims to increase the supply of affordable rental housing through 
the production of 50,000 additional dwellings by 2012.  The dwellings will 
be owned by the bodies financing their development, for example, 
privately-owned property developers, financial institutions, or non profit 
housing/welfare organisations.  The property and tenancy management 
of the new dwellings to be undertaken by, among others, private 
businesses (for example, real estate agents) (Lawson et al, 2010; 
Johnston, 2009). 
 
8.3 The scheme provides a subsidy on the condition that the dwellings are 
rented for at least ten years at a rent that is no more than 80 per cent of 
the local median market rent.  There are allocation conditions that 
require the dwellings to be rented to households whose income falls 
within given limits.  These income thresholds are modelled on eligibility 
criteria for Commonwealth Rent Assistance (Johnston, 2009).  A 
modelling exercise of a sample of NRAS properties and households 
found that 40 per cent of households with affordability problems would 
be moved from paying more than 30 per cent of their income on housing 
to paying less than 30 per cent.  It also finds that the NRAS is likely to 
create savings in CRA expenditure of 5 per cent (Ong & Wood, 2009). 
 
8.4 The subsidy takes the form of a tax credit for private sector participants 
and a grant for charity participants.  For private investors, the NRAS 
initially provided a $6,000 tax credit per new dwelling constructed, each 
year, for ten years, from the Australian government, plus $2,000 cash or 
in-kind contribution from the state or territory government.  The in-kind 
element can be in the form of stamp duty or land tax concessions.  The 
cost of NRAS to the Australian Government through to 2012 is projected 
to be $625 million (Ong & Wood, 2009).  NRAS is inflation indexed and 
is now worth over A$9,000 in nominal terms (Berry, 2010). 
 
8.5 NRAS has not yet appealed to institutional investors.  In the first two 
rounds, only housing associations and other non-profit community 
organisations have taken up the subsidies.  Round 3 is currently 
underway and is aimed at the institutions – bids have to have a minimum 
of 1,000 dwellings.  “It is very doubtful that much will eventuate here – 
because of the barriers that exist (as per 6.1 and 6.2)” (Berry, 2010). 
 
8.6 NRAS was introduced to build up a housing association sector as an 
equity investor and manager of an affordable rental stock; private 
investors would provide debt funding.  This to date has meant normal 
bank mortgage finance.  The bigger housing associations are borrowing 
up to 100 per cent on NRAS dwellings supplementing NRAS subsidies 




charged have to be no greater than 80 per cent of the market level but 
mostly are 75 per cent to meet the regulatory requirements for charity tax 
status.  To date there have been few private for-profit equity rental 
investors taking up NRAS subsidies (Berry, 2010). 
 
8.7 NRAS has been introduced alongside a large ‘Nation Building and Jobs 
Plan’ (A$5.6 billion for affordable housing) as part of the Australian 
Government’s fiscal stimulus package to fight the global financial crisis 
(GFC).  This is in the form of a capital grant for 75 per cent of the cost of 
a new dwelling, the remaining 25 per cent has to attract private funding 
(mortgage debt).  Early in 2010, the government agreed that housing 
associations could couple NRAS subsidies with Nation Building grants.  
There are other boosting schemes around homelessness and 
Indigenous Housing and a one-off growth fund for housing associations 
under ‘National Partnership Agreements’ between the Commonwealth 
and the states.  But these are short term as is National Building.  The 
long term is governed by a 2009 introduced National Affordable Housing 
Agreement (NAHA) that requires state public housing authorities and 
housing associations to leverage future Commonwealth grants by 25 per 
cent.  The NAHA replaced the Commonwealth State Housing Agreement 
that ran from 1945 to 2008 and funded public and community housing 
(Berry, 2010). 
 
9. Policy measures that influence the volume of the 
stock in the private rented sector 
 
9.1 Over the long run demographic change (principally smaller households) 
has boosted demand for the sector (Beer, 1999).  Housing market and 
taxation arrangements have been favourable to small scale investment 
in private renting.  Capital growth (increasing house prices) has made 
the sector an attractive investment, together with provisions that allow 
negative net income streams to offset tax on other activities.  Demand 
has been encouraged by the lack of a significant social sector. 
 
9.2 There is a well-established tradition of investing in residential property.  
Such investment has been encouraged by taxation arrangements such 
as negative gearing, which enables investors to defer tax liabilities until 
capital gains are realised.  Financial innovation has increased access to 
finance for investment.  These changes have contributed to a growth in 
investment since 1996 (Yates & Wulff, 2005; p8).  Rental housing 
investment is also encouraged by low volatility of returns by comparison 
with equities and other asset classes (Berry, 2010). 
 
9.3 Negative net-rental income can be offset against other income for tax 
purposes.  A major incentive for investment is long term capital growth.  
Negative gearing is important for high income individuals with high 





9.4 The attraction of private renting as an investment is combination of 
financial incentives and the availability of an investment that ordinary 
households can understand and perceive as giving a long term safe 
return.  It has been summarised in this way: 
 
“Rental investment leaves the landlord in control of a highly visible 
asset, bricks and mortar, with psychological benefits for risk 
averse investors with limited knowledge of the broader investment 
environment --- rental housing --- has been one of the few 
effective avenues, along with savings banks, home ownership and 
life insurance, for personal savings.  In this sense it has 
functioned as a ‘sink’ for trapped savings.”(Berry, 2000; p663) 
 
9.5 Despite the high level of investment in the private rented sector there is 
concern that there is a shortage of low rent stock.  A wide ranging 
evaluation of this shortage (Yates et al, 2004) suggests that there are 
two main approaches to addressing this issue.  One involves replacing 
the private rental market and the other supplementing the market. 
 
9.6 Replacement might occur through creating a secondary rental market, 
such as happens with head leasing by a social landlord.  This solution 
has been implemented on a small scale in different states through head 
leasing low rent properties as they become available.  This involves 
creation of a secondary market for low income tenants and ensures that 
the low rent stock is allocated to those households most in need of it.  
The need for control over the allocation process is reinforced by the 
argument that shortages are magnified because existing low rent stock is 
occupied by higher income households.  It is suggested that the 
declining numbers of low rent properties mean that an approach that is 
restricted to better targeting of the existing low rent stock will be limited. 
 
9.7 Market supplementation could be accomplished by the development of a 
social housing sector.  If the private sector helps to provide this social 
housing it is argued that new tax breaks, guarantees or other forms of 
direct subsidy will be require together with demand side rental 
assistance (Yates et al, 2004).  The National Rental Affordability Scheme 
provides another model that potentially adds to the stock of privately 
owned rented housing that is subject to rent limitations and allocation 
criteria designed to target households on lower incomes. 
 
10. Policy measures that influence the quality of 
private rented housing 
 
10.1 The Australian censuses do not include data on the quality of houses 
and thus are not usually used in housing analyses in Australia.  There 
appear to be no specific initiatives that are designed to improve the 
quality of the housing stock.  However given that maintenance 
expenditure is deducible for income tax proposes and capital 




gains tax, there are arguably fiscal incentives to maintain and improve 
properties.  The policy literature does not identify poor quality rented 
housing quality as an issue. 
 
10.2 The quality focus is now on environmental standards.  National building 
regulations now specify 5-star energy standards on all new houses.  A 6-
star requirement is widely tipped to become mandatory industry wide.  
This is low by European standards, partly reflecting the Australian 
climate and customs (Berry, 2010). 
 
11. Summary 1 
 
11.1 The private rented sector represents around one fifth of the housing 
stock in Australia.  As a proportion of the stock this has changed little for 
two decades but the absolute numbers have increased considerably.  
This growth has principally been at the top end of the market with the 
availability of lower rent accommodation declining.  This has contributed 
to significant affordability problems for low income households. 
 
11.2 There is a high rate of mobility in the sector and large numbers of young 
households.  There are large numbers of single people who rent 
privately but so do half of all young couples without children.  The 
proportion of higher income renters is growing, probably reflecting rising 
house prices. 
 
11.3 Landlord and tenant legislation is in detail principally a matter for 
individual states but the overall position is one of free market rents and 
very limited security of tenure for tenants.  There are some limits on rent 
increases, especially in the short term but landlords can obtain vacant 
possession easily and at short notice. 
 
11.4 Most private rental housing is owned by individuals who typically own 
only one or two properties.  Land and stamp duty thresholds work 
against larger holdings.  Investment in the private rented sector is 
influenced by a favourable demographic, economic and fiscal 
environment.  Taxation advantages support investment, as does long 
term capital growth.  These factors encourage individual but not 
institutional investment.  This is virtually non-existent.  Institutional 
investors invest in rental housing only through the secondary mortgage 
market. 
 
11.5 The deductibility of a wide range of expenses from rental income for tax 
purposes, including financing costs and depreciation helps to increase 
the rate of return to investment.  Investors who engage in negative 
gearing, accepting ongoing losses, against the prospect of long term 
capital gain, are assisted by a tax system that allows these losses to be 
offset against other income.  The tax system has encouraged investment 





11.6 Assistance with rental deposits and housing allowances help low income 
households enter the sector and make renting more affordable.  There 
are however doubts about whether the national housing allowance 
system provides sufficient support for the lowest income tenants. 
 
11.7 Professional and institutional investors are absent from this sector, 
primarily because the expected return on investment is too low given the 
perceived risks.  Evaluations in Australia suggest that some new form of 
subsidy is required in order to improve this rate of return and encourage 
institutional investment. 
 
11.8 A new National Rental Affordability Scheme is promoting the building of 
new private rental dwellings.  Investors receive tax credits on the 
condition that the properties are let at sub-market rents to households 
within specified income limits.  The scheme is however open to non-
profit organisations as well as private investors and the take up by the 
private sector has been very low. 
 
11.9 In the short term as part of a reaction to the GFC a new ‘Nation Building 
and Jobs Plan’ and other financial packages are providing capital grants 
to support rental house building. 
 
12. Summary 2 
 
1. The private rental stock is growing in Australia.  Over one-fifth of all 
households rent privately. 
 
2. There are large numbers of young mobile households in the sector 
and a growing proportion of higher income households. 
 
3. There is a significant affordability problem for low income tenants 
despite assistance from housing allowances and rental deposits. 
 
4. Free market rents are accompanied by weak security of tenure for 
tenants. 
 
5. Most rental housing is owned by individual landlords who typically 
own one or two dwellings. 
 
6. The deductibility of a wide range of expenses from rental income for 
tax purposes, including financing costs and depreciation helps to 
promote individual investment in the sector. 
 
7. The advantages of negative gearing, for tax purpose, accompanied 
by the prospects of long term capital growth provide an important 
stimulus for individual investment in the sector. 
 
8. Professional and institutional investors are absent from this sector, 
primarily because the expected return on investment is too low given 





9. Policy measures that include subsidies to increase the rate of return 
are a necessary condition for more institutional investment. 
 
10. A new system that gives tax breaks to private investors in low rent 
dwellings is expected to increase the supply of privately owned 
affordable accommodation. 
 
11. A ‘Nation Building and Jobs Plan’ and ‘National Partnership 
Agreements’ are in the short term providing additional assistance for 
rental house building. 
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1.1 This report gives an overview of the policies relating to the private rental 
sector in France, with specific attention being paid to policy measures 
that aim to promote investment in this sector.  The paper is based on an 
analysis of the literature, of relevant policy documents and of statistical 
data sources.  Two French housing experts (Jean-Pierre Schaefer and 
Claude Taffin) have provided information and advice. 
 
2. The size of the private rented sector and its 




2.1 This section presents some basic characteristics of the French private 
rental sector; its importance compared to the other tenure sectors, the 
importance of the different types of private rental landlords, and the 
contribution of the private rental sector to the production of new 
dwellings. 
 
The size of the private rented sector in historical perspective 
 
2.2 As in many other European countries, the private rental sector had a 
dominant position on the French housing market in the period before 
World-War II (Haffner et al, 2009; p107).  In the decades after World-War 
II, the share of the sector decreased considerably.  This was partly due 
to the fact that the rents of private rental dwellings that were occupied 
before 1948 were strictly regulated.  This rent regulation, combined with 
heavy taxes for private rental landlords, led to low returns and prompted 
many private landlords to sell their property.  In addition to this, urban 
renewal operations in inner city areas also resulted in a decline of the 
private rental dwelling stock. 
 
2.3 In the 1980s, the decline of the private rented sector came to an end 
(see also Figure 1).  Since then, the proportion of private rental sector 
dwellings has been stable; the private rental dwelling stock having a 
share that corresponds to about 20 per cent of the total dwelling stock.  
According to most French housing experts, this relative revival of the 
private rented sector is mainly due to the various tax incentives to private 
investors that have been developed by the French government (Taffin, 
2008).  Tutin (2008) notes that the stable share of the private rental 
































Source: INSEE housing survey, various years 
 
Types of landlords 
 
2.4 The vast majority (about 96 per cent) of French private rental dwellings is 
owned by private individuals.  Only a very limited part of the private 
rental stock (about 4 per cent, which equates to 230,000 housing units) 




2.5 In the 1980s the share of the private rental sector in total housing 
production was relatively limited (5 to 10 per cent of this production, 
between 10,000 and 20,000 new private rental sector dwellings each 
year).  In the 1990s, the share of the private rental sector in housing 
production increased to about 15 per cent (with a yearly output 
fluctuating between 35,000 and 45,000 private rental dwellings).  After 
the turn of the century, the production of private rental dwellings further 
increased, reaching a peak of more than 85,000 dwellings in 2006 (see 
Table 2).  In the last few years, the production figures have dropped 





Table 2: Housing starts in France in the period 2004-2010 (*1,000 dwellings) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201012  
Social housing (HLM) 44.0 54.0 57.0 64.0 68.0 80.0 100.0 
Intermediate rental housing 2.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.6 3 
Private rental sector 57.9 73.3 85.5 79.7 58.4 44.3 57 
Owner occupation 272.3 293.7 292.8 294.9 254.6 194.3 195.7 
Secondary homes 21.2 21.8 23.8 23.2 17.4 12.2 15.3 
Total 397 441 460 465 400 334 371.5 
% private rental sector 15 17 19 17 15 13 15 
 
Source: based on information provided by Schaefer, 2010 
 




3.1 This section analyses the private rental sector from the demand-side and 
focuses on the characteristics of private rental sector tenants.  
Furthermore, the main characteristics of the private rental dwelling stock 
are presented. 
 
3.2 The data that is used in this section comes from the French national 
housing survey (L’Enquête logement) which is conducted every four to 
six years by the French national statistical institute (INSEE).  The most 
recent of these was carried out in 2006 and had a sample size of about 
43,000 cases.  Some results of the survey were published in ANAH 
(2009a). 
 




3.3 Table 3 shows that, as far as the income distribution of households is 
concerned, the private rental sector has an intermediate position 
between the owner-occupancy sector and the social rental sector.  The 
lower income groups (first and second quartile) are more strongly 
presented than in the owner-occupancy sector, but less strongly than in 
the social rented sector.  With regard to higher income groups (third and 
fourth quartile), the tenants in the private rental sector occupy the middle 
ground as well.  There are relatively more higher income groups than in 
the social rental sector but less than in the owner-occupancy sector. 
 
3.4 Between 2001 and 2006, the share of lower income groups in the private 
rental sector has increased.  This trend is also visible in the social rental 





                                                 







Table 3: Income distribution in the different tenure sectors in 2001 and 2006 
 
 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
Owner-occupiers 2001 17.1% 23.6% 27.6% 31.7% 
Owner-occupiers 2006 16.1% 23.4% 27.6% 32.9% 
Tenants in social rental sector 2001 38.5% 30.4% 21.4% 9.8% 
Tenants in social rental sector 2006 42.0% 29.8% 19.4% 8.8% 
Tenants in private rental sector 2001 30.1% 24.4% 22.8% 22.7% 
Tenants in private rental sector 2006 32.1% 26.0% 23.1% 18.8% 
All households 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 
Source: ANAH, 2009a 
 
Demographic characteristics of the tenants 
 
3.5 The average age of the tenants in the private rental sector is 42 years, 
which is 10 years less than the average age of all households.  The 
households in the French social rental sector are on average 49 years 
old.  The relatively low average age of private rental sector tenants is 
related to the fact that the private rental sector houses many (young) 
single working people and students. 
 
3.6 Looking at the household composition, one can observe that single 
persons (48 per cent) and one-parent families (8 per cent) are 
overrepresented in the French private rental sector.  By way of 
comparison: these household types have a share of 6 per cent and 35 




3.7 About three million tenants in the French private rental sector receive a 
housing benefit.  On average, these tenants receive an allowance of 
€200 per month. 
 
The demand for private rental dwellings 
 
3.8 Just as in many other European countries, the French private rental 
sector is the domain of households who cannot or do not want to move 
to the social rental sector, for example, because of the long waiting times 
or because their income is too high.  For many tenants in the French 
private rental sector, the owner-occupancy sector is not a good 
alternative either, for example, because house prices are too high or 
because owning a home makes it more difficult to move. 
 
3.9 Ball (2010) notes that many private rental sector tenants live in the inner 
city areas of the large cities, with the greatest number in Paris.  Such 
tenants are highly mobile; two-thirds occupy their dwelling for less than 





Pressure on the private rental market 
 
3.10 In a Western European context, the tension on the French private rental 
market can be described as moderate.  The pressure on this market is 
stronger than in Germany and the Netherlands, but less than in the 
United Kingdom, Spain and Italy (Massot, 2009; p152).  Like 
everywhere, also in France the pressure on the housing market is 
highest in the urbanised regions, in particular the Paris area. 
 
Characteristics of the private rental dwellings13 
 
3.11 Private rental dwellings in France are relatively old; about 44 per cent of 
the private rental dwelling stock was constructed before 1948.  For the 
total French housing stock this is only 30 per cent; relatively more social 
rental and owner-occupancy dwellings have been developed since 1948.  
The average size of a private rental dwelling is 65 square metres, 
compared to 69 square metres in the social rental sector. 
 
3.12 In 2.2 per cent of the private rental dwellings, there is no indoor toilet and 
sometimes even no running water (ANAH, 2009a; p22).  This mainly 
concerns dwellings that were built before World War II.  In recent 
decades, the volume of such low quality dwellings has steadily declined. 
 
3.13 According to Donner (2000, p283) dwellings let by institutional market 
rental landlords are generally of higher quality than those let by 
individual market rental landlords. 
 




4.1 This section discusses the characteristics of both individual and 
institutional private rental landlords. 
 
Individual private rental landlords 
 
4.2 As indicated in Section 2, the large majority of French private rental 
landlords are individual households.  According to the national housing 
survey 2006, there are 2.48 million individual private rental landlords in 
France, which corresponds to 9.4 per cent of all households.  These 
individual private rental landlords let approximately 4.66 million14 
dwellings (including vacant dwellings) which corresponds to an average 
of 1.9 private rental dwelling per household.  Table 4 highlights the age 
                                                 
13 All figures presented in this paragraph refer to the year 2006. 
14 According to ANAH (2009a), the housing survey 2006 underestimates the number of private 
rental dwellings owned by individual landlords.  According to the Compte de logement 2010, 
there are about 5.6 million rental dwellings in France that are owned by private individuals 




distribution of the individual private rental landlords; indicating that the 







Table 4: Age distribution of individual private rental landlords, 2006 (column 
percentages) 
 
Age Individual private rental landlords All households 
< 40 years 12 28.4 
40 -59 years 45.6 37.5 
60-74 years 27.8 20.2 
> 74 years 14.7 13.9 
Total  100 100 
Average age 57 52 
 
Source: ANAH, 2009a 
 
4.3 Table 5 shows the income distribution of the individual private rental 
landlords, divided up according to the number of rental dwellings that 
these landlords possess.  The table shows that more than 50 per cent of 
the individual private rental landlords belong to the highest income 
quartile.  Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between the 
household income and the number of private rental dwellings owned. 
 


















1st quartile 8.9 9.6 7.9 6.8 25.0 
2nd quartile 16.7 19.1 10.6 12.9 25.0 
3rd quartile 23.8 24.2 26.9 19.4 25.0 
4th quartile 50.6 47.1 54.6 61.0 25.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: ANAH, 2009a 
 
Institutional private rental landlords 
 
4.4 Within the total private rental market, institutional private rental landlords 
only occupy a relatively minor position (they own and manage about four 
per cent of the total private rental stock).  The group of institutional 
private rental landlords is rather diverse.  It consists of banks, insurance 
companies, investment funds and Real Estate Investment Trusts (SCPI 
in French).  We have not been able to find statistics on the importance of 
each of these investors.  Most institutional private rental landlords own 




This private rental dwelling stock owned by institutional investors is 
mainly situated in Paris and some main cities, for example, Lyons and 
Marseille. 
 
4.5 Since the 1990’s, institutional private rental landlords have sold a 
substantial share of their housing stock (this stock declined from about 
500,000 dwellings to less than 250,000 dwellings).  This development is 
due to the fact that institutional investors are increasingly focusing on 
investing in offices and retail, where they can enjoy higher returns than 
in housing (see Table 6). 
 
4.6 Nevertheless, some new investment still takes place.  These new 
investments particularly focus on specialised housing, for example, 
rental homes for the elderly (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
Table 6: The portfolio of institutional investors in France in 1998 and 2008 
 
 Housing Offices Retail Other 
1998 36% 46% 11% 7% 
2008 16% 51% 21% 12% 
 
Source: IEIF, 2010 
 




5.1 We have not been able to find statistics on the total individual investment 
in the French private rental sector.  Nevertheless, based on the available 
statistics, it is possible to make some rough and indicative calculations: 
 
• Table 2 shows that in 2005, about 73,000 new private rental 
dwellings were produced.  In that year, a private rental dwelling had 
an average price of €141,000 (Ministère du logement et de la Ville, 
2008; p39).  Thus, as a rough estimation, the total sum of individual 
investment in the private rental sector in France in 2005 was around 
€10.3 billion (73,000 x 141,000). 
 
• In addition to this, there is also investment by individuals in the 
existing housing stock (individuals buying existing dwellings in order 
to let them).  Official data on this are not available either, although it 
is estimated that this concerned about 50,000 dwellings per year in 
the 2005 to 2007 period (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
5.2 In 2005, 71 per cent of the new dwellings acquired by individual 
investors were apartments.  Most of them (67 per cent) were bought 
from developers, whereas the rest (33 per cent) was constructed under 
the commission of individual persons.  About 40 per cent of the dwellings 
concerned were located in an agglomeration with more than 100,000 





Financial aspects of individual investment in the private rented 
sector 
 
5.3 In the past individual investors in the French private rental sector 
obtained a rental yield of around 5 per cent per year.  Recently, 
however, rental yields of 3.5 to 4 per cent are cited in developer’s 
advertisements which try to encourage individuals to invest in the private 
rental sector. 
 
5.4 It should be noted that rental yields are not the only reason for 
individuals to invest in the private rental sector.  Potential capital gains 
(as a result of growth in property prices) may also be a strong incentive. 
 
5.5 Last but not least, it should be noted that not all individual private rental 
landlords are letting dwellings for purely economic reasons.  Some of 
these landlords are in the business for family-related and/or nostalgic 
reasons, for example of because they have inherited the dwelling and/or 
the dwelling is located in their place of birth. 
 
Organisational aspects of individual investment in the private 
rented sector 
 
5.6 Some new developments, especially those associated with fiscal 
incentives, in the private rental sector are developed through specialised 
companies.  In the last ten years, a network of companies has emerged 
that sells dwellings (mainly apartments) that are meant to be let by 
individual private landlords.  Some of the companies in this network are 
tied to developers. 
 
5.7 A substantial share of new private rental sector dwellings is sold as a 
package that includes the management of the flat and insurances for 
covering damage or rent arrears.  The usual fee for such services is 
about 8 per cent of the yearly rent, but fees may range between the 4.5 
and 12 per cent, depending on the kind of services that are included in 
the package.  Management fees can be deducted from the rental income 
for taxation purposes. 
 
5.8 A government backed insurance scheme, Garantie des risques locatifs 
(GRL), provides cover for rent arrears and damages by tenants. This 
form of insurance reduces the risks of private renting (Shaefer, 2010)15. 
 
5.9 It is difficult to estimate what percentage of the private rental dwelling 
stock owned by individual landlords is managed by professionals.  It is 
clear, however, that this phenomenon is especially visible in the larger 
cities where it could reach up to one third of the market (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
                                                 
15 See also http://www.french-property.com/guides/france/working-in-france/letting-






5.10 The umbrella organisation for French individual private rental landlords is 
called UNPI (Union Nationale de la Propriété Immobilière).  This 
organisation lobbies government on behalf private landlords.  They 
regularly ask for the dismantling of the social housing sector and less 










6.1 The amount of money that institutional investors in France invest in the 
private rental sector varies per year, but generally ranges between €500 
million and €1 billion (see Figure 2), although there was a sudden surge 
in investment in 2003.  Every year institutional investors add 3,000 to 
6,000 new private rental dwellings to the French housing stock. 
 
6.2 According to a panel of institutional private rental landlords (Ad Valorem, 
2010), the main impediments to residential investment in the private 
rental sector are the strict regulations with regard to letting (36 per cent) 
and the relatively low yields (34 per cent).  An additional factor impeding 
investment is the limitation on liquidity imposed by selling regulations 
that oblige landlords to offer a sale to sitting tenants before an offer to 
another investor (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
6.3 The importance of institutional private rental landlords has significantly 
decreased in recent decades.  Their share within the total private rented 
sector dropped from about 12 per cent in 1984 to currently about 4 per 
cent.  The insurance companies, who used to be important private rental 
landlords, have disinvested considerably.  This is due to the fact that 
they could realise higher yields outside the residential sector 
(Businessimmo, 2007; see also Table 7). 
 
Figure 2: Amount of money (in million Euros) invested in the French private rental sector 
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Financial aspects of institutional investment in the private rented 
sector 
 
6.4 The returns that institutional investors in the private rental sector can 
make are dependent on both the returns from renting and the returns 
from capital growth (increase in property prices).  According to the IPD 
France Annual Property Index, the returns from letting were 3.7 per cent 
in 2009.  However, as a result of the global economic and housing 
market crisis, the capital growth was negative, resulting in a total return 
that was close too zero. 
 
6.5 Over a longer time period, the total returns show a more positive picture; 
they were 9.2 per cent over the last ten years (see Table 7).  However, 
this is still lower than the returns on investments in other types of 
property, which explains the withdrawal of institutional private landlords 
from the rental sector.  The rental yield is much lower in the residential 
sector than in the other property sectors. 
 
Table 7: Returns on investments in property according to the IPD France Annual 
Property Index (results for December 31, 2009) 
 
 Total yield Total yield in % 
Rental 
yield in % 
Capital 
yield in % Total yield per year 
 1997=100 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 3 yrs 5 yrs 10 yrs 
All property 312.4 -1.4 6.1 -7.1 4.8 10.1 10.1 
Retail 524.9 -1.1 6.1 -6.8 7.3 14.2 13.8 
Offices 317.6 -1.9 6.5 -8.0 4.2 9.3 9.9 
Industrial 302.7 -3.5 7.7 -10.5 2.0 8.2 9.7 
Residential 261.7 0.1 3.7 -3.4 5.0 9.8 9.2 







Organisational aspects of institutional investment in the private 
rental sector 
 
6.6 Regarding professional management of real estate, including real estate 
in the private rental sector, a group called APOGEE (Institut Français du 
Management Immobilier) includes most managers of real estate and 
provides advice and analyses of the sector, although for its members 
only. 
 
7. Policy measures that influence investment in the 




7.1 There are various policy measures that influence investment in the 
French private rental sector.  The most important ones are summarised 
below: 
1. Rent regulation and security of tenure. 
2. Soft loans for private rental landlords (loans with a relatively low 
interest rate and particular tax advantages). 
3. Tax incentives for private rental landlords. 
4. Incentives for improving the quality of the private rental stock. 
 
Influence of the various policy measures 
 
7.2 There are four sets of policy measures to consider: 
 
• Rent regulation and security of tenure are generally seen as a 
disincentive for investments in the private rental sector.  They are 
described in the remainder of this section. 
• The soft loans and tax incentives primarily stimulate investment in 
new private rental dwellings.  These policy measures are discussed 
in Section 8. 
• There are also two tax incentives that stimulate investment in the 
existing housing stock.  These incentives are described in Section 9. 
• The policy measures that focus on the quality of the existing private 
rental dwelling stock. These are covered in Section 10. 
 




7.3 In France, rents for new contracts in the private rental sector may in 
principle be set freely.  However, for private rental dwellings that are built 
with the help of PLS and PLI loans, particular tax incentives or ANAH 
grants (see Sections 8 to 10), there are conditions with regard to the 




tenants.  During the term of the rental contract, the annual rent increase 




7.4 In the private rental sector, the standard length of a rental contract is 
three years for individual private rental landlords and six years for 
institutional private rental landlords. 
 
7.5 Six months before the term of the contract expires the landlord may offer 
a new contract.  In the new contract, the landlord may only ask a higher 
rent if it can be demonstrated that the old rent is substantially below the 
current market rent.  In which case, a new rent may be set on the basis 
of reference dwellings.  The landlord then has to prove that the rents of 
six (in urban areas of over one million inhabitants) or three comparable 
dwellings are significantly higher than the current rent16.  In order to 
simplify this process, some French cities have set up an observatory of 
market rental sector rents.  In the Paris urban area, the rent increase at 
the renewal of contracts in the unregulated market rental sector is 
sometimes limited by central government decree (Haffner et al, 2009; 
p121). 
 
7.6 If the landlord does not offer a new contract with a new rent when the old 
one expires, the old contract is automatically renewed for three years 
under the existing terms (Boccadoro & Chamboredon, 2004; p17). 
 
7.7 The landlord can only terminate the tenancy agreement in the following 
cases: 
• The landlord wishes to use the home for his or her own occupation or 
to house a close relative. 
• The landlord wishes to sell the property.  In this case the tenant must 
be given first right of refusal (droit de préemption). 
• The landlord wishes to carry out a major refurbishment of the 
property. 
• The tenant has not met his obligations in the past (for example, by 
falling into arrears with the rent). 
 
7.8 Notice to terminate a contract during the tenancy period may only be 
given if the contract contains a special clause (clause résolutoire) and 
the tenant has several months of rent arrears.  In practice, this is a 
relatively time-consuming and complex legal process (Boccadoro & 
Chamboredon, 2004; p21).  French private landlords can insure 
themselves against non-payment by tenants through a government-
backed insurance scheme: La Garantie universelle des Risques Locatifs: 
GRL. 
 
                                                 









8.1 In France, there are two main policy measures that influence the 
production of new private rental dwellings: soft loans and tax incentives.  
The main features of these policy measures are described in this 
section. 
 
Soft loans for private rental landlords 
 
8.2 The French housing system is characterised by different soft loans that 
can be used for the construction or acquisition and renovation of rental 
dwellings.  Although the most important loan (PLUS) is only available for 
social rental landlords, there are also two loans that are available to 
private rental landlords: the PLS and the PLI.  Table 8 shows the main 




8.3 The PLS loan is available to any investor that wishes to provide 
dwellings in the intermediate rental sector: the rental segment just above 
the traditional social rental sector (in terms of rental prices).  The loan is 
particularly aimed at regions with tight housing markets in which there is 
a relatively large gap between the ‘cheap’ social rental sector and the 
‘expensive’ market rental sector. 
 
8.4 Tied to the PLS loan are certain tax advantages: a low VAT-rate and 
exemption of land and property taxes.  During the term of the loan, 
private rental landlords have to comply with certain regulations 
concerning the rent level and the income of the tenants.  About 20 per 





8.5 The PLI loan is comparable to the PLS but focuses at a more up-market 
rental segment.  There are no tax advantages tied to the PLI and the 
interest rate of the loan is slightly higher than for the PLS.  At the same 
time the maximum rent that may be asked for PLI dwellings is higher as 
well, and the conditions with regard to the incomes of the tenants are 
less strict.  Each year, about 1,000 to 3,000 rental dwellings are financed 
with the help of the PLI. 
 
8.6 The PLS and PLI loans for private rental landlords are provided by banks 
which submit proposals to a public tender organised by the Ministries of 





Table 8: Main characteristics of the PLS and PLI loans for rental landlords 
 
 PLS PLI 
Target group all investors all investors 
Interest rate 
depends on credit provider 
and type of landlord, usually 
around 1.2% higher than the 
interest on the Livret A saving 
accounts 
depends on credit provider 
and type of landlord, usually 
around  1,5% higher than the 
interest on the Livret A saving 
accounts 
VAT-rate Low (5.5%) Normal17 (19.6%) 
Exemption from land and 
property taxes Yes (25 years) No 
Term of the loan 30 years (50 years for the value of the land) 
30 years (50 years for the 
value of the land) 
Amount of the loan > 50% of investment costs variable 
Duration of contract with 
state: during this contract the 
maximum rent levels and 
income requirements for 
tenants apply 
term of the loan, minimum 15 
years ( 
term of the loan, minimum 9 
years  
Maximum rent level (in € per 
square metre) in 2010 
Ranging between €7.30 and 
€12.38, depending on the 
region 
Ranging between €7.20 and 
€17.38, depending on the 
region 
Maximum income level  depending on region and household size 
depending on region and 
household size, higher 
income limits than in the PLS 
Geographical coverage 
All regions but above all cities 
with a market rent > €9 per 
square metre 
Only the more urbanized 
regions 
Number of dwellings financed 
in 2005-2009 period 177,000 7,500 
Number of dwellings financed 
in 2009 40,000 About 1,500 
Number of dwellings financed 
by institutional private rental 
landlords in 2009 
5,200 (13%) Data not available 
Number of dwellings financed 
by individual private rental 
landlords in 2009 
2,800 (7%) Data not available 
 
Source: www.logement.gouv.fr, information provided by Schaefer, 2010 
 
Tax incentives for private rental landlords 
 
General tax treatment 
 
8.7 Individual private rental landlords have to pay income tax on the rental 
income they receive from their property.  If the annual gross rental 
income is under €15,000, the micro-foncier regime applies.  Under this 
regime, a fixed percentage of 30 per cent may be deducted from the 
rental income to offset the costs incurred by the landlord.  The micro-
foncier regime cannot be combined with tax incentives that aim to 
encourage investment in the rental sector. 
 
                                                 




8.8 For individual private rental landlords who receive over €15,000 in 
annual gross rental income, the standard foncier regime applies.  Under 
this regime, the expenditure that the landlord incurs in connection with 
letting his property (and not only maintenance costs, but also the cost of 
refurbishment and improvement and property taxes, as well as interest 
on mortgages and management fees) may be deducted from the rental 
income.  These expenses may in fact be higher than the rental income.  
A negative balance of a maximum of €10,700 per year18 may be 
deducted from the total income of individual private rental landlords 
(Haffner et al, 2009; p133). 
 
 Tax incentives for individual private rental landlords 
 
8.9 Individual private rental landlords who let dwellings under the standard 
foncier regime may benefit from tax incentives.  Various tax measures 
have been brought in over the past 25 years.  These are usually named 
after the Ministers who introduced them: Méhaignerie, Périssol, Besson, 
Robien, Borloo, etc.  The incentives generally entail a yearly deduction 
of a percentage of the rental income, as well as a yearly deduction of a 
percentage of the investment costs (depreciation). 
 
8.10 Some of the tax incentives (for example Borloo neuf, see Table 9) for 
private rental sector investment can be interpreted as an attempt to 
provide more and better affordable rental housing for middle-class 
households, whose incomes are too high to access the social rented 
sector.  As far as this is concerned, they can be seen as the French 
answer to the housing problems that are experienced by key-workers, 
especially in the big cities.  Tax incentives that seek to increase the 
supply of private rental housing for middle-class households typically use 
criteria with regard to the income of the tenants and the maximum rent 
that may be asked. 
 
8.11 However, there have also been tax incentives without any income 
restrictions for tenants and no or very high maximum rents (for example 
Robien recentré, see Table 9).  These incentives primarily aimed to 
stimulate the (private rental) housing production (Taffin, 2008). 
 
Current tax incentives 
 
8.12 In 2006, the law Engagement national pour le logement (loi ENL) has 
resulted in a reform of the various tax incentives.  Since then, only the 
Dispositif Robien recentré, the Dispositif Borloo neuf ou populaire and 
the Dispositif Borloo ancien were in use.  Individual private rental 
landlords could apply for the first two tax incentives until 31 December 
2009, whereas the Borloo Ancien tax measure is still accessible 
nowadays.  In order to replace the Dispositif Robien recentré and the 
Dispositif Borloo neuf ou populaire, a new tax incentive called Scellier 
                                                 
18 The interest on mortgages may not be taken into account when calculating this deficit.  This 




was introduced on 1 January 2009.  This tax incentive is supposed to be 
simpler than its predecessors (Bouteille, 2010).  The main characteristics 
of all the aforementioned tax incentives are shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Table 9: Main characteristics of the Robien recentré and the Borloo neuf tax incentives 
for investment in the market rental sector  
 
 Robien recentré Borloo-neuf 
Period 1-09-2006 till  31-12-2009 01-01-2006 till 31-12-2009 
Objective Stimulate general supply in the private rental sector  
Stimulate supply of private 
rental housing for middle-
income groups 
Income limits No Yes, depending on household type 
Maximum rent level (2009) 
Depending on the region, 
ranging between €9.02 and 
€21.65 per square metre 
Depending on the region, 
ranging between €7.22 and 
€17,32 per square metre 
Yearly tax deduction as % 
of the investment cost 
6% of the investment can be 
deducted in the first 7 years, 
4% in the years 8 and 9  
6% of the investment can be 
deducted in the first 7 years, 
4% in the years 8 and 9, after 
that 2.5% for two periods of 
three years (optional) 
Fixed reduction (as % of 
the rental income) 0% 30% 
Term of the arrangement 9 years 9 years with the possibility of an extension of 2 times 3 years 









Table 10: The main characteristics of the Scellier tax incentives 
 
 Scellier Scellier intermédiaire 
Period 01-01-2009 till 31-12-2012 01-01-2009 till 31-12-2012 
Objective Stimulate supply in the private rental sector 
Stimulate the supply of private 
rental dwellings for middle 
income groups  
Income limits for tenants No Yes (same limits as in Borloo Neuf) 
Maximum rent levels in 
2009 
Depending on the region, 
ranging between €9.02 and 
€21.65 per square metre 
(comparable to Robien 
recentré) 
Depending on the region, 
ranging between €7.22 and 
€17.32 per square metre 
(comparable to Borloo Neuf) 
Yearly tax deduction as % 
of the investment cost 
If the dwelling is bought in 2009 
or 2010, a total of 25% of the 
investment costs may be 
deducted from the income tax 
over a period of 9 years (with a 
maximum deductible amount of 
€60,000).  This corresponds to 
a yearly tax deduction of 2.78% 
If the dwelling is bought in 2009 
or 2010, a total of 25% of the 
investment costs may be 
deducted form the income tax 
over a period of 9 years (with a 
maximum deductible amount of 
€60,000).  This corresponds to 




of the value of the investment. 
 
If the dwelling is bought in 2011 
or 2012, a total of 20% of the 
investment costs may be 
deducted from the income tax 
over a period of 9 years (with a 
maximum deductible amount of 
€60,000).  This corresponds to 
a yearly tax deduction of 2.22% 
of the value of the investment. 
of the value of the investment. 
 
If the dwelling is bought in 2011 
or 2012, a total of 20% of the 
investment costs may be 
deducted from the income tax 
over a period of 9 years (with a 
maximum deductible amount of 
€60,000).  This corresponds to 
a yearly tax deduction of 2.22% 
of the value of the investment. 
 
In the years 10 to 16, 2% of the 
investment cost may be 
deducted from the income tax 
(in two 3-year periods) 
Fixed reduction (as % of 
the rental income) 0%  30% 
Term of the arrangement 9 years 9, 12 or 15 years 
Geographical coverage  Only available in the more urbanised areas 





Capital gains tax 
 
8.13 Capital gains tax is levied at 6 per cent on the net gain in the value of the 
property.  After five years of ownership a 10 per cent per annum discount 
applies.  There is thus no liability for capital gains tax after 15 years of 
ownership (Global Property Guide, 2010). 
 
Effects and output of the tax incentives 
 
8.14 According to the French government (République Francaise, 2010; p17), 
the tax incentives have clearly had a positive effect on the production of 
private rental housing, thus making the private rental housing market 
less tight.  Between 2003 and 2007, the number of dwellings that was 
sold by developers to individual private rental landlords increased from 
30,000 to 60,000.  According to the French government (République 
Francaise, 2010; p17/18), this surge in housing production was mainly 
due to the Robien tax incentive that was introduced in 2003 and revised 
in 2006.  In 2008, almost 230,000 individual private rental landlords were 
taking advantage of this incentive. 
 
8.15 In 2008, the total expenses on tax benefits were about €600 million.  
However, it should be realised that the extra construction in which the 
tax incentives result, also lead to extra income for the government, for 
example, through Value Added Tax and other taxes (Bouteille, 2010; 
Taffin, 2008).  The average fiscal expense per financed dwelling is 








Evaluation of the tax incentives 
 
8.16 The tax incentives for French individual private rental landlords have 
been in existence for over 25 years.  Some schemes worked with a fixed 
reduction of rental income, whereas others offered a yearly deduction of 
part of the investments costs (accelerated depreciation).  Often, both 
fiscal instruments were combined. 
 
8.17 The way in which a tax incentive is designed has an influence on its 
outcomes.  For example, the mechanism of accelerated depreciation 
may result in larger and more expensive dwellings than the mechanism 
of a fixed deduction (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
8.18 Some tax incentives had regulations with regard to the maximum rent 
and the income of tenants, whereas others did not have such 
restrictions.  In general, one could say that the take-up of incentives with 
serious restrictions was considerably less than the take-up of incentives 
without or with few restrictions, event though the first incentives are 
generally much more generous (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
8.19 At the same time, it is argued that tax incentives without restrictions may 
push up prices.  Moreover, they could lead to an oversupply of dwellings 





Incentives for institutional private rental landlords 
 
8.20 The French policies towards the private rental sector mainly focus on 
individual investors.  This is due to the fact that they own the large 
majority of the private rental stock.  Moreover, they are also most likely 
to invest because the French institutional investors have been reducing 
the share of residential real estate in their portfolios for many years and 
are not likely to change their policy (Taffin, 2008; p3). 
 
8.21 The French government has not introduced specific policy measures that 
aim to reverse the disinvestment by institutional private rental landlords.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that institutional investors can use the 
soft loans that are available for investment in the rental sector (PLS, PLI, 
see Table 8). 
 
8.22 Furthermore, France has recently developed specific fiscal regulations 
for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT’s).  However, until now, the 
impact of such REITS is limited. 
 
9. Policy measures that influence the volume of the 
stock in the private rented sector 
 
9.1 The volume of the private rented housing stock can increase in two 
ways: by the construction of new private rental dwellings and by the 
conversion of existing dwellings into private rental dwellings.  The 
incentives that were described in Section 8 (PLS, PLI, Robien recentré, 
Borloo neuf) mainly focus on the first aspect.  Nevertheless, depending 
on the conditions of the policy measure concerned, they may also be 
used in cases in which existing dwellings are bought, renovated and 
refurbished and subsequently let to tenants. 
 
9.2 Individual investors that buy and subsequently let an existing dwelling 
without renovating or refurbishing it, may apply for the Borloo ancien tax 
incentive of which there are two variants (see Table 11).  In 2008, 8,350 
private rental dwellings (without renovation works) were added to the 






Table 11: Main characteristics of the Borloo tax incentives 
 
 Borloo ancient intermédiaire Borloo ancien social 
Period 01-10-2006 till present 01-10-2006 till present 
Objective Make a larger part of the existing dwelling stock available for renting  
Income limits Yes, depending on household type 
Yes, depending on household 
type 
Maximum rent level in 
2009 
Ranging between €8.19 and 
€17.31 per square metre, 
depending on the region 
Ranging between €5.10 and 
€6.24 per square metre, 
depending on the region. 
Yearly tax deduction as % 
of the investment cost Not applicable Not applicable 
Fixed reduction (as % of 
the rental income) 30% 60% 
Term of the arrangement 
6 years (without subsidised 
renovation) or 9 years (with 
subsidized renovation) 
6 years (without subsidised 
renovation) or 9 years (with 
subsidized renovation) 
Geographical coverage All regions All regions 
 
Source: www.logement.gouv.fr, ANAH, 2009b 
 
10. Policy measures that influence the volume and 
the quality of private rented housing 
 
General policies with regard to housing quality 
 
10.1 French regulation determines what a ‘decent home’ is; each dwelling 
should meet minimum quality standards in order to be suitable for letting.  
The quality regulations specify that a dwelling with a surface area below 
9 square metres, a height below 1.80 metres or a volume lower than 22 
cubic metres is not authorised for rental uses (but it can be sold).  Local 
authorities are entitled to oblige landlords to ensure safety and prevent 
health hazards for the tenants.  This is particularly the case in the big 
cities, where marchands de sommeil (sellers of accommodation for the 
night) rent rooms to immigrants, the aforementioned quality standards 
are sometimes not met.  As far as new construction is concerned, the 
quality standards for the private rental sector are similar to those in the 
other tenures (Schaefer, 2010). 
 
Policy incentives that aim to improve the quality of private rented 
housing 
 
10.2 The Agence Nationale de l’Habitat (ANAH) is a national body that 
provides grants for home refurbishment and improvement.  ANAH also 
manages the Borloo tax incentive (see Section 9).  Private rental 
landlords who choose to carry out renovation works are not only entitled 
to this fiscal incentive but also to a specific subsidy.  In order to qualify 
for such a subsidy the following conditions must be met: 
 
• After the renovation, the dwelling must be let by the home-owner for 




• The renovation work should cost at least €1,500 and it must be 
approved by ANAH.  
• The renovation work may not cost more than a certain amount of 
money per square metre.  This ceiling differs between the different 
French regions. 
 
10.3 The amount of subsidy that an individual private rental landlord can 
receive depends on the maximum rent that is allowed (the lower this 
maximum rent, the higher the subsidy) as well as on the particular 
region.  The amount of the renovation costs that is subsidised may range 
between 15 and 80 per cent (ANAH, 2009b). 
 
10.4 In 2008, about 26,000 dwellings were renovated with the help of the 
above subsidy scheme, often within the framework of urban renewal 
programmes.  This involved a total subsidy of €317 million, which 
corresponds with an average subsidy of about €12,000 per dwelling. 
 
10.5 As part of the above subsidy arrangement, ANAH also provides 
complementary premiums to individual private rental landlords who bring 
a vacant dwelling (vacant for at least 12 months) to the rental market 
(premium of €3,000) or who substantially improve the energy rating of 
their dwelling (premium of €2,000). 
 
11. Summary 1: transferability of fiscal incentives? 
 
11.1 This report has shown that France has developed several policy 
instruments that aim to stimulate investment in the private rental sector; 
the fiscal incentives for individual private rental landlords have in 
particular turned out to be successful.  The question therefore is whether 
such incentives could be transferred to other countries, for example the 
United Kingdom. 
 
11.2 Some lessons of 25 years of fiscal incentives for the private rented 
sector in France: 
 
• The specific features of the fiscal incentives have a strong impact on 
quantity of the housing production, as well as on the size and the 
location of the new private rental dwellings that are built.  Therefore, it 
is very important that the parameters within such incentives (zones, 
maximum rents, income restrictions, kind of fiscal deduction) are 
designed in a sensible and careful way, preferably based on a sound 
housing market analysis. 
 
• In designing the fiscal incentive, one has to strike a balance between 
simplicity on the one hand, and a custom-made approach on the 
other hand.  This especially applies to regionalisation that is applied. 
 
• The efficiency of the fiscal incentives depends on the economic 




the effect of the incentives will probably be strong.  In 2009, about 66 
per cent of new dwellings built by developers in France were sold to 
individual private rental landlords that make use of the tax incentives 
(Bouteille, 2010; p7).  This illustrates the importance of such 
incentives as countercyclical measures.  However, in a period of high 
economic growth and a high construction rate, investment will 
probably also be made without fiscal support.  In which case, the 
incentives may result in an inefficient use of government money and 
possible windfall profits for investors. 
 
12. Summary 2: main findings of country report 
 
1. Until the 1980’s, the share of the French private rental sector had 
been declining as a result of strict rent regulation and tenant 
protection and limited yields for private rental landlords. 
 
2. Since the 1980s, the share of the French private rental sector has 
remained stable at around twenty per cent.  This stabilisation 
seems to be mainly due to the various tax incentives that have 
become available for individual private rental landlords. 
 
3. The share of the private rental sector within the total housing 
production is about 15 per cent. 
 
4. More than 95 per cent of the French private rental dwelling stock 
is owned by private individuals.  These individual private rental 
landlords own on average two dwellings. 
 
5. Tenants in the French private rental sector are relatively young 
and mobile and often live in a single-person household. 
 
6. Compared to the other tenure sectors, French private rental 
dwellings are relatively old and small. 
 
7. French developers and/or brokers often develop housing 
complexes that specifically aim at individual investors. 
 
8. For several decades, French institutional private rental landlords 
have been disinvesting in residential property because they could 
realise higher yields in other property sectors. 
 
9. Investors that want to invest in the private rental sector can apply 
for low-interest loans.  Moreover, for individual private rental 
landlords, there are tax incentives available. 
 
10. Private rental landlords that want to renovate their dwelling can 
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1.1 For the purposes of this report the following, as shown in Table 1, are 
the main types of providers in the private rental sector in Germany: small 
providers, private housing companies and housing cooperatives19. 
 
Table 1: Estimated distribution of providers/owners* of dwellings** in Germany, 2006 
 
Providers/owners of dwellings   % of stock 
Number of dwellings 
(x1,000) 
Total 100   39,617 
Owner-occupied sector 40   15,960 
Rented sector 60   23,657 
* Small providers  37  14,507 
* Professional landlords  23  9,150 
 Private housing companies   10 4,059 
 Housing cooperatives   5 2,079 
 Municipal housing companies   5 2,120 
 Other government housing agencies   1 206 
 Other landlords with subcontracted 
management   1 453 
 Other providers, such as churches   1 233 
 
Source: BBR (2007, p198) 
*) Bold indicates the actors of private rented sector as the term is defined in this text. 
**) Includes dwellings subsidised with bricks-and-mortar subsidies. 
 
1.2 The fact that the rental sector, including the part that is subsidised with 
bricks-and-mortar subsidies is mainly provided by market, private or 
commercial investors characterises the German housing system (Droste 
& Knorr-Siedow, 2007).  It is rooted in West-German housing policy that 
since World War II has been based on a policy of the social market 
economy: social welfare is best served by bringing about economic 
progress via market forces; government intervention is designed to 
support these (Busch-Geertsema, 2004). 
 
1.3 Market forces nowadays indicate that Germany is a country that is 
being, and will further be, confronted with growing and shrinking cities 
and regions at the same time.  As a response, Germany has more or 
less integrated housing policy into other policy areas, especially the 
development of cities and spatial planning (Bundesregierung, 2009).  
The new law on spatial planning (2008) aims to find a balance between 
standard rules for all federal states and freedom to react to local 
circumstances.  In the case of bricks-and-mortar subsidised rental 
                                                 
19 This is based on the advice of the German housing experts who are listed in Section 13.  In 
this definition the private rented sector would not include public providers (municipal and other 
government providers).  While they are often governed by private law, as are the private 




dwellings, central government transferred its powers to the federal 
states in 2006 in order to enable them to make their own legislation as 
needed (see 9.2). 
 
2. The size of the private rented sector and its 
contribution to housing investment 
 
Size and development of sector 
 
2.1 The private rented sector consists of an estimated 53 per cent of the 
dwellings provided and of an estimated 48 per cent if the tenant 
cooperatives are excluded (Table 1).  The rental sector in total 
comprises 60 per cent of stock provided, while homeownership makes 
up the remainder.  The private rented sector consists of dwellings both 
subsidised and not subsidised with bricks-and-mortar subsidies.  The 
dwellings not financed by bricks-and-mortar subsidies are termed ‘free-
financed’.  The subsidisation scheme is time-limited, even though it can 
run several decades, and thus delivers in due course non-subsidised 
rental dwellings to the private rented sector. 
 
2.2 The (private) rented sector has developed in a relatively stable fashion in 
recent decades considering that it totalled 60 per cent of stock in 1982 in 
former West Germany and 69 per cent in former East Germany (Haffner 
et al, 2009)20.  It received a boost following the reunification of East and 
West Germany in 1990, especially in the East.  The housing experts 
indicate that this was the result of the return of private property to private 
owners and of tax facilities that were available for new construction and 
renovation. 
 
2.3 Since 1950 the degressive depreciation deduction21 in income and 
corporate tax has been ascribed a large part of the success of the free-
financed private rented sector (see Appendix 1).  This instrument allows 
for larger shares of fiscal depreciation in the beginning of the ownership 
period.  At the end of 2005 the degressive depreciation deduction was 
abolished in favour of a linear one (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 
2009; BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  There were both fiscal and policy reasons 
(information from experts).  Policy wise, a general degressive 
depreciation allowance22 is thought to no longer fulfil a role in a country 
that is confronted simultaneously with growing and shrinking regions. 
 
                                                 
20 This is a description in average terms.  Regional differences occur.  High rental shares can 
be found in former East Germany, in the north of North-Rhine Westphalia and in metropolitan 
areas (Kofner, 2010; p123). 
21 Degressive depreciation means that the value of the depreciation allowance for tax purposes 
is generous in the early years of ownership and goes down over time. 
22 HM Treasury (2010) reports that the provision of private rental housing with degressive tax 
facilities have recently been challenged as incompatible with EU law (European Court of 
Justice, Case C-244/09, OJ C233/4, 26 September 2009).  According to the experts the ruling 
of the European Court of Justice did not declare the instrument as such as incompatible with 




2.4 Other reasons for the relatively large size of the private rented sector 
can be found in the attraction of tenants to the good quality of the 
dwellings and the strong security of tenure in the rented sector, while 
homeownership was relatively expensive because of high house and 
land prices and relatively difficult to finance because of the need to save 
before a dwelling could be acquired.  Last but not least, the explanation 
that is put forward for a big private rented sector is the fact that the 
rented sector apparently serves the same function in Germany – 
providing security of tenure – as the owner-occupied sector does in 
other countries (Behring & Helbrecht, 2002; Tegeder & Helbrecht, 2007; 
Toussaint et al, 2007).  Thus Kofner (2010) argues that there is no 
unreasonable cultural emphasis on homeownership (see also Kemp & 
Kofner, 2010). 
 
2.5 The combination of these factors has made the (private) rental sector 
attractive as an investment since the 1950s.  The share has remained 
relatively large in the past century because of a competitive position in 
relation to homeownership in terms of subsidies and dwelling 
characteristics.  Sufficient demand has also helped to increase rents 
more than inflation up until the mid-1990s (BMVBS/BBR, 2007). 
 
2.6 Between 1999 and 2009 the private rented sector has increased in size 
(by more than 600,000 dwellings23) because of the sale of public 
dwellings to mostly UK, US Canadian and Australian investors on the 
one hand and continental non-German European investors on the other 
(BMVBS/BBR, 2007; Claßen & Zander, forthcoming; Veser et al, 2007). 
 
Contribution of private rented sector to new house building 
 
2.7 The exact contribution of private providers of rental housing cannot be 
determined, as the producers of new-built dwellings distinguished in 
Table 2-1 (Appendix 2) are not uniform groups.  See 5.3 and 6.3 for 
further information. 
 
2.8 Because of an oversupply of dwellings nationally total dwelling 
production has decreased to the lowest point since World War II 
(BBSR/BBR, 2010; Bundesregierung, 2009).  This also applies to the 
rental sector, as the relative importance of new building of multi-family 
dwellings (of which the rental sector mainly consists; about 80 per cent) 
is decreasing in favour of one-family dwellings and ‘two-family dwellings’ 
(see also BBR, 2007).  Also the building of rental dwellings which are 
subsidised with bricks-and-mortar subsidies is at a low at the moment 
because of the shifting policy focus away from new construction (see 
1.3). 
 
2.9 Generally, stimulating new construction is thus no longer a public policy 
objective.  Renovation of the existing stock has become more important 
                                                 
23 In terms of the estimated number of dwellings of private housing companies (Table 1), it 




than construction (BMVBS/BBR, 2007; Bundesregierung, 2009).  Aims 
include the adaptation of the stock to aging occupiers, shrinking 





3. The demand for rented housing24 
 
Rented housing according to age, household type and income 
 
3.1 Even though the size of the private rented sector is exceptional, the 
structure of its demand is not (Table 2-2, Appendix 2). 
• The bigger the household, the larger the chance of it being a 
homeowner. 
• There is a large volume of younger households, and in East 
Germany there is also a large volume of elderly households in rented 
housing. 
• The market share of the tenants is higher among lower income 
households and the unemployed (Table 2-2). 
 
3.2 However, the differences between rental and owner-occupied 
households in average equivalent income per household do not seem to 
be large in 2006 with €400 per month (2000 prices) and €250 per month 





3.3 These relatively small differences confirm that the private rented sector 
caters for all types of households (Kofner, 2010).  This results from the 
many types of providers that are competing with each other and that are 
mostly behaving in a profit-oriented fashion.  This implies that all types 
of suppliers provide many types of comparable quality levels in rental 
housing (also between free-financed and bricks-and-mortar subsidised 
housing; Hubert, 1998; Busch-Geertsema, 2000) to many types of 
different households – including low-income households. 
 
3.4 The markets for one-family and two-family dwellings are considered a 
sub-market in comparison to the market for multi-family dwellings and 
both sub-markets have been and are forecasted to develop differently.  
A move in new construction is taking place towards one-and two-family 
dwellings (see 2.8) and up until 2020 this trend is forecast to continue 
(BBSR/BBR, 2010).  The opposite development is forecast for the 
market of multi-family dwellings.  These shifts imply that new building in 
the rental sector will remain curbed. 
 
                                                 




Motivations of private renters 
 
3.5 In addition to the reasons described in 2.4, even though households may 
wish to become homeowners (Prognos, 2010), homeownership is 
becoming more unaffordable (for some households) and the labour 
market requires a flexible workforce (BBSR/BBR, 2010).  Nevertheless, 
up to 2025 a slight increase of homeownership by about five percentage 
points is forecast. 
 
Key changes in demand in recent years 
 
3.6 The uneven development of population, households and economic 
activity across Germany poses large risks in the regions that are losing 
out.  Risks of vacancies will be especially high for multi-family rental 
dwellings, and especially in East Germany and the old industrial areas in 
West Germany (BBSR/BBR, 2010).  Only in one-fifth of the regions will 
the risks of vacancies be medium to low. 
 
3.7 A high vacancy rate will tend to increase the attraction of the rental 
sector to low-income households.  This will reinforce the ongoing trend 
that low-income households already can increasingly be found in the 
private rented sector (Busch-Geertsema, 2000).  The fact that 
municipalities are paying the housing costs for the unemployed will allow 
the private rented sector to cater increasingly for low-income households 
(information from experts).  The development came about because the 
share of the bricks-and-mortar subsidised rental sector, which can 
mostly be found in multi-family buildings in the outskirts of cities, has 
shrunk to about 5 per cent of housing (from a high close to 20 per cent; 
BBR, 2007; p195).  The number of subsidised rental dwellings for which 
the subsidy period is ending is larger than the number of new-subsidised 
rental dwellings. 
 
4. The supply of private rented housing 
 
4.1 The main types of private rented sector suppliers according to Table 1 
are: 
• small providers (estimated to be 37 per cent of stock) which include: 
- ‘amateur’ or non-professional individual landlords 
- professional individual landlords 
• professional landlords which include: 
- private housing companies (estimated to be 10 per cent of stock) 




4.2 The supply structure of the German private rented sector is 
comparatively ‘normal’ (Kofner, 2010).  Individuals, couples and 




BMVBS/BBR25, 2007).  Table 2 shows further characteristics, which 
clearly distinguish between professional landlords with more active 
market behaviour and supra-regional investments and the non-
professional landlords26. 
 
4.3 If housing cooperatives are excluded from the private rented sector, 
small providers own 76 per cent of the private rented sector stock 
(14,507 out of 19,019 dwellings).  Within this, small non-professional 
landlords own 28 per cent of the private rented sector stock (5,357 out of 
19,119 dwellings). 
 
Private housing companies 
 
4.4 Private housing companies are the largest group of the professional 
landlords (Table 1).  These are in principle companies that rent out their 
own dwellings.  They are the profit maximisers, though originally, before 
non-German firms entered the market on a large scale (see 2.6), with a 
significant social conscience and a long-term investment focus (Kemp & 
Kofner, 2010).  These new owners are not expected to display the ‘social 
conscience’ of German enterprises (Barry, 1993; p17/21).  Table 3 





4.5 Tenant cooperatives aim to provide accommodation at cost prices.  Any 
profits will be returned to the members who at the same time usually are 
the tenants (BMVBS/BBR, 2007; Haffner et al, 2009).  Cooperatives let 
dwellings to people who buy a share in the housing cooperative.  This 
share usually amounts to about 1 per cent of the cost of building the 
dwelling and makes the tenant part-owner of the dwelling, ruling out any 
conflict of interest between the occupant and the owner. 
 
                                                 
25 Part of this study from which is regularly quoted in this text is a (not-completely 
representative, but biggest) survey of private individual landlords which own multi-family 
buildings that were constructed before 1991 (BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  Conclusions are applicable 
for former East and West Germany.  This distinction remains relevant even fifteen years after 
reunification of both parts of Germany because of structural differences between both housing 
markets. 
26 Amateur landlords own 23% of stock, a share which is equal to the share of stock of 




Table 2: Types and characteristics of individual, couple and partnership landlords with 
multi-family dwellings*, 2005/2006 
 
Type of landlord Amateur landlord (up to 15 dwellings) 
Professional individual landlord 
(16 dwellings and more) 








- relatively high household income on 
average 
- relatively more often retired 
- few dwellings (6-7 on average) 
- often personal connection to 
dwelling or lives close by 
- aims for a good relation with the 
tenant 
- prefers security in equity building in 
real estate to a high return  
- partly cannot cope with the 
necessary information for the 
management of the dwelling 
- relatively higher household income 
on average 
- relatively more self-employed 
- more than 45 dwellings on average 
- seldom lives in the property 
Management*** Mostly self, but also outsourced Mostly self, but also outsourced 
Investment 
motives**** 
- security in old age 
- secure equity building 
- tax savings 
- sometimes personal reason (e.g. 
family property) 
- inheritance building 
- security in old age 
- secure equity building 
- tax savings 
- combination of return and security 
in equity building 
- demand stimuli 
Return/ 
vacancies***** 
- 30% earned a profit 
- vacancy share is higher 
- 43% earned a profit 
- vacancy share is lower 
 
Source: BMVBS/BBR (2007); own interpretation; Survey in the notes refers to survey of natural 
person landlords with ownership of dwellings built before 1991 (see footnote 7). 
*) Multi-family dwellings comprise about 80% of rental stock (see text).  The multi-family 
dwellings of households comprise about 42% of stock. 
**) The survey shows the relatively high household income and that two thirds of landlords 
are self-employed or retired; 24% is employed. 
***) The survey shows that 73% is self-managed, while 21% is managed by private housing 
company. 
****) The first three motives are the most important motives according to the survey.  
Combination of return and security motive is stronger for professional individual. 
*****) The survey shows that 41% achieved a profit, defined as a surplus of revenues over 
costs in the last five years; 19% was making a loss.  The survey shows a total share of 
vacancies of seven percent; 13% in East and six percent in West. 2.5% are considered 
needed. 
 
4.6 Cooperatives encourage the accumulation of housing equity in line with 
central government objectives.  Since 1996 it has been possible to 
accumulate equity in ownership cooperatives as well.  The majority of 
cooperatives are tenant cooperatives though.  They represent a hybrid 
form between renting and owning with strong security of tenure because 
the tenant also owns some share in the overall property.  As they 
embody a way of building equity, national government has designated 









Table 3: Types and characteristics of cooperative and company landlords, 2005/2006 
 
Type of landlord Cooperative Private housing company 
Most frequent form registered cooperative (e.G.) - limited company (GmbH) - company (AG) 
Characteristics 
- aim of providing affordable and long-
term housing for members 
- non-profit* status in corporate tax, if 
mostly renting-oriented 
- 97% of cooperatives are members of 
umbrella organisation GdW** 
- average number of dwellings of GdW**-
members is 1,200 
- majority is post-WWII stock 
- mostly not public stockholders 
- sale and purchase of dwellings 
- offensive marketing 
Management member participation, efficient management efficient management 
Investment motives 
- usage of funds according to articles of 
cooperative 
- cost effective (break-even) 
- up-to-date stock for members 
- profit maximisation 
- portfolio improvement 
- maintaining market share 
- expansion 
- resale to tenants (privatisation) 
 
Source: BMVBS/BBR (2007); own interpretation 
*) See for non-profit status 3-7, Appendix 3. 
**) The GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungsunternehmen (translates as GdW 
federal union of German housing companies) is the national umbrella organization of 
the former non-profit landlords (www.gdw.de; [Accessed 08/11/06]; from Haffner et al, 
2009). Some of the private housing companies will also be GdW-members. 
 
Discussions about increasing the supply of the private rented 
sector 
 
4.7 There are no policy discussions taking place about increasing the size of 
the private rented sector as the share of private renting is relatively high 
and the risks of rental vacancies are increasing (see 3.6 and 3.7). 
 
4.8 However, there is a public discussion taking place about increasing 
subsidisation in particular for private providers of rental dwellings to help 
alleviate the shortages of dwellings that are expected in growth areas 
(information from experts). 
 
5. Individual investment in the private rented sector 
 
Total investment in housing 
 
5.1 The number of dwellings completed (Appendix 2) is not a number of total 
investment in housing because it excludes investment in the existing 
stock.  Estimates about total investment in housing show that since 2000 
annual investment in the stock has been surpassing the amount of 
investment in new dwellings (BBR, 2007; p147).  In 2006 the total 
amount comprised almost €130 billion.  The total amount of investment 
in 2006 amounts to a decrease since 1995 (€160 billion) as a result of 




total decreased from eight per cent in 1995 to 5.3 per cent in 2004.  In 
2008 total investment in housing amounted to €141 billion (GdW, 2009). 
 
Contribution of individuals to investment in the private rented 
sector 
 
5.2 There are only estimates of the differentiation of total investment over 
groups of dwelling owners.  In 2004 a total amount of €73 billion is 
estimated (extrapolation) to have been invested in the existing multi-
family rental stock which has been built up since 1990.  The small 
providers are estimated to have invested in this stock almost €14 billion 
(almost 19 per cent of total); owner-occupiers and other landlords, €52 
billion (almost 72 per cent; BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  The remainder was 
invested by GdW-members (see Section 6). 
 
5.3 Private persons were responsible for 58 per cent of new dwellings in 
2008 (Appendix 2), but this share includes new owner-occupied 
dwellings.  According to the survey of BMVBS/BBR (2007) only 7 per 
cent of investment by individual/couple/partnership landlords resulted in 
an increase in the number of dwellings; the remainder of investment was 
in existing dwellings.  This implies that individual landlords have a big 
impact on the quality of housing. 
 
Main motives for landlords 
 
5.4 Tables 2 and 3 show the main motives for investment in rental housing 
when acquisition is the focus.  The amateur landlords and the 
cooperatives are the least profit focused, while the professional 
individual/couple/partnership landlords and the housing companies are 
more market oriented.  In all cases, investment is about a long horizon 
and security (see also Kemp & Kofner, 2010; Kofner, 2010).  Because 
the housing market has not provided for short-term capital gains, 
especially in recent decades, a long-term horizon is a necessary 
condition for investment in rental housing. 
 
5.5 Individual landlords mainly invest in the existing stock according to the 
survey results of BMVBS/BBR (2007) because of the relatively poor 
quality and the high energy costs of the dwellings which reduce their 
market competitiveness.  The third motive is the improvement of 
return/rent income, while the availability of support was considered 
unimportant. 
 
Main factors influencing investment in the private rented sector by 
individuals 
 
5.6 In the five years up to 2005/2006 41 per cent of multi-family rental 
dwellings built before1991 in East-German cities did not cover costs 
(Table 2; survey of BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  These losses will impact 
negatively on new investment decisions.  Further barriers to investment 




equity (2005/2006).  In West Germany, barriers to investment were 
much lower.  In total more than 40 per cent of German rental dwellings 
were reported to need no investment due to good quality. 
 
5.7 Kofner (2010) argues that amateur landlords, because of their more 
limited market knowledge and knowledge about subsidies, are more 
likely to have problems coping with changes such as decreasing 
demand (and vacancies), increasing numbers of elderly, the increasing 
share of migrants, the high government aims for energy saving, and the 
limited financial public aid available.  As amateur landlords on average 
are 58 years of age according to the survey of BMVBS/BBR (2007), they 
will also have more problems in financing their investment.  This may not 
be the only reason though why investments in existing stock are equity 
intensive. 
 
5.8 BMVBS/BBR (2007) signals rising housing expenses being confronted 
with decreasing numbers of bricks-and-mortar subsidised rental 
housing.  On the one hand fewer dwellings are entering the subsidy 
system, while on the other the period of subsidisation of existing 
dwellings is ending.  An increase in the demand for cheaper rental 
housing can already be observed (BMVBS/BBR, 2007). 
 
5.9 As a result for the dwellings for which the revenues did not cover costs 
the landlords did not have investment plans in East Germany for the 
period 2005/2006 (survey of BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  Disinvestment 
tendencies are suspected contrary to West Germany where these 
landlords developed investment plans, reflecting the more attractive 
markets than in the East. 
 
5.10 Return options on housing investment have become worse in the past 
five years and no significant improvement is expected for the next five 
years, the survey of BMVBS/BBR (2007) shows.  It is no longer 
automatic, as it was 20 years ago, that investing in a multi-family 
dwelling will deliver satisfactory returns. 
 
6. Institutional investment in the (private) rental 
sector 
 
6.1 Institutional investment is defined as investment by GdW-members (see 
Table 3), even though they are not all part of the private rented sector.  
The 3,000 GdW-members (approximately) own about six million 
dwellings and represent about two-thirds of the dwellings of the 
professional landlords (Table 1).  The GdW-members are divided up as 
follows across owners of dwellings: 
• Municipal housing companies (42 per cent). 
• Cooperatives (37 per cent). 
• Private housing companies (15 per cent). 
• Public housing companies (3 per cent). 




• Other housing companies (1 per cent). 
 
The private rented sector-actors in this list, the cooperatives and private 
housing companies, are estimated to own more than half of the dwelling 
stock of GdW-members (weighted according to the housing stock).  
Thus information about them can be taken as indicative for the private 
rented sector.  Table 3 gives an impression of their characteristics and 
investment motives. 
 
6.2 There are different vehicles for indirect investment (Bundesregierung, 
2009; information from experts).  German Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) are allowed to invest in housing stock built as of 2007.  There 
are two REITs and 12 organisations that are striving to become a REIT.  
While open-ended property funds seem to ignore housing as an 
investment, closed-end funds27, which are relatively unknown in other 
countries, seem to focus on special segments.  The stock in the former 
funds is highly fungible, contrary to the stock in the latter funds.  The 
most important investment vehicles are said to be German stock 
companies which can attract funds from the capital market and foreign 
legal structures which are used by foreign financial investors to structure 
their investments.  But these companies with a focus on housing seem 
to be more the exception than the rule in Germany.  As information 
about the indirect investment options is scarce, they are excluded from 
the following descriptions. 
 
Contribution of institutions to investment in the (private) rented 
sector 
 
6.3 There are incomplete estimates on the differentiation of total investment 
over groups of dwelling owners.  New-built private housing companies 
are estimated to have contributed 34 per cent in 2008 (Appendix 2), but 
the companies include public ones. 
 
6.4 GdW (2009) reports that in total about €141 billion was invested in 
housing in Germany in 2008 (+0.8 per cent in real numbers; see 5.1).  
GdW housing companies invested almost €9 billion in 2008 which 
amounts to a nominal decrease of one per cent in comparison to 2007.  
Investments in new stock decreased more than investments in existing 
stock.  Seventy-eight per cent of investment came from investments in 
the existing stock which is the same as the national average.  GdW 
(2009) argues that the decrease in new construction is the result of the 
abolition of the degressive depreciation deduction in combination with 
the increasing complexity around renovations that aim for energy saving. 
 
Returns on investment 
 
                                                 
27 According to the umbrella organisation VGF (http://www.vgf-online.de/ueber-uns.html 
[Accessed 19/05/10]) the 48 members managed an investment volume of €134 billion which 
amounts to about 80 per cent of the market of closed-end funds.  With more than six billion new 




6.5 Investment in the housing stock has not been rewarded by very high 
returns compared to other investment categories, but the returns have 
been stable between 1995 and 2005 (BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  Returns 
generally come from income and not from capital growth, as house 
prices on average have not been rising in the last two decades.  For 
2009 the total residential return comparative to other properties, 
according to the IPD Annual Property Index, was high however, as 









Table 4: Returns on investments in property according to the IPD Germany Annual 













Total return per year 
 Dec 1995=100 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 3 yrs 5 yrs 10 yrs 
All property 160.6 2.5 5.2 -2.6 3.4 2.5 3.1 
Retail 187.5 2.6 5.6 -2.8 4.4 4.6 4.3 
Offices 151.8 2.0 5.1 -2.9 2.8 1.4 2.6 
Industrial* 187.3 -2.9 7.9 -10.1 1.5 3.4 4.4 
Residential* 178.2 5.3 4.2 1.0 5.1 4.8 4.4 
Other 160.9 3.8 5.0 -1.2 3.8 2.8 3.1 
 
Source: www.ipd.com. 
*) Index based in December 1996. 
**) The capital value of residential property is a little more than 12 per cent of the total 
value of all the properties included in the index.  This small share plus the fact that only 
50 per cent of all institutional investors are included, may make the index 
unrepresentative of the real estate market (information from experts). 
 
6.6 As with the individual/couple/partnership landlords, the averages mask 
the problems that the vacancies cause.  For GdW-members the 
vacancies in 2008 fell slightly in comparison to the previous year (GdW, 
2009).  The shares differ regionally from 1 per cent in Hamburg to 14 per 
cent in Sachsen-Anhalt; almost 11 per cent in the East and 3 per cent in 
the West. 
 
6.7 These differences influence the returns of GdW-landlords.  On average 
the return on total capital invested amounted to 3.1 per cent in 2007 
compared to 2.9 per cent and 3.0 per cent in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.  The return is slightly higher on average in West Germany 
(3.2 per cent) than in East Germany (2.9 per cent).  The return on 
investment averages one per cent in 2007, compared to 0.7 per cent 
and 1.0 per cent in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  These returns seem to 





Policy and other measures to promote institutional investment 
 
6.8 There are no special measures to promote institutional investment as 
such.  Any measures that are available (Section 7) do not differentiate 
between different types of investors. 
 
Debates about increasing institutional investment 
 
6.9 There are no debates about increasing institutional investment as such. 
 
6.10 But there are worries about the ‘social face’ of the non-German 
institutional investors that have been coming into the private rented 
sector since 1999.  The foreign investors (see 2.6 and 4.3) apparently 
expect sufficient returns as they have been buying rental stock.  
According to BMVBS/BBR (2007, p35; see also Veser et al, 2007) 
international analysts regarded Germany as one of the most attractive 
markets in 2005 and 2006.  Reasons included a stagnating price 
development at the lower range, attractive financing conditions, more 
than average income returns, a low rate of homeownership and large 
portfolios of dwellings available.  Also in the period of falling interest 
rates, new investment options were sought allowing for high leverage 
(information from experts; Claßen & Zander, forthcoming).  The former 
non-profit private and public housing companies (GdW-members) were 
also regarded as not efficiently managed and not valued according to 
the market offering potential value gains.  The capital gain was meant to 
be realised in due course by sale to preferably the tenants 
(BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  The new owners also aim for a high income 
return before the point of sale is achieved. 
 
7. Policy measures that influence investment in the 
private rented sector 
 
7.1 Soon after World War II the system of regulation and subsidisation of 
rental housing that more or less still is in place (Table 5) was 
established.  It developed in the 1950s through to the 1970s (Appendix 
3).  In principle, even though there was an emphasis on quickly 
replacing lost stock via bricks-and-mortar subsidised rental housing, the 
private actors were not forgotten, and regulation of landlord and tenant 
rights which was perceived to be in favour of tenants was compensated 
by a fiscal degressive depreciation deduction for the landlords (Kofner, 
2010; Appendix 1). 
 
7.2 With the abolition of the degressive depreciation deduction, the ‘normal’ 
treatment that applies to any investor – inter alia a normal depreciation 
deduction – remains.  The exception is the capital gains tax exemption 
when the property is owned for more than ten years.  This is to prevent 
speculation.  A second one is the deduction of the costs of investment in 





7.3 Kemp & Kofner (2010) and Kofner (2010) argue that relatively strong 
tenant protection allows for relatively stable returns on housing 
investment in the long-run.  These stable, but relatively lower returns are 
compensated by some subsidisation, although this is less nowadays 
than in the past.  The combination of restrictions and subsidies 
(including bricks-and-mortar subsidies for social renting) has created a 
competitive tenure that caters for broad layers of the population in the 
long-term. 
 
7.4 Even though technically there may no longer exist much of a tax 
advantage to investment in housing in comparison to other investments, 
the tax treatment of the investment in housing used to make rental 
dwellings good investment and this may still be perceived to be the 
case, especially for individuals (see also 5.10).  It should be noted that 
any negative income from housing can be deducted from other income 
for income tax purposes.  This is a facility that since very recently is no 
longer available for income from stock and savings accounts 
(information from experts; see also Kemp & Kofner, 2010). 
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Source: Own compilation (with help of experts); see Appendix 3 for more information 
*) These instruments do not aim to stimulate investment, but will influence decisions. 
**) There is no tenure neutral treatment with owner-occupation. 
***) Some cooperatives have a fiscal non-profit status, not paying corporate tax.  They 
mainly focus on their ‘renting business’ and not on new investment. 
****) KfW Bankengruppe is a special circuit financial institute that the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the federal states own 
(http://www.kfw.de/EN_Home/KfW_Bankengruppe/index.jsp; [Accessed 15/05/10]).  It 
offers support to encourage sustainable improvement in economic, social, ecological 
living and business conditions, among others in the areas of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, entrepreneurialism, environmental protection, housing, infrastructure, 
education, project and export finance, and development cooperation. 
 
8. Policy measures that influence new building for 
private renting 
 
8.1 See Section 7. 
 
8.2 Because of the policy shift from new-build to stock (see 2.9), general 
subsidies to housing construction have been decreasing, while support 
for stock investment has been increasing (BMVBS/BBR, 2007). 
 
9. Policy measures that influence the volume of the 
stock in the private rented sector 
 
9.1 See Section 7. 
 
9.2 Since the shift in housing bricks-and-mortar subsidisation away from 
central government in 2006 (see 1.3 and 2.8) federal states are able to 
design their own housing investment policies.  The shift in responsibility 
was accompanied by a financial compensation paid for annually by the 
federal government of €518.2 million until 2013 (information from 
experts). 
 
10. Federal policy measures and programmes that 
influence the quality of private rented housing 
 
10.1 There are different tax deductions possible for buildings in 
redevelopment areas and also for historic buildings (Bundesregierung, 
2009; pp92/93).  Also the measures mentioned in Section 7 and 9 





10.2 Investment in housing quality is also stimulated via urban renewal.  The 
programme on the social city (Soziale Stadt) since its inception in 1999, 
has subsidised declining neighbourhoods (Bundesregierung, 2009). 
 
10.3 Then there are programmes that indirectly stimulate the improvement of 
housing quality, if the worst-quality dwellings are demolished or 
improved.  These programmes stimulate some disinvestment in housing 
but also improvements in quality (Stadtumbau Ost since 2002, 
Stadtumbau West since 2004) by subsidising demolition and 
redevelopment28. 
 
10.4 KfW Bankengruppe has a programme for subsidising dwelling 
reconstruction and modernisation that adapts dwellings to the needs of 
the elderly (Appendix 3). 
 
10.5 Last but not least, the federal states and municipalities have developed 
their own programmes and measures, for example, subsidies for 
investments in solar energy (information from experts). 
 
11. Summary 1 
 
11.1 The key factor for explaining the large size of the German private rented 
sector (estimated at 53 per cent of all dwellings provided; or 48 per cent 
when cooperatives are excluded) is for investors an attractive mix of 
regulation and subsidisation that has been in force in the post-World 
War II period. 
 
11.2 A special feature was (and still is) that private landlords could receive 
bricks-and-mortar subsidies to build affordable rental housing for special 
target groups for a limited, but relatively long-lasting period.  After the 
subsidy period ended, these dwellings would become unsubsidised 
rental dwellings that could be let according to the private rented sector 
rules.  At its peak close to 20 per cent of stock was subsidised in this 
way; nowadays it is around five per cent. 
 
11.3 A special feature was the degressive depreciation allowance in income 
and corporate tax for any new-built rental dwelling.  This allowance 
could be regarded as compensation to landlords for their social 
conscience in not striving for maximum returns.  The fact that negative 
income from housing investment (depreciation and debt interest) could 
be deducted from other income was perceived as attractive, especially 
by private person landlords. 
 
11.4 A special feature is the rent regulation that prescribes that rent 
adjustments for sitting tenants are market-led and not regulated by 
norms. 
 
                                                 




11.5 Private renting was also stimulated because households were not 
pushed into homeownership.  Renting provides security of tenure, while 
homeownership used to be relatively expensive. 
 
11.6 Even though the private rented sector is extremely large, the structure of 
demand is comparatively normal: the lower the income, the younger and 
the smaller the household, the more likely they are to be a tenant.  The 
structure of supply is also comparatively normal: individuals dominate 
(estimated 62 per cent of rental stock). 
 
11.7 As Germany is facing a shrinking population in many regions, it has 
changed the focus of its policy.  Bricks-and-mortar subsidies are now the 
responsibility of the federal states, but have been decreasing in 
importance.  In contrast the focus on investments in the existing stock 
via energy savings, urban restructuring and, adaptations to the stock for 
elderly persons has increased in importance.  Tax measures are mainly 
focused on investment in stock as well, except the capital gains 
exemption after an ownership period of ten years.  Landlords in income 
and corporate tax generally are treated as any investor. 
 
 
12. Summary 2 
 
1. The German private rented sector is very large with an estimated 
size of 53 per cent of the dwellings provided (or 48 per cent when 
tenant cooperatives are excluded). 
 
2. The structure of demand is comparatively normal: the lower the 
income, the younger and the smaller the household, the more 
likely they are to be a tenant. 
 
3. The structure of supply is comparatively normal: individuals 
dominate (estimated 62 per cent of rental stock). 
 
4. The size of the sector is the result of past policies motivating 
private individuals and companies to invest in the rental sector.  It 
appears that a good mix between regulation and subsidisation 
was found. 
 
5. Subsidisation included a degressive depreciation allowance and 
bricks-and-mortar subsidies for temporary social renting. 
 
6. Nowadays Germany is being threatened by a reduction in the 
population in many regions. 
 
7. The central government’s policy is shifting from the central level to 





8. The central government’s policy is shifting from new construction 
to investment in existing stock. 
 
9. Present day policies thus no longer include stimulation of general 
investment in the private rented sector.  Energy savings, 
modernisation and measures to adapt older person’s 
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Appendix 1 Degressive depreciation allowance until 2005 
 
1-1 There is a difference between corporation tax and personal income tax, 
as far as the tax rates are concerned, but no difference between the two 
taxes in the way of deducting depreciation.  This scheme was set up in 
1953 (Leutner, 1990) and has continued, with a few variations, until it 
was abolished in 2005 being replaced by the regular system of linear 
depreciation. 
 
1-2 Linear depreciation applies to all rented properties, also to properties 
subsidised by bricks-and-mortar subsidies, and not to the cost of land 
(Braun & Pfeiffer, 2004, p9).  For properties built before 1925, the 
depreciation rate is 2.5 per cent for 40 years, while for properties built 
after 1925, it is 2 per cent for 50 years. 
 
1-3 Until its abolition, in the last version of the depreciation allowance, 
owners were allowed to choose between the linear and degressive 
depreciation systems in the case of new-built dwellings.  The degressive 
system meant in 2005 that annual fiscal depreciation was 4 per cent in 
the first ten years, 2.5 per cent up until year 18 and 1.25 per cent from 
year 19 until year 50.  Table 1-1 also shows earlier systems.  
 
1-4 Fiscal depreciation has been regarded a powerful subsidy tool, as each 
buyer-landlord of the property can take advantage of the deduction on 
the basis of the historical purchase price.  House price inflation alone 
gave landlords a strong incentive to sell off in order to build new 
properties. 
 
1-5 Braun & Pfeiffer (2004) calculated that landlords could have reduced 
rents substantially, 20 per cent of the market rent, if they were to pass 
on the tax benefits to their tenants in full (instead of regarding them as 
additional profit).  This would have made renting more attractive than 
buying for housing consumers. 
 
Table 1-1 Development of degressive depreciation deduction on new-built rented 
dwellings 
Before 1989  
Years 1-8 9-14 15-50
Annual depreciation 5% 2.5% 1.25% 
Cumulative depreciation 40% 55% 100%
From 1989  
Years 1-4 5-10 11-16 17-40
Annual depreciation 7% 5% 2% 1.25% 
Cumulative depreciation 28% 58% 70% 100%
From 1996  
Years 1-8 9-14  15-50
Annual depreciation 5% 2.5%  1.25% 
Cumulative depreciation 40% 55%  100%
2005   
Years 1-10 11-18  19-50
Annual depreciation 4% 2.5%  1.25% 









Tables on new construction and tenant characteristics 
 






















1995 539,936 3,614 223,551 192,012 293,176 4,265
%  0.7 41.4 35.6 54.3 0.8
1996 498,844 3,004 221,046 184,648 258,186 3,013
%  0.6 44.3 37.0 51.8 0.6
1997 515,566 2,915 231,286 185,613 262,805 4,114
%  0.6 44.9 36.0 51.0 0.8
1998 443,748 2,877 180,511 148,054 245,387 3,462
%  0.6 40.7 33.4 55.3 0.8
1999 416,547 2,588 163,522 136,631 237,266 3,191
%  0.6 39.3 32.8 57.0 0.8
2000 377,325 3,375 142,968 120,082 219,917 2,271
%  0.9 37.9 31.8 58.3 0.6
2001 292,328 1,699 110,012 94,318 172,053 2,161
%  0.6 37.6 32.3 58.9 0.7
2002 259,875 1,778 90,251 77,422 159,656 2,015
%  0.7 34.7 29.8 61.4 0.8
2003 240,938 1,389 80,098 68,863 152,645 1,956
%  0.6 33.2 28.6 63.4 0.8
2004 252,163 1,196 80,675 70,229 164,325 1,599
%  0.5 32.0 27.9 65.2 0.6
2005 217,124 852 69,537 60,016 141,801 1,576
%  0.4 32.0 27.6 65.3 0.7
2006 224,575 1,397 78,589 69,343 139,161 1,490
%  0.6 35.0 30.9 62.0 0.7
2007 188,856 1,011 66,248 57,580 116,781 1,275
%  0.5 35.1 30.5 61.8 0.7
2008 155,820 898 60,087 52,489 89,676 1,576
% 100 0.6 38.6 33.7 57.6 1.0
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) Fachserie 5, Reihe 1, Jahrgang 1995-2008. 





Table 2-2 Tenants* as percentage of households by household type, age, income 
quintile and unemployment in Germany, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 
West Germany East Germany
 1991 1996 2001 2006 1991 1996 2001 2006
Household type    
Single, man 84.3 78.8 77.9 73.7 87.0 89.9 81.7 82.2
Single, woman aged up 
to 64 78.9 81.5 80.4 77.7 91.3 92.8 85.5 86.9
Single women 65+ 69.5 67.0 61.4 58.8 85.7 88.6 80.6 82.3
Couple without children 55.0 53.6 48.7 46.1 69.0 69.6 61.3 57.9
Couple with children up 
to age 16 54.7 50.9 49.3 47.4 74.9 65.7 57.4 52.9
Coupe with children 
aged 17+ 30.1 37.5 32.2 31.3 57.6 58.3 41.2 37.4
Single parent 61.2 69.9 73.5 74.1 87.5 83.7 81.8 85.1
Average 60.1 60.0 57.5 55.3 75.2 74.0 67.2 66.6
Age    
Aged up to 40 years 76.2 74.7 77.2 76.5 79.2 78.4 77.3 78.5
41-65 years 49.7 51.6 48.0 46.9 70.9 67.4 60.3 57.5
66+ 57.7 54.9 48.7 44.3 76.6 80.2 67.6 67.6
Average 60.1 60.0 57.5 55.3 75.2 74.0 67.2 66.6
Quintiles of net 
household  
income 
   
First quintile 71.8 74.5 73.8 74.8 75.3 80.5 76.1 79.0
Second quintile 65.2 66.2 62.9 60.9 75.3 71.8 63.3 70.2
Third quintile 65.2 61.7 56.8 58.6 77.5 71.6 67.3 58.1
Fourth quintile 58.4 56.4 54.7 47.6 71.3 70.9 62.8 61.1
Fifth quintile 49.8 47.3 45.2 41.7 71.5 72.1 57.8 51.2
Households with 
unemployed persons 80.0 69.5 71.6 78.5 74.1 69.1 69.1 71.6
Average 60.1 60.0 57.5 55.3 75.2 74.0 67.2 66.6
 
Source: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2008, p227) 










3-1 Since the 1970s (Kofner, 2010) rent control in Germany has been 
concerned with protecting sitting tenants, not new tenants (Haffner et al, 
2009).  Rents for new leases in the market rented sector can be 
negotiated freely, as long as they are not considered exorbitant rents 
under economic criminal law. 
 
3-2 Rent control for sitting tenants in the free-financed rented sector can 
occur by several legal means, but is always market-led.  Rent changes 
for sitting tenants can be based on the rents of three similar rented 
dwellings.  Alternatively, rent changes can be based on a so-called 
Mietspiegel (translated as rent mirror), a database with local reference 
rents of non-subsidised market rents.  Reference rents are based on 
comparable quality characteristics for buildings and dwellings and their 
locations.  There is the general rule that rents may not be increased by 
more than 20 per cent within a three-year period.  Apart from ‘normal’ 
rent increases, landlords are allowed to increase rents after 
modernisation with 11 per cent of price. 
 
Security of tenure 
 
3-3 Security of tenure has been quite strong in Germany since the 1970s 
(Kofner, 2010).  Nowadays this implies that the length of tenancy in 
principle is indefinite (Wurmnest, nd; information from experts).  ‘Fixed-
term lease contracts’ were only permitted under special circumstances.  
Tenants thus are fairly well protected.  The notice period for tenants is 
always three months.  Contrary to the landlord, the tenant does not need 
a reason for handing in their notice.  The tenant is allowed to transfer the 
contract to a new tenant accepted by the landlord. 
 
3-4 Notice periods for landlords run from three months to nine months.  The 
three months period is applicable in the first five years; the nine months 
is applicable from the ninth year on.  Special circumstances that can end 
a contract are if the tenant has at least three months of rent arrears or is 
causing a nuisance.  If the landlord or his family needed the home 
themselves, there may also be grounds for terminating the contract, 
provided this would not cause unacceptable inconvenience to the tenant.  




3-5 Since the 1950s German landlords have been treated as investors: 
revenues are taxed, costs are tax deductible (Kemp & Kofner, 2010).  
Nowadays this means that interest costs for debt are deductible.  Also 
normal maintenance investments are tax deductible in the year of 




as well as new investments are subject to linear depreciation (RWI, 
2009; see Appendix 1).  These aspects are considered normal investor 
tax treatment.  This also applies to the possibility to offset losses from 
renting from taxable income (Kemp & Kofner, 2010; information from 
experts). 
 
3-6 Capital gains from the sale of residential real estate is tax-free unless the 
building has not been held for more than ten years or the seller is a 
commercial real estate dealer (regular trader; Kemp & Kofner, 2010). 
 
3-7  Cooperatives whose rent revenues comprise more than 90% of 
revenues have fiscal non-profit status (BMVBS/BBR, 2007).  This implies 
that they are not paying corporate tax.  This fiscal non-profit status was 
available more broadly until 1990 (Haffner et al, 2009). 
 
3-8 Since its inception, the system of bricks-and-mortar subsidies has been 
designed as a concession model providing subsidies for any landlord for 
the temporary provision of subsidised rental housing to specified target 
groups.  Loans with a lower-than-market (subsidised) interest rate are 
often available from a special financial institution owned by the federal 
states (the KfW Bankengruppe; Haffner & Oxley, 2009). After the 
subsidy period ends, the dwelling becomes a non-subsidised dwelling 
subject to the normal private rented sector-rules. 
 
Other incentives/disincentives for more overall investment in the 
sector 
 
3-9 Other ways the German government stimulates housing investment are: 
 
1. KfW Bankengruppe offers several programmes, under which there is 
one for energy-efficient building and one for the adaptation of 
dwellings for the use by elderly (BMVBS, 2010; information from 
experts).  In principle they offer either a loan with lower-than-market 
interest or a grant. 
2. The EnEV energy savings regulation has been applicable since 2002 
(BMVBS/BBR, 2007; information from experts).  It is obligatory since 
2007 for new buildings and for certain measures for existing 
dwellings.  It has been enforced since 2009.  It should increase 
investments in dwellings, as it requires owners to make new 
investments to fulfil the requirements of the regulation on the one 
hand, as soon as the owner takes measures to modernise the 
housing stock or to replace the technical installations.  On the other 
hand it could give rise to hesitation as long as investment costs are 
not covered by market rents. 
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1.1 This report builds on the report produced in March 2010 on an overview 
of the private rented sector in England.  This formed a baseline study to 
the same format as the other ‘Stage Three’ countries.  It primarily 
focused on a commentary on data and information on the trends in the 
sector together with a brief policy analysis. 
 
1.2 The overall aim of this report is to set the scene for an informed 
discussion on promoting investment in private rented housing supply 
through a comparative perspective.  The more specific objectives are 
fourfold and these are to: 
 
• Provide a succinct account of the private rented sector to a similar 
format adopted for the other ‘Stage Three’ countries i.e. Australia, 
France, Germany and the USA. 
 
• Highlight current policy initiatives at the national and local levels. 
 
• Set out the prospects for and issues facing the sector. 
 
• Begin to consider the lessons that can be learnt from other countries, 
which is taken forward further in the final overall report. 
 
1.3 The next section provides an overview of the private rented sector.  This 
is followed by a focus on the trends in the size, demand and supply 
aspects.  Section four outlines the policy framework and this is followed 
by a description of new initiatives.  Section six briefly investigates the 
investment framework over the last two decades, while section seven 
summarises the immediate prospects.  The final section begins to 
consider the relevance of the experiences from other countries.  There 
are also two summaries provided. 
 
1.4 The evidence is drawn from published secondary sources and there is 
an extensive bibliography at the end of this report.  No primary research 
has been undertaken.  Extensive use has been made of the 
Government-commissioned study of the private rented sector by Rugg 
and Rhodes (2008a and 2008b)29. 
 
1.5 The primary focus of this report is on England and not on Great Britain or 
the United Kingdom.  The policy rationale for this is that housing is a 
‘devolved task’ i.e. it is the responsibility of the national governments in 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  It is, nevertheless, 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting that a similar review has been undertaken in Scotland – see Scottish 




recognised that for the purposes of the overall project many aspects of 
institutional investment (such as taxation and fiscal strategies) are not 





2.1 The following table provides data on the private rented sector in England 
between 1971 and 2007. 
 
Table 1: Key Characteristics on the Private Rented Sector in England 
 
Year Number of Dwellings 
Percentage of 
Housing Stock 
Condition of Stock : Proportion 
of private rented properties not 
meeting decent homes 
standard30  
197131  3.1m 19.3% NA 
1976 2.3m 13.6% NA 
1981 2.0m 11.3% NA 
1986 2.0m 10.3% NA 
1991 1.8m 9.0% NA 
1996 2.1m 10.1% 62.4% 
2001 2.1m 10.1% 50.7% 
2006 2.7m 12.2% 46.8% 
2007 2.9m 12.9% 45.4% 
 
Source: Wilcox, S. (ed) (2009), UK Housing Review 2009/2010, Coventry & London, Chartered 
Institute of Housing and the Building Societies Association, Tables 17 a and 23a. 
 
Points to note: There is no reliable information on the contribution of the private rented sector to 
new house building. 
 
2.2 The major overall features of the sector are: 
 
• A century of decline followed by a recent revival: Approximately 75 
per cent of households were in the private rented sector after the 
First World War, but this declined to less than 10 per cent by 1991.  
By the end of 2007, this had increased to approximately 13 per cent 
of households living in the sector.  Seventy per cent of households 
were home owners and 17 per cent were social renters. 
 
• Approximately one million additional households were renting in 2008 
compared with the late 1980s. 
 
• The overall quality of accommodation is poor: Over 45 per cent of 
properties did not meet the national decent homes standard in 2007. 
 
• According to Rugg & Rhodes (2008b, pp3-4), four interrelated factors 
account for the revival of the sector over the last two decades: 
                                                 
30 Decent homes standard definition was changed in 2006.  It became a higher standard. 




- Housing Act, 1988: This introduced shorthold tenancies and 
lifted rent restrictions on new tenancies. 
- Recession in the early 1990s leading to owner occupiers 
renting out properties because of an inability to sell. 
- Expansion of demand, for example, students as a result of the 
growth in the higher education sector. 
- Availability of buy-to-let mortgages which encouraged 
individuals to purchase properties to rent. 
 
• Detailed information on the relative importance of each of these 
factors is not readily available.  There has been, for example, 
considerable media coverage on buy-to-let.  But as Rugg & Rhodes 
(2008b, p11) point out, although there are over one million buy-to-let 
mortgages, many landlords were using this financial product to 
refinance their existing stock portfolio rather than purchase newly 
built apartments and flats in city centres. 
 
• The private rented sector is diverse and fragmented. Rugg & Rhodes 
(2008b, pxiv) identify ten distinct sub-markets: 
- young professionals 
- students 
- housing benefit market 
- slum rentals 
- tied housing 
- high income renters 
- immigrants 
- asylum-seekers 
- temporary accommodation and 
- regulated tenancies 
 
• Overall, the average age of heads of housing in the private sector are 
much younger than other tenures – over 50 per cent of private 
renters are under 35 compared to approximately 20 per cent of owner 
occupiers and 20 per cent of social renters. 
 
• Mobility is a key characteristic of the sector with over 80 per cent of 
households in the same property for less than five years and 40 per 
cent having moved at least once in the previous 12 months. 
 
• Equally diverse are the types and characteristics of landlords.  The 
sector can be characterised as having a few large private institutional 
and many small landlords32.  Rugg & Rhodes (2008b, pp128-130) 
note: 
- Nearly 50 per cent of private landlords are individuals and 25 
per cent are couples. 
- Individuals and couples accounted for 73 per cent of all 
landlords in 2006 compared to 61 per cent in 1993/94. 
                                                 
32 The largest institutional investment landlord is the Grainger Trust with over 13,000 properties 




- Private and public companies account for 15 per cent of all 
landlords in 2006 compared to 20 per cent in 1993/94. 
- Nearly 60 per cent of landlords own less than 5 properties in 
2006 compared to 43 per cent in 2003/04. 
- In 1993/94, 12 per cent of landlords owned more than 250 
properties but this had declined to 3 per cent by 2006. 
 
• It is estimated that in 2006 60 per cent of private sector landlords in 
England used agents to manage their properties.  This was up from 
37 per cent in 1993/4 (Rugg & Rhodes, 2008b). 
 
• Estimates for the UK, suggest that only about 80 per cent of the 
private rented sector stock is overtly traded in the sense of being 
provided through a market landlord or letting agency (Rhodes, 2006). 
 
3. Trends in the private rented sector 
 
3.1 A useful starting point is to classify trends in the dynamics of the private 
rented sector over the last two to three decades.  As a wide range of 
authors note, the long term decline of the sector ended in the late 1980s 
(see, for example, Crook and Kemp, 2002, Kemp, 2004, and Rugg & 
Rhodes, 2008b).  A number of stages can be identified: 
 
• A growth period from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s: A number of 
factors contributed to this situation including the liberalisation 
associated with the introduction of shorthold and assured shorthold 
tenancies and the lifting of rent restrictions on new tenancies.  In 
addition, the owner-occupied housing crash was significant with 
households renting out properties that they were unable to sell.  The 
number of private rented dwellings increased from 1.8m to 2.1m 
between 1991 and 1996. 
 
• A period of stability from the mid 1990s and early 2000s:  The 
number of private rented dwellings did not change between 1996 and 
2001, even though buy-to-rent mortgages became readily available 
from 1998. 
 
• A second growth period from the early 2000s onwards: The number 
of private rented dwellings increased from 2.1m in 2001 to 2.9m in 
2007.  This is popularly referred to in magazines such as ‘Landlord & 
Buy-to-Let’33, as the ‘buy to let boom’. 
 
3.2 A number of commentators (such as Rugg & Rhodes, 2008b) have 
argued that the role of buy-to-rent has been overstated.  For example, 
many buy-to-let mortgages were used for re-mortgaging purposes.  A 
more plausible analysis is that the growth of the private rented sector 
over the last decade reflects broader supply and demand trends in the 
                                                 




housing and labour markets.  Access to owner occupation, especially for 
first time buyers, became less affordable, while the opportunities to 
become a social housing tenant were reduced because of the increase 
in the size of housing registers.  Existing and potential landlords 
responded to these demand drivers. 
 
3.3 Similarly, the changes in demand have been fuelled by labour market 
factors.  These include: 
 
• Greater mobility requirements in some occupational sectors 
especially in the early stages of working careers, for example, 
financial services. 
 
• Growth in the higher and further education sectors with the number of 
individuals in full time education increasing from 1.4 million in 
1995/96 to nearly 2 million in 2006/07. 
 
• Migrant workers from Eastern European countries (often referred to 
as A8 countries). 
 
3.4 These trends have altered the demand side of the sector.  As was 
pointed out in the previous section, there are a number of sub-
sectors/niche markets.  The growth over the last two decades has been 
in especially the young professional sector, students and immigrants.  In 
addition, councils have increasingly made use of the private rented 
sector for accommodation for homeless households (see below).  
Declining sub-sectors have included tied accommodation (particularly in 
rural areas) and long established tenants with regulated tenancies. 
 
3.5 From a supply perspective, the key trend has been the relative growth of 
small scale landlordism at the expense of companies.  In 2006, 
approximately 75 per cent of landlords were private individuals or 
couples and 10 per cent were property companies. The respective 
figures for the early/mid 1990s were 60 per cent and over 15 per cent.  
Nevertheless, these overall trends do hide a number of developments 
over the last decade.  Firstly, larger housing associations have been 
setting up subsidiaries that provide market rented accommodation.  
Places for People, for instance, through its Blueroom subsidiary, own 
over 5,000 properties.  Secondly, the student market has seen the rise of 
new niche providers.  These include Unite that owns over 125 properties 
in 24 cities and provide 38,300 bedspaces with a further 1,200 new 
spaces to be available during 2010. 
 
3.6 The geography of private renting is also diverse and changing.  At a 
regional level in 2001, over 16 per cent of households in Greater London 
were in the private rented sector compared to 8 per cent in the North 
East.  At a local authority level, there were a number of inner London 
Boroughs with substantial private rented sectors including the London 
Borough of Westminster with over 35 per cent.  There is also a 




Rhodes (2008b, p36) highlight that in the North East in 2001, over 20 per 
cent of households in wards classified as rural villages were in the 
private rented sector.  However, as has already been pointed out in this 
report, a major but declining contributory factor in rural areas is tied 
accommodation. 
 
3.7 These complex trends are leading to a growing consensus that there is a 
‘modern private rented sector’ emerging that provides flexible and 
affordable accommodation for younger households (see, for instance, 
Rhodes, 2006).  Nevertheless, care is required in not over-stating this 
trajectory or implicitly suggesting an exaggerated optimism for the future.  
Factors to bear in mind include: 
 
• The vast majority of households aspire to owner-occupation. 
 
• Most households experience private renting at some stage in their 
housing life cycle, but it provides homes for life for very few people. 
 
• The private rented sector fulfils an important but specialist role in the 
housing market and this varies considerably by area. 
 
• The structure of the supply side suggests a decline in interest among 
traditional property companies but potentially the rise of new 
corporate players. 
 
• The majority of landlords are individuals and couples holding less 
than five properties.  This is sometimes referred to as ‘small-scale 
landlordism’ and a ‘cottage industry’ i.e. private renting is not 
regarded as the prime source of income34.  But this is not to suggest 
that small landlords necessarily offer a poor service or product 
compared with corporate organisations. 
 
4. Policy framework 
 
4.1 As has already been pointed out, the Government commissioned a study 
of the private rented sector in 2007.  Rugg & Rhodes (2008a and 2008b) 
sub-titled their study as the ‘contribution and potential’ of the sector.  It 
together with other reports (for example, Bill et al, 2008), commentaries 
(for example, Wilcox, 2008) and recent developments (for example, HM 
Treasury, 2010) have highlighted a number of interrelated national policy 
areas including demand and supply, fiscal policy, and stock quality and 
property management.  The key issues affecting each of these areas are 
outlined below.  This is followed by a brief discussion of the neglected 
issue of a local policy framework (see Davies, 2007). 
 
Demand and supply 
 
                                                 




4.2 The previous sections highlighted a degree of uncertainty over the future 
trends.  But the consensus is that there is likely to be a continuing rise in 
demand because of the difficulties of households in meeting their 
aspirations for owner occupation and the shortage of social rented 
property.  The role of the ‘modern private rented sector’, thus, appears to 
fill a gap in the housing market that meets the demand at one or more 
points in housing life cycle of households.  It is not a ‘sector for life’. 
 
4.3 Changes in supply have been a response to demand pressures.  The 
impact of buy-to-let has been to increase supply with a minimum impact 
on overall house price inflation (NHPAU, 2008).  Nevertheless, a number 
of cities are reported to have faced the prospects of dealing with a glut of 
city centre apartments that have been difficult to let.  There has also 
been an entry into the market of new players such as large housing 
associations and specialist student housing providers (for exaple, Unite). 
 
4.4 A linked theme in the debate on supply has been the frequent assertion 
that the private rented sector could make a much more significant 
contribution to increasing new housing output (see, for instance, Bill et 
al, 2006 and 2008, and the Property Industry Alliance et al, 2010).  This, 
however, raises a number of challenging issues and questions.  To what 
extent, for example, would this be a substitute for social housing or 
owner-occupied properties?  What would be the organisational and fiscal 
models needed to achieve higher outputs?  Does this type of supply 
necessitate a more radical perspective on the role of private renting – 
does it become a ‘home for life’? 
 
4.5 The Chartered Institute of Housing in a recent briefing paper suggest 
that there is a role for a ‘more dynamic, affordable rented sector’ than 
one currently based on two independent tenures – social renting and 
private renting (Davies and Lupton, 2010)35.  It is also worth noting that a 
study by Hometrack reported in Inside Housing revealed that 15,000 
households allocated general needs homes in 2009 would have had 
enough income to afford intermediate renting (Brown, 2010). 
 
4.6 The crucial point is, however, that there is a political and social 
consensus in favour of meeting the aspirations of households to become 
owner occupiers.  The new Minister for Housing in the coalition 
government highlighted this in his first policy speech on the ‘age of 
aspiration’36. 
 
4.7 The fundamental policy options on the future role of the private rented 
sector are: 
 
• Maintaining the ‘modern private rented sector’ in its role of meeting 
household requirements at certain points in the life cycle. 
 
                                                 
35 The potential parallels with Sweden and its integrated rental sector are interesting in this 
respect – see also final section of this report. 




• Transforming private renting into a tenure of choice and aspiration. 
 
• Creating an integrated dynamic affordable rented sector. 
 
4.8 The first option requires relatively minor changes, while the latter two 
explicitly push towards radical changes in housing policy across all 
tenures as well as in fiscal policy. 
 
Fiscal policy (see also section six) 
 
4.9 There is an acknowledgement that the national fiscal regime favours 
owner occupation.  This has been evident for many decades since the 
abolition of Schedule A taxation37 for home owners in the early 1960s.  
There appears, however, to be little political appetite to review this 
situation.  Instead there have been and continue to be a series of 
measures to encourage institutional investment through, for example, 
Residential Business Expansion schemes in the early 1990s, Housing 
Investment Trusts and, more recently, Real Estate Investment Trusts.  
These generally have not been successful – see Bill et al (2008), Cook 
and Kemp (2002), Jones (2007) and the Property Industry Alliance et al 
(2010). 
 
4.10 The Treasury are currently consulting on the issue of encouraging more 
investment in the sector.  It will be interesting over the next few months 
to analyse the responses and suggestions especially in the light of 
earlier contributions by the Smith Institute (see Bill et al, 2006 and 2008).  
These highlighted that a wide range of fiscal measures were necessary 
such as changes to Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT), the encouragement 
of tax efficient investment vehicles and changes to VAT.  They also 
emphasised that fiscal measures had to be seen as part of a broader 
package of creating a level playing field on taxation and changes to the 
planning system for landlords and investors. 
 
4.11 Nevertheless, the debate on investment, taxation and planning has to be 
located within the policy arena of the future role of the sector (see 
above). 
 
Stock quality and property management 
 
4.12 The poor overall quality of private rented sector has already been 
highlighted.  Although improvements have taken place in the last 
decade, national policy has prioritised social rented properties and the 
decent homes standard over the private rented sector.  Regulatory 
measures such as landlord accreditation schemes are aimed at tackling 
this issue. 
 
                                                 
37 Schedule A taxation relates to income from land and property.  Landlords pay tax on their 
rent receipts while owner occupiers have not done so since 1963.  There is a recent review 
article on this issue – see Welham, P. (2007) The Tax Treatment of Owner-Occupier Housing 




4.13 There has been a strong emphasis in the debates on the private rented 
sector on the need to ‘professionalise’ private rented sector 
management.  It is argued that this would contribute to improved stock 
quality and better relations between tenants and landlords.  There are a 
number of policy aspects including regulatory regimes based on, for 
instance, accreditation and licensing schemes for private landlords.  
Local authorities are responsible for implementing these types of 
measures.  One of the themes emerging from the debate on the Rugg 
Review was the appropriateness of tighter regulations and tougher 
sanctions (see Stubbings, 2010).  However, the new coalition 
government has recently announced that it is not intending to proceed 
with plans to introduce new regulations covering, for instance, a national 
register of landlords, regulation of letting and managing agents, and 
compulsory written tenancy agreements38.  Instead the emphasis will be 
on councils making use of their existing powers – many of which are 
discretionary. 
 
4.14 There are also debates on security of tenure.  As has already been 
noted, the introduction in 1988 of shorthold tenures and later assured 
shorthold tenancies (along with lifting rent restrictions on new tenancies) 
contributed to the growth in the sector.  Nevertheless, it is argued that 
assured shorthold tenancies provide only limited security for tenants.  
Wilcox (2008) argues that there is a case for making modest changes in 
the legislation to give a greater degree of security in exchange for tax 
incentives to improve the quality of the stock. 
 
4.15 The trade off between security of tenancy, stock condition and a more 
favourable investment climate presents an interesting policy agenda.  
Again, however, its relevance depends on the future role of the sector. 
 
The local policy dimension  
 
4.16 Councils through their regulatory role play an important part in the 
private rented sector at the local level.  As Davies (2007) has pointed 
out, this has been a neglected area of housing strategy – ‘a cinderella 
service’.  There are a number of factors that have contributed to this 
situation.  Firstly, local housing strategies tend to focus on issues such 
as stock condition in the private sector (i.e. owner occupation and private 
renting – with the latter being marginalised) and empty homes.  Secondly 
the emphasis is on individual regulation of private landlords. 
 
4.17 Davies (2007) suggests, however, that there is potential for a strategic 
enabling role for councils, which could involve: 
 
• A focus on geographical concentration on neighbourhoods with high 
levels of private rented sector in poor condition (as has been 
happening in most of the housing market renewal pathfinders). 
 
                                                 




• An emphasis on the opportunities and challenges of the student 
housing market. 
 
• The potential of private rented property to meet the needs of 
homeless households. 
 
• Integrating private rented property into choice-based lettings 
schemes. 
 
4.18 There are clearly opportunities for councils and the Homes and 
Communities Agency to think strategically about the role of the private 
rented sector through the single conversation process and the local 
investment plans and agreements. 
 
4.19 Nevertheless, this type of facilitating role presupposes that the current 
role of the private rented sector is maintained. 
 
5. New initiatives 
 
5.1 There have been two significant national developments over the last 
twelve months linked to institutional investment in the private rented 
sector as well as a number of local initiatives.  The two national 
developments are as follows: 
 
• The Treasury announced as part of its Pre-Budget Statement in 
December 2009 that it intended to issue a consultation paper on 
investment in the sector.  This was published in February 2010 (HM 
Treasury, 2010).  It argues that the sector could contribute to tackling 
the under-supply of new housing in the UK.  A number of issues are 
raised including encouraging both individual and institutional 
investment with the emphasis on the latter.  The consultation on 
these proposals closed at the end of April 2010. 
 
• The Homes and Communities Agency, which is the housing and 
regeneration agency for England, initiated work in 2009 on securing 
institutional investment for private rented housing39.  In February 
2010, it announced it was seeking expressions of interest for six sites 
in London that will be led by a consortia headed either by a private 
rental fund investor or a major contractor/builder40.  It is understood 
that over 60 expressions of interest were received from a diverse 
range of stakeholders including developers, housing associations 
and land owners. In April 2010, Regeneration and Renewal reported 
that two out of four potential investors (Aviva and Aegon) had 
announced their willingness to participate in this initiative (Carpenter, 
2010). 
 
                                                 
39 For more details, see http://www.homesandcommunities.co.uk/Private-Rental-Sector-
Initiative. 




5.2 The key driver for both of these initiatives has been to attract investment 
into the private rented sector so as to increase overall output of new 
housing.  It is less clear as to the intended role of the new development 
in the private rented sector funded through these schemes (see above). 
 
5.3 At the local level, there have also been a series of interesting 
developments.  Regeneration and Renewal reported that Birmingham 
City Council has accepted a planning agreement for a scheme that 
involves 26 per cent of provision in the form of intermediate rent of 80 
per cent of market value for 21 years (Marrs, 2010).  This is instead of 
the normal policy of 35 per cent affordable homes.  The city council has 
also been reported as agreeing the business case for a joint venture with 
an institutional investor to provide up to 1,500 family homes for private 
renting. 
 
5.4 The example of the planning agreement illustrates the challenge of 
balancing long term need with a pragmatic response to the recession.  
On the one hand it is important to ensure that housing development is 
not constrained in the current financial situation by existing requirements 
for affordable housing provision.  But on the other hand, there is growing 
pressure faced by councils and housing associations to tackle the 
increase in the number of households on housing registers. 
 
6. Policies for investment in the private rented 
sector 
 
6.1 There have been a number of studies of specific measures to attract 
institutional investment into the private rented sector (for example, Crook 
and Kemp, 2002, on housing investment trusts, and Jones, 2007, on real 
estate investment trusts).  Bill et al (2008, p5) comment, 
 
“Real estate investment trusts have failed to encourage the 
building of homes for rent, nor have they helped professionalise 
the rented sector.  Both these aims were central to the policy 
introduced after years of debate in January 2007.  So what now?” 
 
6.2 The conclusions over the lack of success of these initiatives are similar.  
Firstly, the rules governing these instruments do not reflect the standard 
operating procedures of property companies and are not attractive to 
institutional investors.  The Property Industry Alliance (2010) and Bill et 
al (2006 and 2006) further confirm this comment.  Secondly, the existing 
structure of the private rented sector comprising small landlords and a 
pepper potting of units is a disincentive.  Economies of scale in property 
management are required and can only be achieved primarily from 
geographical proximity.  Large scale sustained investment by companies 






6.3 As has already been pointed out, new specialist niche markets are 
emerging, for example, student provision.  But as Bill et al (2006 and 
2008) note there are a number of bigger conditions (as well as fiscal 
instruments) that would need to be met to attract large scale institutional 
investment to achieve 40 to 50,000 new properties per year.  Yet there is 
considerable potential.  The Property Industry Alliance (2010) notes that 
the top ten investment managers have approximately £62 billion of 
property under investment, but only 1 per cent is invested in residential 
property.  The bigger conditions include: 
 
• Need for a long term perspective and consensus on the role of the 
sector and the financial, planning and taxation policies.  It is argued 
that there have been far too much short-termism and pragmatic 
approaches. 
 
• Maintaining a healthy property investment market as housing is a 
subset of the ‘property asset class’.  But, as pointed out above, 
housing is effectively a new asset class and investors will only be 
attracted if, firstly, they can make substantial investments and, 
secondly, that it is attractive in terms of risks and returns relative to 
other major asset classes. 
 
• Reforming the planning system so that private rented property is not 
encouraged at the expense of social renting.  This could be achieved 
by creating a new use class or licensing system.  The latter might 
involve a requirement that a proportion of new homes would have to 
be rented out for a fixed period of time. 
 
• Rethinking the regulatory framework by, for example, simplifying the 
complex framework covering stock condition and landlord-tenant 
relations through a single comprehensive piece of legislation.  
Nevertheless as Bill et al (2008) point out, unfortunately much of the 
debate centres on a rather sterile argument over deregulation.  
Instead it is argued that a simplified comprehensive approach would 
create consistency and clarity for all parties. 
 
6.4 In relation to fiscal instruments, a wide range of suggestions has been 
put forward in recent years (and have been usefully summarised by the 
Property Industry Alliance, 2010): 
 
• Reform of Stamp Duty Land Tax to create a level playing field for 
institutional purchasers. 
 
• Changes to VAT including lowering the rate for refurbishment. 
 
• 100 per cent capital allowances to offset the refurbishment of homes 
for rent. 
 
• Reforming the rules on real estate investment trusts to allow for ones 





7. Immediate prospects 
 
7.1 There continues to be considerable debate on the future role and nature 
of the private rented sector (see, for example, Rugg & Rhodes, 2008a 
and 2008b, Wilcox, 2008).  The recent Treasury consultation paper on 
investment in the sector is likely to generate a further period of debate. 
 
7.2 An important strand to this debate is the impact of the economic 
recession.  There are a number of elements that point to possible 
retrenchment but also alternatively to growth.  They relate to the factors 
highlighted by Rugg & Rhodes (2008b) that have resulted in a revival of 
the sector over the last two decades including: 
 
• The lack of availability since 2008 of buy-to-let mortgages and its 
consequences for investment in the sector (but see above on the 
debate on the significance of buy-to-let). 
 
• A plateau-ing out effect of the rise in the number of full-time higher 
education students from 2010 because of a cut-back in government 
funding and short term targets. 
 
• The impact of the recession on owner-occupation and the likelihood 
that households that are unable to sell may resort to letting their 
property. 
 
7.3 At the same time, the focus has to take note of changes in the other 
tenures.  There is increasing demand for social housing that is unlikely to 
be met through a new affordable housebuilding programme.  
Furthermore, the lack of suitable mortgage products for first time-buyers 
is increasingly making it difficult for households to get on to the bottom 
rung of the owner occupation ladder.  Both of these drivers suggest a 
growing demand for private rented property.  However, as Wilcox (2008) 
notes, landlord behaviour is affected by declining returns and lower 
house price expectations.  Nevertheless, he points out that surveys of 
smaller landlords often emphasis their conservative-nature and a status 
quo position with a desire to retain ‘good tenants’. 
 
8. Learning the lessons from elsewhere 
 
8.1 A comparative perspective can be useful for contributing to a more 
informed debate about the role of the private rented sector.  Two 
justifications are usually put forward to justify such an approach.  These 
are ‘shock therapy’ (i.e. challenging existing opinions and thinking) and 
policy transfer.  Both are, however, subject to health warnings!  It is 
imperative that there is an appreciation of the different economic, 
political and social environments in different countries.  Therefore, a 
focus on overall quantitative data provides only a superficial picture.  The 




provide an appropriate balance between quantitative and qualitative 
information and, as such, useful comparisons can be drawn. 
 
8.2 A comparative perspective on private renting can challenge conventional 
thinking i.e. dispel a number of myths that have emerged from this case 
study of England: 
 
• Deregulation and a large private rented sector: Much of the thinking 
in this country is based on the misleading proposition that a large 
private rented sector requires a high degree of deregulation.  The 
case studies of France, Germany and the USA highlight that large 
private rented sectors exist with straightforward comprehensive 
regulations.  The key issue is one of better regulation rather than little 
or much regulation. 
 
• Over-emphasis on large scale institutional investment: Although there 
is a greater level of institutional investment in private renting in 
countries such as the USA, the sector is still dominated by small 
scale landlords.  In the debate on attracting institutional investment, 
there is a danger of neglecting the needs of existing landlords. 
 
• Institutional investment: This form of investment is well-established in 
countries such as Germany and the USA and is a result of long term 
consensus policies on the roles of all tenures as well as on the 
principles of fiscal incentives.  Changes in fiscal incentives (as well 
as, for example, planning policies) will not be effective unless there is 
an agreement over the future role of the private rented sector. 
 
• National and local policies: The examples of Germany and the USA 
illustrate that federal policies need to be considered along with 
regional and local strategies.  There has been relatively little debate 
in this country on the role of councils as strategic enablers of the 
private rented sector. 
9. Summary 1 
 
9.1 The private rented sector is diverse in terms of types of landlords, 
tenants and geographical patterns.  The function and role of the sector is 
varied with a number of niche markets.  Nevertheless, a key 
characteristic of the sector is a predominance of small scale landlords. 
 
9.2 There are continuing issues of poor housing conditions, tenants who are 
unclear over their rights and responsibilities, unsatisfactory management 
arrangements and a few unscrupulous landlords.  The scale and detailed 
nature of some of these issues are far from clear.  There have been on-
going attempts at national level to tackle some of these issues over the 





9.3 There have been significant changes in the private rented sector over 
the last two to three decades.  The long term decline has been reversed 
in relative and absolute terms.  There is a consensus that the sector is 
gradually being transformed into a ‘modern private rented sector’, which 
provides flexible and easy access accommodation for a young mobile 
population. 
 
9.4 There has been no explicit Government policy statement that clearly 
indicates the specific future role of the private rented sector in the 
housing market.  There have, however, been frequent 
acknowledgements that it performs an important function.  Clarity on this 
point is essential if a productive debate is to take place on additional 
investment. 
 
9.5 The existing and future role of the sector is inextricably linked with owner 
occupation and social renting.  For example, the difficulties faced by 
potential first time buyers may propel them to live in the private rented 
sector.  Similarly, households that are on housing registers but not in 
high or urgent need are unlikely to be housed in the social rented sector 
and may seek accommodation in the private rented sector.  
Nevertheless, it must be appreciated that the majority of households 
aspire to owner occupation. 
 
9.6 Investment in the private rented sector is a complex issue.  Buy-to-rent 
mortgages in the early/mid part of the last decade were significant but 
their importance is often overstated as a significant proportion were used 
for re-mortgaging purposes.  Attempts to establish large scale 
institutional investment through, for example, Residential Business 
Expansion Schemes, Housing Investment Trusts and Real Estate 
Investment Trusts have not been successful. 
 
9.7 It is often unclear as to the objective of additional investment.  It might be 
to provide new accommodation, improve existing properties or to enable 
landlords to build up portfolios by purchasing stock from other tenures.  
The impact of additional investment on owner occupation and the social 
rented sector may be both positive and negative.  For example, policy 
instruments that encourage landlords to buy up relatively low priced 
owner-occupied property might result in improved stock condition but 
could reduce the opportunities for first time buyers. 
 
9.8 Learning lessons from other countries is the standard justification for a 
comparative approach.  The experiences in other countries suggest that 
a number of myths and uncontested statements frequently made about 
the private rented sector in England can be challenged.  For example, it 
is possible to have a large viable sector with high degrees of regulation 
and security of tenure. 
 
9.9 In relation to additional investment, a key finding from other countries is 
the importance of long term consensus strategic principles on the role of 





10. Summary 2 
 
1. Approximately 13 per cent of households live in the private rented 
sector in England compared to10 per cent a decade ago. 
 
2. There is considerable diversity in the sector in terms of landlords, 
tenants and geographical patterns. 
 
3. There continues to be challenges in tackling issues such as poor 
stock condition. 
 
4. Although there are significant niche sub-markets, there is a growing 
consensus that the sector is gradually being transformed into a 
‘modern private rented sector’ that provides flexible and affordable 
accommodation primarily for young mobile households. 
 
5. The future of the sector is inextricably linked to the owner-occupied 
and social rented sectors.  Most households aspire to become owner-
occupiers. 
 
6. There has been no explicit statement by the Government on the 
detailed role of the private rented sector as part of the housing 
market. 
 
7. Attempts to attract investment into the sector have not been very 
successful. 
 
8. There can be unintended consequences for other tenures if policies 
for attracting additional investment are not specific and 
straightforward. 
 
9. There are a number of myths on promoting private renting that can 
be dispelled by investigating the sector in other countries.  It is 
possible to have a large viable private rented sector with high 
degrees of regulation and security of tenure. 
 
10. Significant additional investment in the sector is only likely if there is a 
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